Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After Hurricane Katrina hit the Mississippi Gulf Coast in August 2005, W. C. Fore entered into a contract with Harrison County, Mississippi, to remove the large amount of debris that was left behind. The Mississippi State Tax Commission (MSTC) then assessed a fee of $1.00 per ton of debris removed. Fore appealed the assessment to the MSTC Board of Review, claiming that the fee did not apply to emergency waste removal. The Board of Review upheld the assessment. Fore appealed the Board of Review’s decision to the MSTC Full Commission, which also affirmed the assessment. Fore then appealed to the Harrison County Chancery Court, First Judicial District. The chancery court upheld the assessment, and Fore appealed to the Supreme Court. Finding that the MSTC's and chancery court's findings were supported by substantial evidence and that there was no misapprehension of the law, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "W. C. Fore, Inc. v. Miss. Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

These three consolidated appeals (all springing from a divorce granted in 1994) presented thirty-eight issues including one of first impression. A judgment creditor served writs of execution on two corporations whose restricted stock was owned by the judgment debtor, who then sold his stock back to the corporations. The chancellor dismissed the writs, holding that the sale of stock rendered them moot. Upon review of the case, the Supreme Court held that statutory restrictions on the transfer of restricted shares of corporate stock apply to both voluntary and involuntary transfers of the shares; that after a judgment creditor serves a corporation with a writ of execution regarding one of its shareholders, repurchasing the shareholder’s shares will not excuse the corporation from responding to the writ of execution by filing the statutorily required sworn statement; and that the judgment creditor may (to the extent allowed by Mississippi statutes and other applicable law) execute on all benefits due the judgment debtor by the corporation, including the purchase price of the judgment debtor’s stock. Because the Court reversed the chancellor on three issues and remanded for a new trial, and because the chancellor's resolution of those issues may affect the outcome of others, the Court held that all issues not specifically resolved in this opinion could be presented by the parties to the chancellor for adjudication. View "West v. West" on Justia Law

This Mississippi Tort Claims Act case arose from an accident that occurred in Wayne County, Mississippi, between a school bus and a four-door passenger car. Following the accident, the driver of the car Ernestine Worsham, brought suit alleging negligence and negligence per se on behalf of the driver of the school bus, and negligence, negligence per se, and gross negligence on behalf of Wayne County School District. After a bench trial, the driver of the school bus Natasha Middleton, was dismissed from the suit. And despite evidence that a local county supervisor unilaterally had placed the speed-limit signs on County Farm Road, without a traffic investigation, approval by the Board, or passage of an ordinance, the trial court found Middleton's actions constituted negligence per se, and thus awarded judgment in favor of Worsham. Wayne County timely appealed. Because Mississippi Code 63-3-511 (Rev. 2004) requires that "[w]henever local authorities, including boards of supervisors . . . determine and declare, by ordinance, a reasonable and safe speed limit," that such determinations be made "upon the basis of an engineering and traffic investigation," the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Wayne County Sch. Dist. v. Worsham" on Justia Law

This guardianship case began in the Youth Court for the City of Pearl. Petitioners Wanda Bell and Jane Dennis Morse requested that the case be transferred to the Rankin County Chancery Court. Later, Bell and Morse requested that the chancery court dismiss their petition, alleging that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. In addition to dismissing the case with prejudice, the chancellor awarded custody of the child to Frances Cathryn Dennis Finnegan, the child’s natural mother. Aggrieved, Bell and Morse appealed raising two issues: (1) whether the youth court erred by transferring the case to chancery court; and (2) whether the chancellor erred by awarding custody to Finnegan. Upon review, the Supreme Court determined the chancellor properly had jurisdiction of the case. However, the chancellor erred by dismissing the case and awarding custody to Finnegan without any on-the-record findings. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of the Guardianship of B.A.D." on Justia Law

