Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant-Appellant David Shaffer was convicted of child exploitation for soliciting sex from a twenty-nine year old female who he thought was thirteen. He argued to the Court of Appeals that the could not be guilty of child exploitation because no actual child was involved in the sting. The Court of Appeals agreed, but reversed and remanded for Defendant to be sentenced for attempted child exploitation, a crime for which he was neither indicted nor tried. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the actual attempt to exploit a child violated the child exploitation statute. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated and affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence. View "Shaffer v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

John Fletcher, John McConnon, and Tom Leader (collectively, "Fletcher") appealed an order of the Chancery Court of Hancock County incorporating the City of Diamondhead, Mississippi. Fletcher argued that the chancery court lacked jurisdiction over the petition for incorporation because it did not include two-thirds of the signatures of the qualified electors residing in the proposed incorporation area, and notice was improper. Fletcher also argued that objectors to the incorporation were denied the right of cross-examination at the hearing, and that the second chancellor's failure to order a new trial was an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court found that the petition for incorporation met the jurisdictional requirements, because notice was proper and the petitioners presented substantial evidence that the petition contained two-thirds of the signatures of the qualified electors residing in the proposed incorporation area. Furthermore, the Court found that the chancellor did not deny the objectors' right of cross-examination, and the second chancellor's decision not to order a new trial was within his discretion. View "Fletcher v. Diamondhead Incorporators" on Justia Law

Charles Phillips and RJK Investments, LLC, appealed a circuit court's order dismissing with prejudice all of its claims pursuant to a compromise and settlement order entered in the United States Bankruptcy Court. Phillips, through RJK, owned and managed a restaurant franchise. After a fire damaged the restaurant, Defendants Joey Kelley and other creditors attempted to seize control of the remaining assets. Phillips and RJK sued the creditors on multiple grounds. While this case was pending, Phillips individually filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court's order plainly directed the trustee to execute an Order of Dismissal as to all claims in this action. The order released the defendants from any further responsibility and liability, which necessarily would include any claims of RJK. Accordingly, the Supreme Court found that the trial court did not err in dismissing Phillips' and RJK's suit. View "Phillips v. Kelley" on Justia Law

After a mistrial, Defendant Stephan Hickman was retried and found guilty of capital murder with the underlying felony of robbery. The circuit court sentenced Hickman to life without parole in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erroneously restricted his right to cross-examine a witness in violation of his right to confrontation, and that the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction. View "Hickman v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance filed a formal complaint against Judge Teresa Brown Dearman for violating Canons 1 (charging judges to establish, maintain, and enforce high standards of conduct to uphold the integrity of the judiciary), 2A (charging judges to act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary), 2B (charging judges to avoid lending the prestige of their office to advance the private interests of others), and 3B(2) (charging judges to be faithful to the law and not to be swayed by partisan interests), when she initiated a telephone call to a circuit court judge in Florida. The Commission averred that Judge Dearman reached the voice mailbox of the Florida judge's judicial assistant, identified herself as a judge in Mississippi, and recommended that bond be set for a longtime friend and criminal defendant. It further averred that Judge Dearman personally guaranteed the defendant’s appearance if bond was granted. The Commission recommended that Judge Dearman be publicly reprimanded and ordered to pay $100 in costs, but the Supreme Court found the recommendation insufficient. The Court ordered that Judge Dearman be suspended from office for thirty days without pay in addition to a public reprimand and costs of $100. View "Mississippi Comm'm on Judicial Performance v. Dearman" on Justia Law

The "last will and testament" of Ted Watkins named his ex-stepdaughter Petitioner Diana Kinsey as executrix of his estate, and bequeathed all of his property to her. A year following his death, the estate was closed, and Petitioner was discharged from her executrix duties. Several years later, she filed a wrongful-death action against various silica-related entities in circuit court for Mr. Watkins' death from silicosis. The defendants moved to dismiss the claim as barred by the applicable statutes of limitations or alternatively, that Petitioner lacked standing to file the action. The circuit court dismissed all defendants with prejudice. In its review of the case, the Supreme Court only dealt with the issue of whether Petitioner's claim was time barred by the statute of limitations, and indeed found that her claim was so barred. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment dismissing Petitioner's action. View "Kinsey v. Pangborn Corp. et. al." on Justia Law

