Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In November 2021, Mettro Johnson filed a motion in Coahoma County Chancery Court to set aside a 2002 order that determined paternity and required him to pay child support, arguing the order was void due to insufficient service of process. The court found the 2002 order void for lack of personal jurisdiction because Johnson was served one day short of the required thirty-day notice period.The Court of Appeals affirmed the chancery court's decision in a divided ruling, agreeing that the 2002 order was void due to insufficient service of process. The Mississippi Department of Human Services (MDHS) filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court of Mississippi granted.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and agreed that the chancery court lacked personal jurisdiction over Johnson due to insufficient service of process. However, the court found that Johnson waived his challenge to personal jurisdiction by entering into a stipulated agreement in 2003, which acknowledged the validity of the 2002 order. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the judgments of the Coahoma County Chancery Court and the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Department of Human Services v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Nolan D. Palmer appealed a circuit court order enforcing sureties' liability related to a fee dispute among attorneys Barry Wade Gilmer, Seth Little, and Chuck McRae. McRae had initially sued Barry in Hinds County Chancery Court, and Barry subsequently filed a complaint in Madison County Circuit Court against Little, McRae, and McRae's attorneys, Michele Biegel and Bettie Ruth Johnson. The Madison County Circuit Court transferred the entire suit to Hinds County Chancery Court, but the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed this transfer for the claims against Biegel and Johnson, remanding the case back to Madison County Circuit Court. On remand, the circuit court dismissed Barry's complaint against Biegel and Johnson as frivolous and ordered Barry to pay their costs.Barry appealed and filed an appeal bond with supersedeas, signed by Barry, Matthew Gilmer, and Palmer. The bond was not signed by the circuit clerk. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's orders, and Biegel and Johnson moved to enforce the sureties' liability, claiming Barry had not satisfied the judgments. The circuit court found the bond enforceable as a contract, holding Barry and Palmer liable.Palmer appealed, arguing he was denied due process, the bond was invalid, and the circuit court erred in enforcing the bond as a contract. The Mississippi Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and found that Palmer waived his arguments by failing to appear or defend the motion in the circuit court. The court held that Palmer was provided due process as required under Rule 8(d) and affirmed the circuit court's order enforcing sureties' liability. View "Palmer v. McRae" on Justia Law

M.M. and J.B., Sr. were once married and had a daughter, L.B. After their divorce, J.B., Sr. married P.B. L.B. gave birth to J.J.W.B. in May 2018, but the child was removed from her custody due to her drug addiction. In August 2018, L.B.'s brother sought custody of J.J.W.B., and temporary custody was placed with J.B., Sr. and P.B. M.M. sought visitation rights in September 2018. The court granted custody to J.B., Sr. and P.B. and visitation rights to M.M. in October 2018. In July 2019, custody was again placed with J.B., Sr. and P.B., with continued visitation for M.M.In October 2020, J.B., Sr. and P.B. filed for voluntary termination of parental rights and adoption of J.J.W.B., which was granted in December 2020 without notifying M.M. M.M. filed a petition for contempt in January 2021 for not being allowed visitation, and later, in February 2022, she filed a motion to set aside the adoption. The Smith County Chancery Court denied the motions to dismiss filed by J.B., Sr. and P.B., reasoning that M.M. should have been notified of the adoption proceedings and that her visitation rights were not terminated by the adoption order.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case. The court held that M.M.'s motion to set aside the adoption was untimely and that she was not a necessary party to the adoption proceedings. Therefore, the court reversed the denial of the motion to dismiss M.M.'s motion to set aside the adoption. However, the court affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss M.M.'s contempt action, holding that the adoption did not extinguish her visitation rights. The case was remanded to the chancery court for further proceedings to determine visitation post-adoption. View "In Re The Adoption of J.J.W.B." on Justia Law

