Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Henry Gibson was a resident of Arnold Avenue Nursing Home (AA) in Greenville from 2001 until 2002. After being hospitalized in December 2002, Gibson was moved to another nursing home and died on January 26, 2003. Gibson's estate filed a wrongful-death action in 2004 seeking compensatory and punitive damages. The plaintiffs averred that Magnolia Healthcare, Inc., the owner of AA, and Foundation Health Services, Inc. were negligent in causing various injuries, some of which contributed to Gibson's death. The jury awarded $1.5 million in compensatory damages, which the trial court reduced to $500,000 for noneconomic damages and $75,000 for permanent disfigurement. The trial court refused to allow the jury to consider punitive damages. Plaintiffs appealed asserting: (1) whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow the jury to consider punitive damages; and (2) whether the statutory cap for noneconomic damages was constitutional. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no error in the trial court's refusing to allow the jury to consider punitive damages. The Court found that Plaintiffs failed to raise the constitutionality of the statutory cap before the trial court; thus that issue was procedurally barred. View "Estate of Henry Gibson v. Magnolia Healthcare, Inc." on Justia Law

A jury in DeSoto County found Defendant Jeremy Rogers guilty of statutory rape, sexual battery, and fondling of his twelve-year-old stepdaughter, Mary. Defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that he was denied a fair trial by introduction of extensive prior-bad-acts evidence, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Finding no merit to the issues Defendant raised on appeal after a review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction. View "Rogers v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

While attending a group-therapy session at St. Dominic’s Hospital (SDH) in 2005, Plaintiff Elizabeth Martin slipped and fell on a floor while it was being waxed. She alleged she received injury to both knees and sued SDH for negligence regarding her injuries allegedly caused by the fall. At the conclusion of the trial, SDH moved for a directed verdict, claiming that Plaintiff had not provided sufficient evidence to establish the proximate cause of her injury. The circuit court granted SDH's motion for a directed verdict, and Plaintiff timely filed an appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the circuit court and remanded the case for a new trial, finding that Plaintiff had provided enough evidence to create a question of fact for the jury to make a determination based on the totality of the evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed and found that the circuit court correctly granted SDH's motion for a directed verdict. View "Martin v. St. Dominic-Jackson Memorial Hospital" on Justia Law

A circuit court dismissed Plaintiff Jimmy Steven Fowler Jr.'s wrongful-death action for failing to timely serve presuit notice on the defendants as required by Mississippi Code Section 15-1-36(15) (Rev. 2003). The trial court denied Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that: (1) he presented evidence which raised a presumption of timely presuit notice; (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion for reconsideration; and (3) the defendants, John Paul White, M.D., Marilyn Lehman, R.N., and The Sanctuary Hospice House, Inc. (collectively, Sanctuary), waived the affirmative defense of lack of presuit notice because they failed to timely pursue the defense while actively participating in the litigation. Upon review of the circuit court record, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding the trial court's finding that Plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to create a presumption of presuit notice was supported by substantial evidence. The trial court was within its discretion in denying Plaintiff's Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration. And Plaintiff's waiver argument was procedurally barred because he raised it for the first time on appeal. View "Fowler v. White" on Justia Law

Defendant Tadise Seales was convicted of grand larceny following a jury trial in the Neshoba County Circuit Court. Defendant appealed his conviction, asserting that the trial court erred: (1) by not suppressing his confession; and, (2) in denying his motion for a directed verdict. "Finding no merit to either averment," The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Seales v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

