Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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In 2006, Defendant Ladennis Graham pled guilty to simple possession of approximately twelve grams of cocaine. The circuit court sentenced Defendant to serve sixteen years in the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) with fifteen years to be suspended upon the successful completion of twelve months of house arrest, four years of supervised post-release supervision and completion of a community service program. While Defendant was on house arrest, MDOC determined he violated the conditions of his suspended sentence when he was arrested at his brother's house during the execution of a search warrant, which turned up a number of guns and narcotics. Defendant was required to serve the remainder of his sixteen-year sentence as an inmate. Defendant then filed a motion for post-conviction relief (PCR) which was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, the Court of Appeals found that Defendant's sentence was illegally vague and indeterminate, and remanded the case for revocation of Defendant's sentence if the circuit court or State chose to initiate such a proceeding. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals was correct in reversing the circuit court’s ruling that it did not have proper jurisdiction to hear Defendant's motion for post-conviction collateral relief. However, it was improper for the Court of Appeals to rule on the merits of Defendant's motion without the circuit court doing so first, as the circuit-court had exclusive, original jurisdiction. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was vacated; the circuit court judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Graham v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

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The Pascagoula School District (which contains a Chevron crude oil refinery and a Gulf liquified natural gas terminal) brought suit, seeking a declaration that a new law that mandated that revenue the District collected from ad valorem taxes levied on liquified natural gas terminals and crude oil refineries be distributed to all school districts in the county where the terminals and refineries were located was unconstitutional and requesting injunctive relief. All parties filed for summary judgment. After a hearing, the trial judge ruled that the law was constitutional, and the plaintiffs appealed that decision. Because the Supreme Court found the contested statute violated the constitutional mandate that a school district's taxes be used to maintain "its schools," it reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Pascagoula School District v. Tucker" on Justia Law

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Precious Martin and Associates, PLLC (Martin) contracted with T. Jackson Lyons & Associates, P.A. (Lyons) to handle appeal work on several of Martin's cases. After Martin stopped paying for the work, Lyons filed a complaint in the County Court alleging breach of contract and claiming $14,543.19 owed on open account. The county court awarded Lyons $14,543.19 in damages and $4,847.73 in attorney's fees. Martin appealed to the Circuit Court claiming that the trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees. The circuit court reversed the county court judgment on the basis that the agreement between the law firms was an oral contract, not an open account, such that attorney's fees should not have been awarded. Aggrieved, Lyons appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Court found that the circuit court's reversal of the award of attorney's fees was not supported by the evidence. The county court's award of attorney’s fees was supported by the credible evidence and was not an abuse of discretion. The judgment of the Circuit Court was reversed, and the judgment for attorney's fees entered by the County Court was reinstated and affirmed. View "T. Jackson Lyons & Associates, P. A. v. Precious T. Martin, Sr. & Associates, PLLC" on Justia Law

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Henry Gibson was a resident of Arnold Avenue Nursing Home (AA) in Greenville from 2001 until 2002. After being hospitalized in December 2002, Gibson was moved to another nursing home and died on January 26, 2003. Gibson's estate filed a wrongful-death action in 2004 seeking compensatory and punitive damages. The plaintiffs averred that Magnolia Healthcare, Inc., the owner of AA, and Foundation Health Services, Inc. were negligent in causing various injuries, some of which contributed to Gibson's death. The jury awarded $1.5 million in compensatory damages, which the trial court reduced to $500,000 for noneconomic damages and $75,000 for permanent disfigurement. The trial court refused to allow the jury to consider punitive damages. Plaintiffs appealed asserting: (1) whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow the jury to consider punitive damages; and (2) whether the statutory cap for noneconomic damages was constitutional. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no error in the trial court's refusing to allow the jury to consider punitive damages. The Court found that Plaintiffs failed to raise the constitutionality of the statutory cap before the trial court; thus that issue was procedurally barred. View "Estate of Henry Gibson v. Magnolia Healthcare, Inc." on Justia Law

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A jury in DeSoto County found Defendant Jeremy Rogers guilty of statutory rape, sexual battery, and fondling of his twelve-year-old stepdaughter, Mary. Defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that he was denied a fair trial by introduction of extensive prior-bad-acts evidence, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Finding no merit to the issues Defendant raised on appeal after a review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction. View "Rogers v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