Diamante Myers was charged with shooting into a dwelling and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. The incident occurred on November 2, 2020, in Picayune, Mississippi, where Myers approached Abasi Bolden, who was cooking in his yard. After a verbal altercation, Myers threw an object at Bolden, leading to a physical fight. Myers later returned with a gun and fired shots, hitting a nearby house and shattering a window. Myers was wearing an ankle monitor, and data from the monitor placed him at the scene. He was arrested nearby, and gunshot residue was found on his hands.The Pearl River County Circuit Court tried Myers in June 2023. The jury found him guilty on both charges. Myers appealed, arguing that the trial court committed plain error by granting jury instruction S-3, which he claimed constituted an impermissible constructive amendment to his indictment. The trial court had denied Myers's motion for a directed verdict after the prosecution rested its case.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case. The court held that the language used in jury instruction S-3 did not constitute an impermissible constructive amendment to Myers's indictment. The court found that the instruction did not materially alter the essential elements of the offense or any defense Myers had. Therefore, the trial court's decision to grant the instruction was not plain error. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the lower court's decision, upholding Myers's convictions. View "Myers v. State of Mississippi" on Justia Law

Mark Johnson sued the Clarksdale Public Utilities Authority (CPU) and its members in federal district court, alleging he was fired for reporting inefficiency and incompetence to the state auditor. His initial complaint asserted retaliation under the Mississippi Whistleblower Protection Act (MWPA), later amended to include First Amendment retaliation and breach of contract. The defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, which the district court granted, holding that Johnson failed to comply with the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA) notice requirements and that the MWPA claim was barred by the MTCA’s one-year statute of limitations. The court also found Johnson’s First Amendment and breach-of-contract claims time-barred.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case, focusing on whether the MTCA’s procedural requirements apply to MWPA claims. The defendants argued that the MTCA’s broad application and limited immunity waiver necessitate compliance with its procedural requirements for MWPA claims. Johnson countered that the MWPA provides a separate right to monetary relief and should not be subject to the MTCA’s requirements.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the certified question from the Fifth Circuit. The court concluded that the MWPA is a remedial statute separate from the MTCA. The MWPA does not prescribe a statute of limitations or notice requirement, and the reference to the MTCA’s damages cap does not incorporate its procedural requirements. Therefore, the court held that MWPA claims are not subject to the MTCA’s statute of limitations and notice requirements. The certified question was answered accordingly. View "Johnson v. Miller" on Justia Law

The case involves the termination of parental rights of S.D.P. and I.T.A. regarding their medically fragile child, I.T.A. Jr., who suffered a catastrophic brain injury at eight months old. The injury occurred while the child was in the care of his mother, S.D.P., and his maternal grandmother. The child was later diagnosed with numerous severe medical conditions, including blindness, deafness, and quadriplegia, requiring extensive and constant care. The parents provided inconsistent explanations for the injury, and the treating physicians found these explanations inconsistent with the child's injuries.The Harrison County Youth Court entered an emergency custody order, placing the child in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Child Protection Services (MDCPS). The court found the injury resulted from nonaccidental trauma and that the parents failed to comply with service agreements designed to prepare them to care for their child's medical needs. Despite efforts by MDCPS to reunify the family, the parents did not substantially comply with the service plan, leading the court to change the plan to adoption.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and affirmed the youth court's decision to terminate the parental rights of both parents. The court found clear and convincing evidence that the parents were unfit to care for the child due to their insufficient understanding and ability to manage the child's extensive medical needs. The court emphasized that the child's survival depended on specialized care that the parents were unable to provide, despite having been given ample opportunity to learn. The court also dismissed the parents' argument regarding the insufficiency of the guardian ad litem's investigation, noting that the parents had waived this argument by not raising it in the lower court. View "S.D.P. v. Harrison County Department of Child Protection Services" on Justia Law

