Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Damien Anderson (also known as Damien Wise) was convicted of murder arising from the homicide of Darnell “Sporty” Smith. Defendant contended the circuit court erred when it refused to grant a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter. He stated that the trial court improperly forced the defense to choose between manslaughter and self-defense instructions. However, because no reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty of the lesser-included offense, the Supreme Court found no error and affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. View "Anderson a/k/a Wise v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Defendant Deric Bailey was convicted by a jury of deliberate-design murder for which he was sentenced to life in prison. On appeal, Defendant's conviction and sentence were reversed by the Court of Appeals and the case was remanded for a new trial. At his second trial, Defendant again was convicted of deliberate-design murder and sentenced to life in prison. The trial court denied his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, a new trial, and Defendant timely filed this appeal. Defendant Bailey presented five issues on appeal to the Supreme Court: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying certain jury instructions; (2) whether the trial court erred in excluding from evidence the statement Defendant gave at the time of his arrest; (3) whether the jury selection process was constitutionally infirm under "Batson"; (4) whether the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to grant a speedy trial; and (5) whether Bailey was deprived of his right to a fair trial, or at the very least, denied his right to a fair and impartial judge. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Defendant's claims were without merit, and affirmed Defendant's conviction and life sentence. View "Bailey v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

After After Corey Lee failed to appear at his divorce hearing, the chancellor granted his wife's complaint for divorce and divided the marital property. On appeal, Mr. Lee argued, among other things, that the chancellor erred by not making the findings of fact and conclusions of law required by case law. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that Mr. Lee's claim was procedurally barred for failing to raise the issue before the chancellor. But because Mr. Lee did raise the issue, and because the chancellor's failure to make findings of fact and conclusions of law was manifest error, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Lee v. Lee" on Justia Law

Defendant Gary Lee pled guilty to accessory after the fact to armed robbery in 1982. In 2010, he filed a petition for habeas corpus (post-conviction relief under Mississippi law) at the circuit court. The court denied Defendant's petition, finding it barred by the three-year statute of limitations in Mississippi Code Section 99-39-5(2) (Supp. 2011). Because Defendant's petition fell outside the three-year statute of limitations and because the trial court may dismiss a petition when it plainly appears from the face of the motion that the movant was not entitled to any relief, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Lee v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance (Commission) filed a formal complaint against Justice Court Judge Rickey Thompson (District Four, Lee County). The multicount complaint charged Judge Thompson with numerous instances of judicial misconduct, causing such alleged conduct to be actionable under Article 6, Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890. Ultimately, the Commission and Judge Thompson submitted a joint motion for approval of a recommendation that the judge be publicly reprimanded, suspended from office for a period of thirty (30) days without pay, fined the sum of $2,000 and assessed costs in the amount of $100. Charges of misconduct were filed against the judge stemming from his alleged improper disposal of cases involving separate charges of individuals operating motor vehicles with no proof of liability insurance. Upon review, the Supreme Court adopted the joint recommendation of the Commission and Judge Thompson. View "Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial Perf. v. Thompson" on Justia Law