Defendant Jeffrey Havard was found guilty of capital murder (murder during the commission of sexual battery) of six-month-old child. The jury also found that Defendant's sentence should be death, and the Adams County Circuit Court imposed the death sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence on direct appeal. His motion for rehearing was subsequently denied, as was his motion for post-conviction relief filed in 2007. Defendant sought habeas relief in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi; however, that case was stayed pending the outcome of his second motion for post-conviction relief before the Mississippi Supreme Court. Finding no merit in Defendant's successive motion for post-conviction relief, the Court denied his successive petition. View "Havard v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Lamar Hooker appealed a chancery court's grant of Stephen Greer's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, in which the court awarded attorney's fees to Greer based on Hooker's improper filing of a lis pendens, and Greer's Motion for Summary Judgment on Hooker's counterclaim. Greer and Hooker knew each other for more than thirty years, having worked together in multiple business ventures. In early 2002, Greer and Hooker entered into an agreement for the purchase, development, and sale of two tracts of land to which each made monetary contributions and participated in certain decisions regarding the development and marketing of the properties. In September 2003, Greer sent a letter to Hooker in which he cancelled their business arrangement. In this letter, he characterized the relationship as a "proposed joint venture" and declared such proposed venture "null and void." Greer claimed the venture was predicated on Hooker's ability to put up one half of the initial capital investment to purchase the properties, and that Hooker had failed to do so. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's finding that the lis pendens was improperly filed. However, because the trial court based the attorney's fees award on an improper interpretation of the Litigation Accountability Act, the Court reversed the judgment, vacated the award, and remanded for further consideration. Finally, the Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for Greer on Hooker's counterclaim, holding that his claim was subject to a three-year statute of limitations and was thus time-barred. View "Hooker v. Greer" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Court had the right, authority, and power to declare itself superior to and above both the other two branches of government in all matters of constitutional compliance. Attorney General Jim Hood asked the judicial branch of government to void several pardons, alleging that the applicants failed to publish notice as required by Section 124 of the Mississippi Constitution. After the Court received this appeal, Governor Barbour (who issued the pardons) submitted an amicus curiae brief, and the Court allowed his counsel to participate in oral argument. At oral argument, the Court asked Attorney General Hood to point out any pardon that was not facially valid, and he could not. The Court noted that the parties and Governor Barbour presented numerous issues for consideration, including: whether those who did not apply for a pardon were required to publish notice; whether the governor(and not the convicted felons) applied for some of the pardons; whether some of the pardons had any applicant at all; whether the publication provision requires four or five weekly publications; whether the governor, the attorney general, or the pardonees have the burden of proof; and whether the attorney general is estopped from objecting to the pardons. "No judicial duty is more central to the proper operation of our system of government than is [the Court's] duty to decide this issue correctly. . . . [the Court was] compelled to hold that – in each of the cases before us – it fell to the governor alone to decide whether the Constitution’s publication requirement was met."View "In Re: Charles Hooker, et. al." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this product liability/breach of warranty case was whether the trial judge abused his discretion in denying the defendants' motion to transfer venue when the plaintiff sued in the county where the product was located when the alleged defects first appeared and not where the product was purchased or repaired. Finding that the general venue statute, Mississippi Code Section 11-11-3(1)(a) (Rev. 2004), requires that the case be brought in the county where the product was purchased and/or repaired, the Court reversed and remanded the case for transfer to the proper venue. View "Laurel Ford Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Blakeney" on Justia Law

In 2004, Marvin Rhoda and Edith Weathers were involved in an automobile collision in Southaven. Rhoda sued Weathers alleging negligence, and the jury returned a verdict for Weathers. The Court of Appeals affirmed the jury's verdict, but reversed and remanded the trial court's refusal to assess sanctions against Weathers for failing to admit to certain requests made by Rhoda in discovery. The Supreme Court granted Weathers's petition for writ of certiorari to address only the issue of sanctions against Weathers. Upon review, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals on this issue and affirmed the circuit court's denial of Rhoda's request for sanctions. View "Rhoda v. Weathers" on Justia Law

Dr. Carroll Meador filed a complaint against Mississippi Baptist Health Systems, Inc. (MBHS), Trustmark National Bank (Trustmark), and Doe Defendants 1 through 10, for breach of fiduciary duties, interference with fiduciary duties, interference with contract rights, interference with prospective business advantage, intentional infliction of emotional distress, deceit, fraud, and retaliatory discharge. The complaint stemmed from the doctor's employment with MBHS and a large line of credit he obtained from Trustmark. A dispute between the parties ended with the bank suing the doctor for defaulting on the loan, and the doctor declaring bankruptcy. Several defendants sought to remove the case to the federal district court. The district court granted remand of the case, finding the federal bankruptcy proceedings in the case had been concluded and only state claims remained. Then Defendants Trustmark, MBHS and several codefendants filed a motion for summary judgment and motion to dismiss. The doctor appealed the ultimate outcome of the trial court's decision in favor of Defendants. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to strike portions of the doctor's affidavit, and in denying Trustmark and MBHS' motions for summary judgment. The Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Trustmark National Bank v. Meador" on Justia Law