Lyncoya Ratcliff was convicted of possession of a weapon by a felon and possession of a stolen firearm. He was pulled over by police for a broken headlight, and during the stop, officers found a stolen firearm in the vehicle. Ratcliff denied knowledge of the firearm but admitted ownership of a bag containing ammunition matching the stolen weapon. He was subsequently arrested and convicted on both charges.The Forrest County Circuit Court denied Ratcliff's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and he appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions. Ratcliff then filed a petition for certiorari, which the Supreme Court of Mississippi granted, focusing solely on his conviction for possession of a stolen firearm.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case de novo, considering whether the evidence was sufficient to support Ratcliff's conviction for possession of a stolen firearm. The court found that the evidence presented did not exclude the reasonable hypothesis that Ratcliff hid the weapon because he was a convicted felon, not because he knew it was stolen. The court noted that the State failed to provide sufficient evidence of Ratcliff's guilty knowledge that the firearm was stolen, as required by precedent cases such as Barton v. State.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed and rendered Ratcliff's conviction for possession of a stolen firearm, finding that the State did not meet its burden of proving guilty knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt. The court did not address Ratcliff's conviction for possession of a weapon by a felon, as it was not raised in the petition for certiorari. View "Ratcliff v. State of Mississippi" on Justia Law

The case involves Dr. Bryan C. Fagan, a surgeon, who called Judy Faulkner, a surgical scheduler, a vulgar name in the presence of several operating room personnel. Faulkner was not present during the incident but later heard about it from other staff members. She sued Fagan for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress, claiming that the vulgarity constituted an attack on her professional abilities and was therefore slander per se.The Lee County County Court held a bench trial and ruled in favor of Faulkner on the defamation claim, awarding her $30,000 in damages, but ruled in favor of Fagan on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Fagan appealed the defamation ruling to the Lee County Circuit Court, which affirmed the County Court's decision. Fagan then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed and rendered the judgments of the lower courts, holding that the trial court manifestly erred by finding the statement defamatory.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' judgment on different grounds. The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred as a matter of law by denying Fagan’s motion for a directed verdict. The Court concluded that name-calling, even as offensive as the term used by Fagan, is not actionable as defamation in Mississippi. The Court found that Faulkner's proof fell short of establishing a prima facie case of defamation per se, as the vulgarity did not impute a want of professional capacity. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the judgments of the Lee County Circuit and County Courts. View "Fagan v. Faulkner" on Justia Law

Rudy Toler fired his handgun at four youths while traveling on Highway 90 between Pass Christian and Gulfport in 2021. This led to a high-speed chase during which Toler fired two more shots at pursuing officers. A Harrison County grand jury indicted Toler on ten felony charges, including multiple counts of aggravated assault and failure to stop for law enforcement. In 2023, a jury found Toler guilty on most counts, except for one count of aggravated assault against an officer.The Harrison County Circuit Court sentenced Toler to a total of forty years in prison. Toler appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support several of the convictions and that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of his peaceful character.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions for aggravated assault against the officers and one count of aggravated assault against the youths. However, the court determined that the indictment was multiplicitous regarding the four counts of aggravated assault against the youths, as they were based on a single act of firing one shot. The court held that these counts should be merged into one.The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the convictions in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case to the trial court to vacate the sentences for the four multiplicitous counts, merge them into one count, and resentence Toler accordingly. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of Toler’s peaceful character. View "Toler v. State of Mississippi" on Justia Law

Les Smith filed a petition for injunction and declaratory relief against Elizabeth and Rebecca Brockway to prevent them from installing a manufactured home on their property, alleging it violated restrictive covenants. The Brockways' property, Lot 13, was part of the Lakewood Village Subdivision, developed by Rainmaker’s Development Company, Inc. The restrictive covenants were referenced in the original warranty deed but were unsigned by the original grantor, Frank J. Steed.The Panola County Chancery Court denied Smith’s petition, finding the restrictive covenants unenforceable because they were not signed by the original grantor, as required by the covenants themselves. The court concluded that without the grantor's signature, the covenants never became a valid contractual obligation and thus did not run with the land.Smith appealed to the Supreme Court of Mississippi, arguing that the restrictive covenants were valid because they were attached to the original warranty deed, which was signed by the grantor. He contended that the covenants should be enforceable as they were intended to run with the land and that all subsequent purchasers, including the Brockways, had notice of them.The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the chancellor’s decision, holding that the restrictive covenants were unenforceable because the original grantor failed to sign them. The court emphasized that the plain language of the covenants required the grantor’s signature to trigger their enforceability. Since the grantor did not sign the covenants, there was no intent to create covenants that would run with the land, and thus, they were never enforceable. View "Smith v. Brockway" on Justia Law