Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In November 2008, P. Leslie Riley and an organization known as "Personhood Mississippi" filed an initiative, now known as Measure 26, with the Office of the Secretary of State. The initiative was qualified by the Secretary of the State to be placed on the general election ballot. Thereafter, Deborah Hughes and Cristen Hemmins ("Plaintiffs") filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief in Hinds County Circuit Court against Secretary of State Delbert Hosemann, challenging Measure 26 as a violation of Article 15, Section 273(5)(a) of the Mississippi Constitution. On August 10, 2010, Plaintiffs filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Secretary of State replied with a response to that motion. Then, on September 30, 2010, the trial court entered and approved an Agreed Order, allowing Riley and Personhood Mississippi to intervene. In that same order, all parties agreed that this case was "based on questions of law" and "should be resolved by way of judgment on the pleadings." Subsequently, after considering the motion and responses, having heard oral argument, and being otherwise fully advised in these matters, the trial court denied Plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that they had not carried their heavy burden in attempting to restrict the citizenry's right to amend the Constitution. Thereafter, the trial court entered an additional order, titled "Final Judgment." The trial court ruled that the denial of Plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the pleadings disposed of the case. Additionally, the trial court ruled that "final judgment is hereby entered in favor of the" Secretary of State and the Intervenors. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded Measure 26 was not ripe for review. Thus, the Court vacated the trial court's final judgment in favor of Intervenors and Secretary Hosemann. The Supreme Court finally dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint without prejudice. View "Hughes v. Hosemann" on Justia Law

Defendant Kenneth Hugh Knight was convicted in the Pearl River County Circuit Court for possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute while in possession of a firearm. Defendant appealed, raising three issues: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel, (2) the denial of his motion for a directed verdict or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), and (3) the denial of his motion for a new trial. Because the record was not sufficient to address Knight's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Supreme Court dismissed the claim without prejudice. The Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment on the remaining issues. View "Knight v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Bernice Conner filed a medical-negligence suit against Mid-South Retina, LLC. The County Court of Coahoma County originally granted summary judgment in favor of Mid-South, finding that Conner had failed to establish the necessary element of causation. The trial court then reversed its judgment upon reconsideration and denied Mid-South's motion for summary judgment. Aggrieved, Mid-South filed a petition for interlocutory appeal to the Supreme Court. In 2003, Mid-South Retina, LLC, and Dr. Brad Priester treated Bernice Conner for age-related macular degeneration. As part of Conner's treatment, she intravenously received Visudyne, a drug that aids in cold-laser therapy for macular degeneration. During Conner's second visit to Mid-South, Visudyne infiltrated the soft tissue around the injection site in the bend of Conner's elbow. Dr. Priester determined that enough Visudyne had entered Conner's bloodstream and proceeded with the cold-laser therapy. The therapy session continued without incident. Visudyne is a photodynamic drug, and tissue containing the drug can easily burn if exposed to sunlight. Dr. Priester testified that, because of this side effect, he ensured that Conner's elbow was sufficiently bandaged and covered prior to her leaving Mid-South. Shortly after leaving, Conner called Mid-South complaining that her arm was hurting. The next day, Dr. Priester contacted Conner, and she informed him that she was still in pain. Dr. Priester instructed her to go to an emergency room. Conner went to an emergency room and was referred to a general surgeon, who prescribed pain medication and antibiotics. Conner saw the surgeon two more times in 2003, and the surgeon noted that the injury on Conner's elbow measured less than one centimeter in size. Upon review of the case, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment denying Mid-South's motion for summary judgment and remanded the case back to the trial court finding genuine issues of material fact that still existed with regard to causation of Conner's pain. View "Mid-South Retina, LLC v. Conner" on Justia Law

The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance filed a formal complaint against Nell Y. Cowart, justice court judge for the Southeast District, Pearl River County, Mississippi, alleging judicial misconduct. After conducting an independent inquiry of the record and giving careful consideration to the findings of fact and recommendation of the Commission, the Supreme Court adopted the agreed-upon sanctions. Judge Cowart admitted she made a phone call in an attempt to help release a criminal defendant from jail. Judge Cowart stated that the defendant in question was not a criminal, and "would not spend another night in jail." While an officer was testifying concerning the allegations against the defendant, Judge Cowart became emotional and tearful. After Judge Cowart set bond at $5,000, the defendant was removed from the courtroom, and Judge Cowart apologized to the officers for her emotional display of sympathy toward the defendant. On the basis of these actions the Commission filed a formal complaint against Judge Cowart. View "Mississippi Comm'n on Jud. Perf. v. Cowart" on Justia Law