As a result of Hurricane Katrina, the Mississippi Windstorm Underwriting Association (MWUA) sustained great losses well in excess of its reinsurance. MWUA assessed its members to cover the loss. Members are required to share in MWUA’s expenses, profits, and losses based on their percentages of wind and hail insurance premiums written in the previous calendar year. After the initial assessments, several member companies complained that they had incorrectly reported the previous year's figures. The Board of Directors gave the members a one-time opportunity to submit corrected data (a true-up). Some members (most of whom did not submit corrected data) appealed the assessment following the true-up. The Board denied their appeals. The members appealed their claims to the Insurance Commissioner, and the Commissioner denied their requested relief. Thereafter, the members appealed the Commissioner’s decision to the chancery court, which granted the members relief on all but one issue. Aggrieved, MWUA appealed the chancery court's judgment, and the members filed a cross-appeal. MWUA presented eight issues on appeal to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor's judgment on two issues: grouping and reinsurance allocation. But the Court reversed and remanded the chancellor's judgment on the remaining issues. View "Mississippi Windstorm Underwriting Assn. v. Union National Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Kristine Malouf took the drug Depakote to control her seizures both before and during her pregnancy. While Kristine gave birth to a seemingly healthy child in March 1997, she and her husband eventually discovered the child had brain damage. In 2002, the Maloufs filed a complaint in Hinds County against Dr. Ruth Fredericks, a neurologist; and in 2006, they filed an amended complaint adding Dr. J. Martin Tucker, Jr., an obstetrician-gynecologist (Defendants) alleging Kristine's treating physicians negligently caused their child's brain damage and other injuries. After the Maloufs joined Dr. Tucker, the Defendants moved to transfer venue to Rankin County. The trial court denied the motion to change venue, finding the Defendants had abandoned it. The Supreme Court granted Defendants' interlocutory appeal to determine whether the trial court erred in its ruling on venue. Upon review, the Court affirmed the trial court's finding that the Defendants abandoned their right to contest venue. View "Fredericks v. Malouf" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Brian and David Knight each filed separate complaints against their uncle Defendant Benny Knight, alleging assault and battery. The trial court dismissed these cases without prejudice for want of prosecution nearly ten years later. Neither Plaintiff appealed the dismissal. In 2010, Brian and David refiled separate actions, but the trial court granted Benny's motions to dismiss both cases, finding that the one-year statute of limitations had run on both actions. Plaintiffs retained new counsel and tried to refile the cases. The court clerks' office notified counsel for Plaintiffs that per a local rule, separate complaints must be filed for each plaintiff. Plaintiffs then refiled their cases separately. In response, counsel for Benny argued that the statute of limitations should not toll for ten years and permit a plaintiff to refile a lawsuit after its dismissal for failure to prosecute, even if dismissed without prejudice. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the local rule that required Plaintiffs to refile their cases separately to be in error, and also found that the statute of limitations was not tolled since the case was dismissed without prejudice for want of prosecution. The Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, but on alternate grounds. View "Knight v. Knight" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant Edna Mae Sanders of murdering her husband, and she was sentenced to life in prison. The Court of Appeals reversed her conviction and remanded for a new trial based on the trial court's error in denying a "no duty to retreat" jury instruction, and based on an error in suppressing evidence. Defendant threw a pot of hot cooking oil on her husband while he was sleeping, testifying that she threw the oil to protect herself and her children after she had been violently attacked. The State argued on appeal that the Court of Appeals erred when it (1) found that Defendant was entitled to a "no duty to retreat" instruction, because the evidence showed that she reinitiated the attack after the husband had stopped attacking her; (2) incorrectly conflated the applicable statute such that the court "created precedent" for defendants to claim entitlement to the presumption of reasonable fear, even where the person "against whom 'defensive force' was used was a resident of the dwelling"; and (3) improperly invoked plain error to review the exclusion of testimony regarding the husband's alleged sexual molestation of Defendant's daughter. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals' ultimate disposition, and found "no merit" in the State's claims on certiorari. View "Sanders v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

A fire destroyed a cotton-picking machine owned by Arcadia Farms Partnership. Though insurance coverage initially was denied, Audubon Insurance Company eventually paid Arcadia for the loss. Arcadia then filed suit against Audubon, asserting that Audubon's failure to submit prompt payment constituted a "bad faith breach of the policy terms." Audubon filed a motion for summary judgment. Audubon asserted that, since Arcadia had been paid on its claim prior to filing suit, Arcadia's only potential form of compensatory damages would be prejudgment interest. Yet according to Audubon, Section 75-17-7 of the Mississippi Code prohibited Arcadia from recovering prejudgment interest prior to the filing of the complaint. The trial court granted summary judgment for Audubon and denied Arcadia's motion for reconsideration or in the alternative, motion to amend its complaint to plead specifically for prejudgment interest. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Arcadia could seek prejudgment interest from the date of breach, prior to the filing of the complaint, and that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying Arcadia's motion to amend. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals, but granted certiorari to address some uncertainty in the law surrounding Section 75-17-7. The Supreme Court clarified that in contract cases, Section 75-17-7 does not restrict prejudgment interest to the post-complaint period; prevailing parties in a breach-of-contract suit may seek interest from the date of breach. View "Arcadia Farms Partnership v. Audubon Insurance Company" on Justia Law