In 1994, Defendant Joseph Patrick Brown (a.k.a. Peanut Brown) was convicted of capital murder for shooting a convenience-store clerk to death on August 8, 1992, during the commission of an armed robbery. Defendant was sentenced to death by lethal injection. His conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Supreme Court. On March 17, 1998, Defendant filed an application for post-conviction relief, which the Supreme Court granted in part, for the sole purpose of determining whether Defendant's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek an independent psychological evaluation of Defendant for use as mitigation evidence. A special judge appointed to hear the matter denied Defendant's petition for post-conviction relief, and Defendant appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion for discovery, as he failed to show "good cause" for his request. Furthermore, Defendant did not demonstrate that his trial counsel was ineffective in not introducing, as mitigation, a report of Defendant's psychological evaluation or in further investigating Defendant's psychological state. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court's decision to deny Defendant's petition for post-conviction relief. View "Brown v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Roxco, Ltd., was hired as the general contractor for several public-construction projects for the State of Mississippi, including four building projects at the University of Mississippi, Jackson State University, and Alcorn State University. State law requires that a certain percentage of the cost of construction be retained to ensure completion. However, Mississippi Code Section 31-5-15 (Rev. 2010) allows the contractor to access that retainage by depositing with the State other acceptable security. Pursuant to Section 31-5-15, Roxco substituted securities valued at $1,055,000, deposited in a safekeeping account at Trustmark National Bank. Upon being notified of Roxco's default, the State instructed Trustmark to transfer the funds from the treasury bills into the state treasury account. By letter, Roxco directed Trustmark not to transfer the funds from the treasury bills to the State's account. Notwithstanding Roxco's letter, Trustmark deposited the funds into the State's account. Roxco filed suit against Trustmark for breach of contract and conversion. Trustmark argued that Section 31-5-15 permitted the release of the funds in the safekeeping account. A jury found in favor of Roxco and awarded $3,720,000 in damages. Aggrieved, Trustmark appealed. Finding that the trial court should have granted the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Trustmark National Bank v. Roxco Ltd." on Justia Law

After Hurricane Katrina hit the Mississippi Gulf Coast in August 2005, W. C. Fore entered into a contract with Harrison County, Mississippi, to remove the large amount of debris that was left behind. The Mississippi State Tax Commission (MSTC) then assessed a fee of $1.00 per ton of debris removed. Fore appealed the assessment to the MSTC Board of Review, claiming that the fee did not apply to emergency waste removal. The Board of Review upheld the assessment. Fore appealed the Board of Review’s decision to the MSTC Full Commission, which also affirmed the assessment. Fore then appealed to the Harrison County Chancery Court, First Judicial District. The chancery court upheld the assessment, and Fore appealed to the Supreme Court. Finding that the MSTC's and chancery court's findings were supported by substantial evidence and that there was no misapprehension of the law, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "W. C. Fore, Inc. v. Miss. Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

These three consolidated appeals (all springing from a divorce granted in 1994) presented thirty-eight issues including one of first impression. A judgment creditor served writs of execution on two corporations whose restricted stock was owned by the judgment debtor, who then sold his stock back to the corporations. The chancellor dismissed the writs, holding that the sale of stock rendered them moot. Upon review of the case, the Supreme Court held that statutory restrictions on the transfer of restricted shares of corporate stock apply to both voluntary and involuntary transfers of the shares; that after a judgment creditor serves a corporation with a writ of execution regarding one of its shareholders, repurchasing the shareholder’s shares will not excuse the corporation from responding to the writ of execution by filing the statutorily required sworn statement; and that the judgment creditor may (to the extent allowed by Mississippi statutes and other applicable law) execute on all benefits due the judgment debtor by the corporation, including the purchase price of the judgment debtor’s stock. Because the Court reversed the chancellor on three issues and remanded for a new trial, and because the chancellor's resolution of those issues may affect the outcome of others, the Court held that all issues not specifically resolved in this opinion could be presented by the parties to the chancellor for adjudication. View "West v. West" on Justia Law

This Mississippi Tort Claims Act case arose from an accident that occurred in Wayne County, Mississippi, between a school bus and a four-door passenger car. Following the accident, the driver of the car Ernestine Worsham, brought suit alleging negligence and negligence per se on behalf of the driver of the school bus, and negligence, negligence per se, and gross negligence on behalf of Wayne County School District. After a bench trial, the driver of the school bus Natasha Middleton, was dismissed from the suit. And despite evidence that a local county supervisor unilaterally had placed the speed-limit signs on County Farm Road, without a traffic investigation, approval by the Board, or passage of an ordinance, the trial court found Middleton's actions constituted negligence per se, and thus awarded judgment in favor of Worsham. Wayne County timely appealed. Because Mississippi Code 63-3-511 (Rev. 2004) requires that "[w]henever local authorities, including boards of supervisors . . . determine and declare, by ordinance, a reasonable and safe speed limit," that such determinations be made "upon the basis of an engineering and traffic investigation," the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Wayne County Sch. Dist. v. Worsham" on Justia Law