The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance filed a formal complaint and charged Steve Little with judicial misconduct. The Commission filed its Finding of Facts and Recommendations with this Court stating that Steve Little should be publicly reprimanded, suspended from office for ninety days without pay, and assessed the costs of this proceeding in the amount of $100. After thorough review, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Commission's findings and recommendations, and denied the Joint Motion for Approval of Recommendations. The Court found that as a justice court judge, Little individually and in concert with others, allowed certain misdemeanor charges to be remanded, nonadjudicated and "retired to the files." Specifically, Little allowed the "de facto nonadjudication" of sixteen charges of driving under the influence (DUI) over the course of two years, allegedly in violation of Mississippi Code. The Commission found by clear and convincing evidence that, by engaging in this conduct, Little had violated Canons 2A, 3B(2) and 3B(8) of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Further, Little's conduct is said to constitute willful misconduct in office and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, which brings the judicial office into disrepute. View "Mississippi Comm'n on Jud. Perf. v. Little" on Justia Law

In this personal-injury products-liability case, a jury awarded plaintiff Trellvion Gaines $7 million, finding that he had been brain-damaged from exposure to lead. In an effort to convince the Supreme Court to reverse the trial judgment and to render judgment in its favor, Defendant Sherwin-Williams Company challenged the reliability of Plaintiff's causation experts and fact witnesses. In the alternative, Sherwin-Williams alleged that unreliable, unfairly prejudicial, and untimely disclosed expert testimony and a biased jury pool required a new trial. Because Plaintiff's experts' speculation was inadmissible, and because the Plaintiffs' experts did not present any scientific authority that an acute, asymptomatic ingestion of lead could lead to the alleged injuries, Plaintiff did not offer sufficient proof of causation. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case on the causation issue. The Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. View "Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Gaines" on Justia Law

David Waide filed an Initiative with Mississippi Secretary of State Delbert Hosemann, and Hosemann approved it for placement on the November, 2011 general election ballot. Plaintiff Leland Speed filed a complaint against Hosemann in the Hinds County Circuit Court, along with a Motion for Expedited Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, asking the Supreme Court to declare Initiative 31 unconstitutional and to enjoin Hosemann from placing it on the ballot. Speed argued that Initiative 31 "violates Section 273(5)(a) because that section prohibits use of the initiative process for the proposal, modification or repeal' of any portion' of the Constitution's Bill of Rights." Speed argued that Initiative 31 was a "proposal, modification or repeal' of the Bill of Rights . . . and more specifically of its Section 17, which governs taking of private property for a public use." After Hosemann and Waide responded to Speed's pleadings, Speed filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, in which he argued that the case "involve[d] a pure issue of law with no material facts in dispute" and asked the court to enter judgment in his favor under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). The trial judge both denied Speed's motion for judgment on the pleadings and ruled on the merits, finding that Speed's complaint should be dismissed with prejudice and ordering that Hosemann be allowed to proceed in placing Initiative 31 on the ballot. On appeal, Speed asked the Supreme Court to reverse the trial judge, declare that Initiative 31 violates Section 273(5) of the Mississippi Constitution, and "keep Initiative 31 off the November ballot." Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the issue presented in this appeal (the constitutionality of proposed Initiative 31) was not ripe for adjudication by the Court, such that any opinion thereon would be improperly advisory. Accordingly, the Court vacated the trial court's decision and dismissed the case. View "Speed v. Hosemann" on Justia Law

