Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court concerned whether the Union County Circuit Court erred in finding that the City of New Albany Board of Aldermen's (City) decision that a tract of land had been legally rezoned from agricultural to industrial was arbitrary and capricious and that the City failed to give statutorily required notice before changing the zoning designation. Upon review of the trial court record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that the circuit court did not err: in finding that the City acted arbitrarily and capriciously; in finding that the City failed to give statutorily required notice; and in concluding that the property should remain zoned for agricultural use. The Court vacated the Court of Appeals' holding and reinstated the judgment of the circuit court. View "Riverside Traffic Systems, Inc. v. Bostwick" on Justia Law

J. C. and Betty Lockhart owned a life estate in an undivided one-fourth interest in 160 acres in Monroe County, Mississippi. After the death of J.C., Betty Lockhart filed a complaint to partition by public sale the land that she shared with her in-laws, Bolin and Orene Hamilton. The Hamiltons also owned a life estate in the same property, and they maintained the property as their homestead. Additionally, Lockhart sued Richard and Peggy Collins, who had a future interest in the property as remaindermen. The trial court dismissed Lockhart’s petition, and Lockhart appealed. Because Lockhart failed to meet the statutory requisites for a partition sale, the Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor’s ruling. View "Lockhart v. Collins" on Justia Law

Defendant Alvin Johnson was convicted of possession of cocaine and sentenced to sixteen years' imprisonment with nine suspended and five years of post-release supervision and a fine. The Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence. Defendant petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari concerning two issues: (1) whether the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction; and (2) whether the agents' search of a nearby vehicle violated Defendant's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures within the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Sections 14 and 23 of the Mississippi Constitution. The Supreme Court granted Johnson’s certiorari petition, and found Defendant's first issue to be dispositive. The State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Johnson was in constructive possession of the cocaine found in the nearby vehicle. Therefore, the circuit court erred by denying Defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). Finding that proximity alone was insufficient to show constructive possession, and that the State presented no additional incriminating circumstances, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment and that of the trial court and rendered judgment in Defendant's favor. View "Johnson v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant David Shaffer was convicted of child exploitation for soliciting sex from a twenty-nine year old female who he thought was thirteen. He argued to the Court of Appeals that the could not be guilty of child exploitation because no actual child was involved in the sting. The Court of Appeals agreed, but reversed and remanded for Defendant to be sentenced for attempted child exploitation, a crime for which he was neither indicted nor tried. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the actual attempt to exploit a child violated the child exploitation statute. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated and affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence. View "Shaffer v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

John Fletcher, John McConnon, and Tom Leader (collectively, "Fletcher") appealed an order of the Chancery Court of Hancock County incorporating the City of Diamondhead, Mississippi. Fletcher argued that the chancery court lacked jurisdiction over the petition for incorporation because it did not include two-thirds of the signatures of the qualified electors residing in the proposed incorporation area, and notice was improper. Fletcher also argued that objectors to the incorporation were denied the right of cross-examination at the hearing, and that the second chancellor's failure to order a new trial was an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court found that the petition for incorporation met the jurisdictional requirements, because notice was proper and the petitioners presented substantial evidence that the petition contained two-thirds of the signatures of the qualified electors residing in the proposed incorporation area. Furthermore, the Court found that the chancellor did not deny the objectors' right of cross-examination, and the second chancellor's decision not to order a new trial was within his discretion. View "Fletcher v. Diamondhead Incorporators" on Justia Law

Charles Phillips and RJK Investments, LLC, appealed a circuit court's order dismissing with prejudice all of its claims pursuant to a compromise and settlement order entered in the United States Bankruptcy Court. Phillips, through RJK, owned and managed a restaurant franchise. After a fire damaged the restaurant, Defendants Joey Kelley and other creditors attempted to seize control of the remaining assets. Phillips and RJK sued the creditors on multiple grounds. While this case was pending, Phillips individually filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court's order plainly directed the trustee to execute an Order of Dismissal as to all claims in this action. The order released the defendants from any further responsibility and liability, which necessarily would include any claims of RJK. Accordingly, the Supreme Court found that the trial court did not err in dismissing Phillips' and RJK's suit. View "Phillips v. Kelley" on Justia Law

