Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case was an interlocutory appeal from a circuit court which granted the "Motions to Compel Arbitration" of Pass Marianne, LLC (Pass) and Alfonso Realty, Inc. (Alfonso). On appeal, the Supreme Court considered: (1) whether Pass waived its right to arbitration, and (2) whether a principal’s waiver of its contractual right to arbitrate operates to waive that right for its agent. In 2005, Pass entered into a contract with Carl E. Woodward, LLC (Woodward) for the construction of a new condominium development, Pass Marianne Condominiums, in Pass Christian, Mississippi. In February, Pass and Lemon Drop Properties, LLC (Lemon Drop) entered into a "Preconstruction Sales and Purchase Agreement" for Unit No. 209 within the Pass Marianne Condominiums. Because of Hurricane Katrina, construction of the Pass Marianne Condominiums was not completed until 2007. On October 3, 2007, Pass executed a warranty deed conveying Unit No. 209 to Lemon Drop, and Woodward furnished a "Warranty of Completion of Construction" to Lemon Drop. On October 28, 2008, Lemon Drop filed a Complaint in the circuit court against Pass and Woodward, which sought, inter alia, rescission of the Agreement due to alleged defects in design and construction. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that while Pass waived its right to compel arbitration, that waiver was not imputed to its agent, Alfonso. As there was no evidence of waiver by Alfonso, it should have been entitled to proceed in arbitration. Therefore, as to Alfonso the Court affirmed the circuit court's order granting arbitration was affirmed. But regarding Pass, Court reversed and remanded the circuit court's order for further proceedings. View "Lemon Drop Properties, LLC. v. Pass Marianne, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Pamela Lynn Lawson appealed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the Defendant Honeywell International, Inc., on her Mississippi Products Liability Act (MPLA) claim and her negligence claim arising from injuries she sustained when her seatbelt buckle allegedly malfunctioned during an automobile accident. On July 31, 2005, Plaintiff lost control of her 1999 Jeep Cherokee while driving from Clara to Waynesboro, Mississippi. The vehicle veered off the highway and rolled over several times before coming to a stop. Plaintiff claimed that, although she had her Gen-3 seat belt buckle correctly fastened at the time of the accident, a defective design in the buckle caused it to malfunction and disengage, resulting in her ejection from the vehicle. Plaintiff alleged she suffered severe injuries as a result. She filed this action against Honeywell whom she alleged originally designed the Gen-3 seat belt buckle before selling it to Chrysler in the mid-1990s. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment as to Plaintiff's MPLA claim, finding Honeywell was not the "manufacturer" of the buckle for purposes of liability under the MPLA. However, the Court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment as to Plaintiff's negligence claim, and remanded for trial, as the MPLA does not preclude common-law claims of negligence against a nonmanufacturing and nonselling designer of a product. View "Lawson v. Honeywell International, Inc. " on Justia Law

The Hancock County Chancery Court granted Stacy Ruth Carambat a divorce from James Edward Carambat on the ground of habitual and excessive drug use. James appealed, arguing that the chancellor erred by granting the divorce, because his marijuana use did not affect the marriage, was not excessive, and was not akin to using opium, morphine, or other, like drugs. The couple married in 1993, and had twin boys in 1999. The couple separated in 2008 and Stacy filed for divorce later that year. Before the couple married, Stacy knew that James regularly smoked marijuana, and James admitted that he had been smoking marijuana since he was fourteen years old. James continued smoking marijuana throughout the marriage. Although the couple had conversations about James’s need to cease his marijuana use, James stated Stacy never asked him to quit. Stacy thought James would stop his drug use once the twins were born. Stacy alleged three grounds for divorce: irreconcilable differences, habitual cruel and inhuman treatment, and habitual and excessive drug use. She requested custody of the twins, child support, equitable distribution of the assets, alimony, and attorney’s fees. James answered Stacy’s complaint for divorce denying Stacy’s grounds for divorce, her claim that they had not cohabited since the separation, and her claim that she should have custody of the twins. Upon review of the chancery court's record, the Supreme Court found no error in its grant of the Carambats' divorce. View "Carambat v. Carambat" on Justia Law

Appellant Algernon Williams was convicted of shooting into a dwelling, when ballistics testing revealed that the shots were fired from a gun he had admitted owning, and which was in his possession during the time of the shooting. He claimed he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial for not filing any post-trial motions or by failing to adequately investigate and subpoena his only proposed witness sooner. Upon review, the issues presented to the Supreme Court on appeal were not based on facts fully apparent from the record. Therefore, the Court concluded the claims were more appropriate for post-conviction-relief petitions. Viewing Appellant's petition as one for post-conviction relief, the Court reviewed the claims in light of the applicable legal authority. The Court concluded that Appellant did not show he was denied his Sixth-Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, nor did he make an argument challenging the weight or sufficiency of the evidence presented against him at trial: "There [was] no reason to believe the outcome of this case would have been any different had [Appellant's] attorneys filed the post-trial motions at issue." Therefore the Court dismissed both of Appellant's claims without prejudice. View "Williams v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

