Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This guardianship case began in the Youth Court for the City of Pearl. Petitioners Wanda Bell and Jane Dennis Morse requested that the case be transferred to the Rankin County Chancery Court. Later, Bell and Morse requested that the chancery court dismiss their petition, alleging that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. In addition to dismissing the case with prejudice, the chancellor awarded custody of the child to Frances Cathryn Dennis Finnegan, the child’s natural mother. Aggrieved, Bell and Morse appealed raising two issues: (1) whether the youth court erred by transferring the case to chancery court; and (2) whether the chancellor erred by awarding custody to Finnegan. Upon review, the Supreme Court determined the chancellor properly had jurisdiction of the case. However, the chancellor erred by dismissing the case and awarding custody to Finnegan without any on-the-record findings. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of the Guardianship of B.A.D." on Justia Law

Defendant Jeffrey Havard was found guilty of capital murder (murder during the commission of sexual battery) of six-month-old child. The jury also found that Defendant's sentence should be death, and the Adams County Circuit Court imposed the death sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence on direct appeal. His motion for rehearing was subsequently denied, as was his motion for post-conviction relief filed in 2007. Defendant sought habeas relief in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi; however, that case was stayed pending the outcome of his second motion for post-conviction relief before the Mississippi Supreme Court. Finding no merit in Defendant's successive motion for post-conviction relief, the Court denied his successive petition. View "Havard v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Lamar Hooker appealed a chancery court's grant of Stephen Greer's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, in which the court awarded attorney's fees to Greer based on Hooker's improper filing of a lis pendens, and Greer's Motion for Summary Judgment on Hooker's counterclaim. Greer and Hooker knew each other for more than thirty years, having worked together in multiple business ventures. In early 2002, Greer and Hooker entered into an agreement for the purchase, development, and sale of two tracts of land to which each made monetary contributions and participated in certain decisions regarding the development and marketing of the properties. In September 2003, Greer sent a letter to Hooker in which he cancelled their business arrangement. In this letter, he characterized the relationship as a "proposed joint venture" and declared such proposed venture "null and void." Greer claimed the venture was predicated on Hooker's ability to put up one half of the initial capital investment to purchase the properties, and that Hooker had failed to do so. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's finding that the lis pendens was improperly filed. However, because the trial court based the attorney's fees award on an improper interpretation of the Litigation Accountability Act, the Court reversed the judgment, vacated the award, and remanded for further consideration. Finally, the Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for Greer on Hooker's counterclaim, holding that his claim was subject to a three-year statute of limitations and was thus time-barred. View "Hooker v. Greer" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Court had the right, authority, and power to declare itself superior to and above both the other two branches of government in all matters of constitutional compliance. Attorney General Jim Hood asked the judicial branch of government to void several pardons, alleging that the applicants failed to publish notice as required by Section 124 of the Mississippi Constitution. After the Court received this appeal, Governor Barbour (who issued the pardons) submitted an amicus curiae brief, and the Court allowed his counsel to participate in oral argument. At oral argument, the Court asked Attorney General Hood to point out any pardon that was not facially valid, and he could not. The Court noted that the parties and Governor Barbour presented numerous issues for consideration, including: whether those who did not apply for a pardon were required to publish notice; whether the governor(and not the convicted felons) applied for some of the pardons; whether some of the pardons had any applicant at all; whether the publication provision requires four or five weekly publications; whether the governor, the attorney general, or the pardonees have the burden of proof; and whether the attorney general is estopped from objecting to the pardons. "No judicial duty is more central to the proper operation of our system of government than is [the Court's] duty to decide this issue correctly. . . . [the Court was] compelled to hold that – in each of the cases before us – it fell to the governor alone to decide whether the Constitution’s publication requirement was met."View "In Re: Charles Hooker, et. al." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this product liability/breach of warranty case was whether the trial judge abused his discretion in denying the defendants' motion to transfer venue when the plaintiff sued in the county where the product was located when the alleged defects first appeared and not where the product was purchased or repaired. Finding that the general venue statute, Mississippi Code Section 11-11-3(1)(a) (Rev. 2004), requires that the case be brought in the county where the product was purchased and/or repaired, the Court reversed and remanded the case for transfer to the proper venue. View "Laurel Ford Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Blakeney" on Justia Law

In 2004, Marvin Rhoda and Edith Weathers were involved in an automobile collision in Southaven. Rhoda sued Weathers alleging negligence, and the jury returned a verdict for Weathers. The Court of Appeals affirmed the jury's verdict, but reversed and remanded the trial court's refusal to assess sanctions against Weathers for failing to admit to certain requests made by Rhoda in discovery. The Supreme Court granted Weathers's petition for writ of certiorari to address only the issue of sanctions against Weathers. Upon review, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals on this issue and affirmed the circuit court's denial of Rhoda's request for sanctions. View "Rhoda v. Weathers" on Justia Law