After a mistrial, Defendant Stephan Hickman was retried and found guilty of capital murder with the underlying felony of robbery. The circuit court sentenced Hickman to life without parole in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erroneously restricted his right to cross-examine a witness in violation of his right to confrontation, and that the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction. View "Hickman v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance filed a formal complaint against Judge Teresa Brown Dearman for violating Canons 1 (charging judges to establish, maintain, and enforce high standards of conduct to uphold the integrity of the judiciary), 2A (charging judges to act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary), 2B (charging judges to avoid lending the prestige of their office to advance the private interests of others), and 3B(2) (charging judges to be faithful to the law and not to be swayed by partisan interests), when she initiated a telephone call to a circuit court judge in Florida. The Commission averred that Judge Dearman reached the voice mailbox of the Florida judge's judicial assistant, identified herself as a judge in Mississippi, and recommended that bond be set for a longtime friend and criminal defendant. It further averred that Judge Dearman personally guaranteed the defendant’s appearance if bond was granted. The Commission recommended that Judge Dearman be publicly reprimanded and ordered to pay $100 in costs, but the Supreme Court found the recommendation insufficient. The Court ordered that Judge Dearman be suspended from office for thirty days without pay in addition to a public reprimand and costs of $100. View "Mississippi Comm'm on Judicial Performance v. Dearman" on Justia Law

The "last will and testament" of Ted Watkins named his ex-stepdaughter Petitioner Diana Kinsey as executrix of his estate, and bequeathed all of his property to her. A year following his death, the estate was closed, and Petitioner was discharged from her executrix duties. Several years later, she filed a wrongful-death action against various silica-related entities in circuit court for Mr. Watkins' death from silicosis. The defendants moved to dismiss the claim as barred by the applicable statutes of limitations or alternatively, that Petitioner lacked standing to file the action. The circuit court dismissed all defendants with prejudice. In its review of the case, the Supreme Court only dealt with the issue of whether Petitioner's claim was time barred by the statute of limitations, and indeed found that her claim was so barred. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment dismissing Petitioner's action. View "Kinsey v. Pangborn Corp. et. al." on Justia Law

This case came before the Supreme Court on an interlocutory appeal from circuit court. The issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in failing to apply premises-liability law and denying Double Quick, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment. The matter arose from a shooting that occurred in the parking lot of a Double Quick convenience store. George Ford, accompanied by his young son, entered Double Quick to make a purchase. Shortly afterward, Cassius Gallion entered the store. Ford and Gallion exchanged words. Gallion exited the store first. Then Ford left the store to pump gas into his car. Because she was worried that Ford and Gallion would fight, the assistant store manager accompanied Ford and helped Ford’s son into the car. At the gas pumps, Ford and Gallion again exchanged words. Mario Moore, who had arrived at the Double Quick but had not yet been inside, approached Ford’s car, intervened in the argument, and threw a punch at Ford. Mario missed Ford, but struck Jackson, who then returned to the store and called the police. Ford then retrieved a pistol from the trunk of his car and shot Mario. Mario died as result of his injury. Dorothy Moore, as administrator of Mario’s estate, filed suit against Double Quick arguing that Double Quick had neglected to protect Mario from injury and death while he was on the store’s premises. The trial court denied both parties' motions for summary judgment. The trial court held that the case was more similar to a basic negligence action against an employee of Double Quick than a premises-liability action, and that a jury should determine whether the manager's actions were the proximate cause of Mario's injuries. Double Quick appealed the portion of the order denying it summary judgment. "In premises-liability cases, there are two ways to establish legal causation, or foreseeability, in cases of assault by a third person: the requisite 'cause to anticipate' the assault may arise from actual or constructive knowledge of the assailant's violent nature, or actual or constructive knowledge that an atmosphere of violence exists on the premises." The Supreme Court found that there was no suggestion in the record that the store manager had any knowledge of Ford's violent nature. Moore failed to prove that the injury was reasonably foreseeable, or that the manager's behavior was the proximate cause of Mario's injury. Accordingly, the Court held that the trial judge should have granted Double Quick's motion for summary judgment. View "Double Quick, Inc. v. Moore" on Justia Law