The Secretary of State of Mississippi (State) and the City of Ocean Springs (Ocean Springs) appealed a chancery court's decision that enjoined the construction of a sidewalk. The sidewalk would have run along a beach adjacent to the seawall on property claimed by Respondents Clyde Gunn, III and Neil Harris in Ocean Springs. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the chancellor erred in granting the permanent injunction. The State and Ocean Springs asserted that the chancellor erred in issuing the permanent injunction because: her finding of irreparable injury was not supported by substantial evidence; an adequate remedy at law was available; and she failed to rule on the merits of the underlying dispute regarding ownership of the land where the proposed sidewalk was to be located. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no error in the chancellor’s earlier determination that irreparable injury would result if she did not grant an injunction and that no adequate remedy at law was available. The Court concluded that the chancellor’s order and opinion was in fact a preliminary injunction, incorrectly styled as a permanent injunction: "[i[t is clear from its language that the chancellor sought to protect the interests of all parties until ownership of the property could be determined. We therefore remand this case to the Hinds County Chancery Court, vacate the permanent injunction, and leave the earlier-issued preliminary injunction in place." View "Mississippi v. Gunn" on Justia Law

The central issue in this case was whether an oil company could deduct reasonable processing and investment costs from the payments it made to royalty owners. If so, the Supreme Court had to determine whether Mississippi code 53-3-39 was applicable in calculating the damages owed to the royalty owners for unreasonable deductions. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor's holding that reasonable processing and investment costs could be deducted from royalty owners' payments. However, the Court determined that the chancellor erred by failing to apply 53-3-39 to calculate damages. Thus, the Court partly affirmed, partly reversed the chancellor's decision, and remanded the case for recalculation of damages. View "Pursue Energy Corporation v. Abernathy" on Justia Law

Petitioner Sylvia Montgomery filed suit against the Mississippi Transportation Commission (Commission) after she was injured when her car struck a pothole in the northbound lane of Interstate 55 near Vaughan. The Commission filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming it was exempt from liability under several provisions of the Mississippi Torts Claim Act (MTCA). The circuit court denied the Commission’s motion. A three-justice panel of the Supreme Court granted the Commission’s petition for interlocutory appeal. Upon review of the parties’ briefs and the record, the Court found the trial court erred by not determining whether the duty to warn of a dangerous condition on the highway is a discretionary duty under the "public-function test." Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court’s denial of the Commission’s motion for summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Mississippi Transport. Comm'n v. Montgomery" on Justia Law

Defendant Gary Glidden was convicted of one count of possession of a controlled substance. The circuit court sentenced him to serve a term of four years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. The court also sentenced Defendant to serve his imprisonment as an habitual offender. After entering an order denying Defendant's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, for a new trial, Defendant perfected his appeal to the Supreme Court. Finding that no reversible error occurred at trial, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence of the circuit court. View "Glidden v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance filed a Formal Complaint against Lamar County Justice Court Judge Carol Ann Bustin. The complaint charged that Judge Bustin, while serving as an attorney for David C. Lema’s ex-wife, executed a felony arrest warrant for Lema based upon an affidavit submitted by the ex-wife. The Commission and Judge Bustin jointly moved the Supreme Court to accept an agreed findings of fact and to approve the recommended sanctions: a public reprimand, a $500 fine, and assessment of costs in the amount of $100. After conducting an independent inquiry and giving careful consideration to the joint motion for approval of recommendations and the supporting brief, the Court disagreed with the recommendation of the Commission. "Because Judge Bustin abused the power of her office, acted as judge in a matter involving one of her own clients, and has engaged in similar misconduct in the past, we order a thirty-day suspension from office without pay in addition to the recommended sanctions." View "Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial Perf. v. Bustin" on Justia Law

Defendant Leo Wales was tried in absentia for two counts of armed robbery and two counts of aggravated assault. A jury found Defendant guilty on all counts, and the Circuit Court of Hinds County sentenced Defendant to twenty years, and forty years for each count of armed robbery and assault, each sentence to run concurrently in the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Defendant's consecutive and concurrent sentences required him to serve a total of eighty years. On appeal, Defendant argued that (1) the trial court erred in trying him in absentia; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction in Count I, aggravated assault or, alternatively, the verdict of guilty in Count I was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence; and (3) the trial court erred by denying his proffered jury instruction on the specific intent required for armed robbery. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentence, because it found substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that he had waived his right to be present at trial, because the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict of guilty in Count I, and that verdict was not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, and because the jury instructions, taken as a whole, fully and fairly informed the jury of each element of the crime of armed robbery. View "Wales v. Mississippi" on Justia Law