This case came before the Supreme Court on an interlocutory appeal from circuit court. The issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in failing to apply premises-liability law and denying Double Quick, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment. The matter arose from a shooting that occurred in the parking lot of a Double Quick convenience store. George Ford, accompanied by his young son, entered Double Quick to make a purchase. Shortly afterward, Cassius Gallion entered the store. Ford and Gallion exchanged words. Gallion exited the store first. Then Ford left the store to pump gas into his car. Because she was worried that Ford and Gallion would fight, the assistant store manager accompanied Ford and helped Ford’s son into the car. At the gas pumps, Ford and Gallion again exchanged words. Mario Moore, who had arrived at the Double Quick but had not yet been inside, approached Ford’s car, intervened in the argument, and threw a punch at Ford. Mario missed Ford, but struck Jackson, who then returned to the store and called the police. Ford then retrieved a pistol from the trunk of his car and shot Mario. Mario died as result of his injury. Dorothy Moore, as administrator of Mario’s estate, filed suit against Double Quick arguing that Double Quick had neglected to protect Mario from injury and death while he was on the store’s premises. The trial court denied both parties' motions for summary judgment. The trial court held that the case was more similar to a basic negligence action against an employee of Double Quick than a premises-liability action, and that a jury should determine whether the manager's actions were the proximate cause of Mario's injuries. Double Quick appealed the portion of the order denying it summary judgment. "In premises-liability cases, there are two ways to establish legal causation, or foreseeability, in cases of assault by a third person: the requisite 'cause to anticipate' the assault may arise from actual or constructive knowledge of the assailant's violent nature, or actual or constructive knowledge that an atmosphere of violence exists on the premises." The Supreme Court found that there was no suggestion in the record that the store manager had any knowledge of Ford's violent nature. Moore failed to prove that the injury was reasonably foreseeable, or that the manager's behavior was the proximate cause of Mario's injury. Accordingly, the Court held that the trial judge should have granted Double Quick's motion for summary judgment. View "Double Quick, Inc. v. Moore" on Justia Law

This case was an interlocutory appeal from a circuit court which granted the "Motions to Compel Arbitration" of Pass Marianne, LLC (Pass) and Alfonso Realty, Inc. (Alfonso). On appeal, the Supreme Court considered: (1) whether Pass waived its right to arbitration, and (2) whether a principal’s waiver of its contractual right to arbitrate operates to waive that right for its agent. In 2005, Pass entered into a contract with Carl E. Woodward, LLC (Woodward) for the construction of a new condominium development, Pass Marianne Condominiums, in Pass Christian, Mississippi. In February, Pass and Lemon Drop Properties, LLC (Lemon Drop) entered into a "Preconstruction Sales and Purchase Agreement" for Unit No. 209 within the Pass Marianne Condominiums. Because of Hurricane Katrina, construction of the Pass Marianne Condominiums was not completed until 2007. On October 3, 2007, Pass executed a warranty deed conveying Unit No. 209 to Lemon Drop, and Woodward furnished a "Warranty of Completion of Construction" to Lemon Drop. On October 28, 2008, Lemon Drop filed a Complaint in the circuit court against Pass and Woodward, which sought, inter alia, rescission of the Agreement due to alleged defects in design and construction. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that while Pass waived its right to compel arbitration, that waiver was not imputed to its agent, Alfonso. As there was no evidence of waiver by Alfonso, it should have been entitled to proceed in arbitration. Therefore, as to Alfonso the Court affirmed the circuit court's order granting arbitration was affirmed. But regarding Pass, Court reversed and remanded the circuit court's order for further proceedings. View "Lemon Drop Properties, LLC. v. Pass Marianne, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Pamela Lynn Lawson appealed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the Defendant Honeywell International, Inc., on her Mississippi Products Liability Act (MPLA) claim and her negligence claim arising from injuries she sustained when her seatbelt buckle allegedly malfunctioned during an automobile accident. On July 31, 2005, Plaintiff lost control of her 1999 Jeep Cherokee while driving from Clara to Waynesboro, Mississippi. The vehicle veered off the highway and rolled over several times before coming to a stop. Plaintiff claimed that, although she had her Gen-3 seat belt buckle correctly fastened at the time of the accident, a defective design in the buckle caused it to malfunction and disengage, resulting in her ejection from the vehicle. Plaintiff alleged she suffered severe injuries as a result. She filed this action against Honeywell whom she alleged originally designed the Gen-3 seat belt buckle before selling it to Chrysler in the mid-1990s. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment as to Plaintiff's MPLA claim, finding Honeywell was not the "manufacturer" of the buckle for purposes of liability under the MPLA. However, the Court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment as to Plaintiff's negligence claim, and remanded for trial, as the MPLA does not preclude common-law claims of negligence against a nonmanufacturing and nonselling designer of a product. View "Lawson v. Honeywell International, Inc. " on Justia Law

The Hancock County Chancery Court granted Stacy Ruth Carambat a divorce from James Edward Carambat on the ground of habitual and excessive drug use. James appealed, arguing that the chancellor erred by granting the divorce, because his marijuana use did not affect the marriage, was not excessive, and was not akin to using opium, morphine, or other, like drugs. The couple married in 1993, and had twin boys in 1999. The couple separated in 2008 and Stacy filed for divorce later that year. Before the couple married, Stacy knew that James regularly smoked marijuana, and James admitted that he had been smoking marijuana since he was fourteen years old. James continued smoking marijuana throughout the marriage. Although the couple had conversations about James’s need to cease his marijuana use, James stated Stacy never asked him to quit. Stacy thought James would stop his drug use once the twins were born. Stacy alleged three grounds for divorce: irreconcilable differences, habitual cruel and inhuman treatment, and habitual and excessive drug use. She requested custody of the twins, child support, equitable distribution of the assets, alimony, and attorney’s fees. James answered Stacy’s complaint for divorce denying Stacy’s grounds for divorce, her claim that they had not cohabited since the separation, and her claim that she should have custody of the twins. Upon review of the chancery court's record, the Supreme Court found no error in its grant of the Carambats' divorce. View "Carambat v. Carambat" on Justia Law