In 2005, Weight Watchers discovered that its bookkeeper, Dianne Belk, had embezzled nearly $1,000,000 from the business over a six-year period. Belk embezzled the money by writing checks to herself from Weight Watchers accounts. She concealed her writing of unauthorized checks by inputting legitimate vendors' names in the computerized bookkeeping system as the ostensible payees. However, Belk would type her name as payee on the paper checks. Belk then would cash the checks at local banks and casinos, including the Rainbow Casino, and she often would gamble with the embezzled money. Belk reported her winnings to the Internal Revenue Service via W-2G forms provided by the casino, and she paid taxes on those winnings. According to the complaint, Belk lost roughly $240,000 of the stolen funds to Rainbow Casino. More than three years after first learning of Belk's embezzlement activities, Weight Watchers filed suit against Belk, Robert Belk, Jr. (Dianne's husband), Rainbow Casino-Vicksburg Partnership, L.P., Bally Technologies Inc. (the casino's management company),and five John Doe defendants. Weight Watchers' claims against Rainbow Casino and Bally Technologies were based on fraud, unjust enrichment, conversion, and negligence. Rainbow moved for summary judgment, arguing that the three-year statute of limitations had begun to run in 2005 when Weight Watchers first learned that Belk had been cashing unauthorized checks at the casino. Rainbow also argued, in the alternative, that summary judgment was appropriate because the casino was a holder in due course and that it did not have a legal duty to investigate the circumstances surrounding issuance of the checks. In this appeal, the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the statute of limitations barred an action against a casino for its alleged involvement in an embezzlement scheme. Finding that the Weight Watchers failed to provide any evidence of fraudulent concealment by the casino, the Court agreed with the trial court that the statute of limitations had run at the time the suit was filed. View "WW, Inc. v. Rainbow Casino-Vicksburg Partnership, LP" on Justia Law

Louis Wallace, personal representative of the Estate of Cynthia Wallace, filed a suit in circuit court against Cynthia’s doctor Dr. Emad Mohammed, alleging wrongful death as the cause of action. After discovering evidence that Louis was never legally married to Cynthia, Dr. Mohamed moved to intervene in the estate proceedings in the Chancery Court. The chancellor allowed the intervention, considered the evidence, and removed Wallace as the administrator, and in his stead, appointed the Chancery Clerk. Subsequently, Dr. Mohamed moved to dismiss the wrongful death action, claiming Wallace lacked standing to bring the suit on behalf of the estate. The circuit court granted the motion and dismissed the wrongful death action “since Plaintiff lacked standing to commence the suit,” and “the Plaintiff lack[ed] standing as a wrongful death beneficiary and there being rightful beneficiaries available to commence a new suit.” Subsequently, Wallace appealed the chancery court’s decision to allow Dr. Mohamed to intervene in the estate proceedings, as well as the decision to remove Wallace as estate administrator. The Mississippi Court of Appeals reversed both chancery court rulings and remanded the case with instructions to reinstate Wallace as the estate administrator. Wallace then appealed the circuit court’s judgment, which had granted Dr. Mohamed’s motion to dismiss the wrongful death suit. Upon review, the Supreme Court found Wallace was not entitled to recover for Cynthia Wallace’s death, and Wallace was not the estate’s representative. The Court concluded the circuit court erred in dismissing the case, but find no error in its dismissing Wallace. The Court vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals and reversed the circuit court’s decision to dismiss the wrongful death suit. View "In re the Estate of Cynthia Wallace" on Justia Law

In October 2006, Defendant Rachel Nelson was involved in an automobile collision. The City of Richland charged her with driving under the influence. In November Defendant pled “nolo contendere” in the Municipal Court of Richland. Later that month, Defendant filed a notice of appeal in the Rankin County Circuit Clerk’s office stating that a sufficient cash appeal and cash bond had been posted, and requesting a jury trial in county court de novo. The trial date was set for April 2, 2007. On March 27, 2007, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on writ of procedendo and to return the cause of action to the Municipal Court of Richland for imposition of sentence. On the same day, the Rankin County Court granted Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and ordered the matter back to the Municipal Court of Richland on writ of procedendo. On March 30, 2007, a Richland city prosecutor filed a motion to set aside the order of dismissal, to reinstate Defendant’s appeal, and to stay the proceedings. Defendant argued to the Supreme Court that: (1) the county court had no jurisdiction to set aside the order of dismissal and remand on writ of procedendo; and (2) double jeopardy was invoked because the county court “nolle prossed” the charge after the appeal was taken. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the decision to hear the city’s arguments on the motion to dismiss in this case was within the county court’s sound discretion: “the entry of a nolle prosequi does not bar another prosecution for the same offense under a new indictment . . [Here, Defendant] did not claim she had been twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense. Rather, she contended that she may be prosecuted in the future for felony DUI. Therefore, the question of whether the municipal court proceedings would bar a subsequent prosecution under double-jeopardy considerations was not ripe for determination.” The Court affirmed the county court’s decision. View "Nelson v. Mississippi" on Justia Law