Dr. Carroll Meador filed a complaint against Mississippi Baptist Health Systems, Inc. (MBHS), Trustmark National Bank (Trustmark), and Doe Defendants 1 through 10, for breach of fiduciary duties, interference with fiduciary duties, interference with contract rights, interference with prospective business advantage, intentional infliction of emotional distress, deceit, fraud, and retaliatory discharge. The complaint stemmed from the doctor's employment with MBHS and a large line of credit he obtained from Trustmark. A dispute between the parties ended with the bank suing the doctor for defaulting on the loan, and the doctor declaring bankruptcy. Several defendants sought to remove the case to the federal district court. The district court granted remand of the case, finding the federal bankruptcy proceedings in the case had been concluded and only state claims remained. Then Defendants Trustmark, MBHS and several codefendants filed a motion for summary judgment and motion to dismiss. The doctor appealed the ultimate outcome of the trial court's decision in favor of Defendants. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to strike portions of the doctor's affidavit, and in denying Trustmark and MBHS' motions for summary judgment. The Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Trustmark National Bank v. Meador" on Justia Law

Two appeals were consolidated from chancery-court cases. In the first case, Diamondhead Country Club and Property Owners Association, Inc. sued Thomas Alfonso, III, and Anne Scafidi Cordova (d/b/a Bay Jourdan Publishing Co., "BJP") for breach of a contract to publish "The Diamondhead News." In 1997, the chancery court entered a preliminary injunction order preventing BJP from publishing "The Diamondhead News," selling advertising for the paper, collecting or disposing of advertising revenues derived from the publication of the paper, and interfering with the printing, publication, or distribution of "The Diamondhead News." The chancery court also found that an arbitration clause in the publishing contract was inapplicable to the lawsuit. The chancery court denied BJP's two subsequent motions to compel arbitration of the breach-of-contract dispute. BJP appealed the chancery court's denial of arbitration. In the second case, BJP sued Diamondhead and Gulf Publishing Co., Inc. (d/b/a The Sun Herald) for intentional interference with the publishing contract. Gulf Publishing filed a motion for summary judgment. The court granted summary judgment to Gulf Publishing and directed the entry of a final judgment as to Gulf Publishing pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). BJP appealed that grant of summary judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court's order denying BJP’s second motion to compel arbitration because the issue was ruled upon previously, and no appeal was taken. Finding genuine issues of material fact for trial, the Court reversed the chancery court's order granting summary judgment to Diamondhead and Gulf Publishing, and remanded that case for further proceedings. View "Alfonso v. Gulf Publishing Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant Kevin Dale McCain was convicted of robbery. On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court addressed the permissibility vel non of a post-conviction amendment of Defendant's indictment to include habitual-offender status. In 2011, the Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence. Two days later, the Supreme Court's mandate issued in "Gowdy v. Mississippi," (56 S.3d 540 (Miss. 2011)), which held that a a post-conviction amendment of an indictment to include habitual-offender status "was prohibited[,]"such that the “enhanced portion” of Gowdy's sentence was vacated and his case was remanded for resentencing. Defendant's Motion for Rehearing on appeal contended that "Gowdy should apply to this case" and requested that the Court of Appeals "vacate [his] sentence and . . . have him resentenced under [Section] 97-3-73." The Court of Appeals denied Defendant's motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that in considering a post-conviction amendment of an indictment to include habitual offender status, the requirements of "a fair opportunity to present a defense" and no "unfai[r] surprise" are assessed on a case-by-case basis. In Defendant's case, both requirements were satisfied. The Court therefore affirmed Defendant's conviction for robbery and sentence of life as a habitual offender in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, without eligibility for parole or probation. View "McCain v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Defendant William Matthew Wilson was indicted in a multiple-count indictment for capital murder with the underlying felony of child abuse and for a separate count of felonious child abuse. He pled guilty to capital murder and to the separate child-abuse count. Defendant purportedly waived a sentencing hearing before a jury. He was sentenced to death for capital murder and to twenty years for felonious child abuse. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's death sentence, with the mandate issuing on December 10, 2009. Defendant timely filed his motion seeking post-conviction collateral relief. The Attorney General filed a response, and Defendant filed a reply to that response. Upon review of the claims raised, the Supreme Court found that Defendant established that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on certain grounds; therefore, his PCR motion is granted in part and denied in part. View "Wilson v. Mississippi" on Justia Law