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While attending a group-therapy session at St. Dominic’s Hospital (SDH) in 2005, Plaintiff Elizabeth Martin slipped and fell on a floor while it was being waxed. She alleged she received injury to both knees and sued SDH for negligence regarding her injuries allegedly caused by the fall. At the conclusion of the trial, SDH moved for a directed verdict, claiming that Plaintiff had not provided sufficient evidence to establish the proximate cause of her injury. The circuit court granted SDH's motion for a directed verdict, and Plaintiff timely filed an appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the circuit court and remanded the case for a new trial, finding that Plaintiff had provided enough evidence to create a question of fact for the jury to make a determination based on the totality of the evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed and found that the circuit court correctly granted SDH's motion for a directed verdict. View "Martin v. St. Dominic-Jackson Memorial Hospital" on Justia Law

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A circuit court dismissed Plaintiff Jimmy Steven Fowler Jr.'s wrongful-death action for failing to timely serve presuit notice on the defendants as required by Mississippi Code Section 15-1-36(15) (Rev. 2003). The trial court denied Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that: (1) he presented evidence which raised a presumption of timely presuit notice; (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion for reconsideration; and (3) the defendants, John Paul White, M.D., Marilyn Lehman, R.N., and The Sanctuary Hospice House, Inc. (collectively, Sanctuary), waived the affirmative defense of lack of presuit notice because they failed to timely pursue the defense while actively participating in the litigation. Upon review of the circuit court record, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding the trial court's finding that Plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to create a presumption of presuit notice was supported by substantial evidence. The trial court was within its discretion in denying Plaintiff's Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration. And Plaintiff's waiver argument was procedurally barred because he raised it for the first time on appeal. View "Fowler v. White" on Justia Law

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Defendant Tadise Seales was convicted of grand larceny following a jury trial in the Neshoba County Circuit Court. Defendant appealed his conviction, asserting that the trial court erred: (1) by not suppressing his confession; and, (2) in denying his motion for a directed verdict. "Finding no merit to either averment," The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Seales v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

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In 1994, Defendant Joseph Patrick Brown (a.k.a. Peanut Brown) was convicted of capital murder for shooting a convenience-store clerk to death on August 8, 1992, during the commission of an armed robbery. Defendant was sentenced to death by lethal injection. His conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Supreme Court. On March 17, 1998, Defendant filed an application for post-conviction relief, which the Supreme Court granted in part, for the sole purpose of determining whether Defendant's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek an independent psychological evaluation of Defendant for use as mitigation evidence. A special judge appointed to hear the matter denied Defendant's petition for post-conviction relief, and Defendant appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion for discovery, as he failed to show "good cause" for his request. Furthermore, Defendant did not demonstrate that his trial counsel was ineffective in not introducing, as mitigation, a report of Defendant's psychological evaluation or in further investigating Defendant's psychological state. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court's decision to deny Defendant's petition for post-conviction relief. View "Brown v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

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Roxco, Ltd., was hired as the general contractor for several public-construction projects for the State of Mississippi, including four building projects at the University of Mississippi, Jackson State University, and Alcorn State University. State law requires that a certain percentage of the cost of construction be retained to ensure completion. However, Mississippi Code Section 31-5-15 (Rev. 2010) allows the contractor to access that retainage by depositing with the State other acceptable security. Pursuant to Section 31-5-15, Roxco substituted securities valued at $1,055,000, deposited in a safekeeping account at Trustmark National Bank. Upon being notified of Roxco's default, the State instructed Trustmark to transfer the funds from the treasury bills into the state treasury account. By letter, Roxco directed Trustmark not to transfer the funds from the treasury bills to the State's account. Notwithstanding Roxco's letter, Trustmark deposited the funds into the State's account. Roxco filed suit against Trustmark for breach of contract and conversion. Trustmark argued that Section 31-5-15 permitted the release of the funds in the safekeeping account. A jury found in favor of Roxco and awarded $3,720,000 in damages. Aggrieved, Trustmark appealed. Finding that the trial court should have granted the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Trustmark National Bank v. Roxco Ltd." on Justia Law