Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioners Mary Gray, Peggy Pettaway, Kimberly Clausell, Lillian Byrd, and Chris Clausell filed negligence lawsuits against the City of Jackson, City of Raymond and Alice Wilson. Before trial, Raymond settled with Petitioners leaving Jackson and Ms. Wilson as Defendants. A Raymond police officer pursued Ms. Wilson who was driving erratically on a Raymond highway. Jackson officers were notified that Raymond police were in pursuit of Ms. Wilson's vehicle and assisted in the pursuit. The chase ended with Ms. Wilson striking a vehicle containing the Clausells and Ms. Byrd. Ms. Wilson died from the injuries she sustained, and Kimberly Clausell and Lillian Byrd were both injured in the crash. The trial court found that Ms. Wilson was fifty percent at fault, Raymond was thirty percent at fault and Jackson was twenty percent at fault. Jackson appealed the final judgment of the circuit court arguing that the court's apportionment of fault was made in error. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court's judgment was not supported by substantial evidence. The Court reversed the circuit court's judgment in favor of Petitioners and rendered judgment in favor of Jackson. View "City of Jackson v. Gray" on Justia Law

Minor Petitioners Latisha Head and Ashley McCoy through their mothers Shirley Russell and Shirley McCoy (collectively Petitioners) filed a complaint against the Jackson Public School District (JPS), the City of Jackson, the Jackson Police Department and several school officials because of a skirmish that occurred at Watkins Elementary School. Petitioners' complaint alleged assault and battery against a school official as a result of an altercation with Ms. Head. Four years would pass between Petitioners' initial complaint and the discovery phase of the case for various reasons by both parties' counsel. JPS moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to prosecute. The circuit court denied the motion, and from this denial, JPS appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found no inexcusable delay and that JPS suffered no actual prejudice. The Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of JPS' motion, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Jackson Public Sch. Dist. v. Head" on Justia Law

The estate of Charles Harris filed a medical malpractice action against John Lee, M.D. and the Forest Family Practice Clinic. Days before trial, the estate tried to move the circuit court to transfer venue based on Dr. Lee's status in the community and his son's position as the local sheriff. The circuit court denied the estate's motion. In jury selection, the estate exercised only seven of its ten peremptory challenges. Ultimately the empaneled jury returned a verdict in favor of Dr. Lee and the clinic. On appeal, the estate argued multiple errors at trial pertaining to voir dire and to the court's jury instructions warranted a new trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court found certain jurors' lack of candor during voir dire, and subsequent disclosures and opinions that surfaced only during jury deliberations constituted misconduct that the trial court should have considered before denying the estate's motion to set aside the verdict. Therefore, the Court reversed the circuit court's denial of the estate's motion to set aside the verdict and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Merchant v. Forest Family Practice Clinic, PA" on Justia Law

The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance (Commission) filed two formal complaints against Alcorn County Justice Judge Jimmy McGee alleging willful misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brought the office into disrepute. The Commission and Judge submitted a joint motion for approval of a 120-day suspension, a public reprimand, costs and fees to the Supreme Court. After its independent review, the Supreme Court agreed that Judge McGee's conduct violated several canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The Court disagreed with the Commission's recommendation. The Court found the Judge's actions warranted a public reprimand, suspension from office for 270 days, and costs and fees. View "Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. McGee" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Vanessa Decker under the Mississippi Vulnerable Adults Act for using her mother's money without the mother's consent. At trial, the evidence established that she had obtained her mother's consent to use the money, so the State requested (and the trial judge granted) a jury instruction that allowed the jury to find Ms. Decker guilty even if she had permission to use the money. Ms. Decker was sentenced to a four year jail term and sentenced to pay restitution, fines and court costs. On appeal, Ms. Decker argued that the jury instruction was a material mistake. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the instruction materially changed the grand jury's indictment. Accordingly, the Court reversed the lower courts' decisions in this case and remanded it for further proceedings.

Appellants Bobbi Young and Linda Carter, next of kin to Clarence Young, appealed an order of the circuit court that granted summary judgment in favor of Respondent Dr. Robert Smith and Baptist Memorial Hospital. On appeal, the Youngs argued that the circuit court abused its discretion in refusing to grant their "motion to withdraw admissions" filed seven years after the admissions were otherwise "conclusively established." Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the circuit court's ruling was well within its discretion under the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court further affirmed the circuit court's finding that no genuine issue of material fact remained regarding the Youngs' claims against Dr. Smith and the hospital, and affirmed the grant of summary judgment in the Doctor's favor.

When prosecutor Charles Graves was not prepared to proceed to trial and had not produced a video to defense counsel, a circuit court judge held him in criminal contempt and ordered him to be incarcerated. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the trial judge denied the prosecutor due process of law and that the record contained insufficient evidence of criminal contempt. The Court reversed the prosecutor's convictions and the order of the circuit court was vacated.

Respondent Charles Gant possessed a letter of intent to purchase property. He offered to sell the property to Grant Legacy, LLP once he completed the purchase. Grand responded to the offer by agreeing to purchase the property through an unnamed partnership entity with Respondent to be formed at a later date. The new partnership was called "Grand Legacy of Mississippi, LP (Grand-MS). After the purchase, Grand and Grand-MS claimed that Respondent stated he would not profit from the purchase and resale. The two Grands argued that Respondent had a duty to disclose his intent to profit on the original property sale, and that in failing to disclose that information, Respondent committed fraud. The trial court concluded that the Grand-MS partnership agreement contained no clause prohibiting Respondent from making a profit on the land-purchase-transaction. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondent, finding he had no duty to disclose any profit made to the newly formed partnership. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the essence of this case centered around the duties limited partners owe one another and the allegation of fraud stemming from an alleged breach of those duties. The Court found no basis by which it would disturb the trial court's findings. The Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Respondent.

Since his conviction in 1979 for capital murder, Defendant Robert Jackson filed multiple unsuccessful motions and applications for post-conviction relief. Based on the Supreme Court's dispositions of his 2002, and 2004 applications, the circuit court summarily dismissed the application underlying this case, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Undeterred, Defendant petitioned the Supreme Court arguing that his capital murder indictment was constitutionally insufficient. The Supreme Court granted Defendant's pro se petition for the writ of certiorari in this instance because the Court found that the trial court erroneously dismissed Defendant's PCR motions: "we recognize that the trial court dismissed the motion as a successive writ based on our 2002 and 2004 denials of [Defendant's] applications, and the Court of Appeals interpreted our denials as rejections of [Defendant's] arguments." the Court set aside its own decisions in 2002 and 2004, and reversed the trial court's dismissal and the Court of Appeals' decision. The Court remanded the case back to the trial court for further post-conviction-relief proceedings.

This case stems from an interlocutory appeal by Kelly Blossom regarding the issuance of a protective order by the Rankin County Chancery Court that denied her attempt to take two depositions in her divorce case. In 2009, Michael Blossom filed a complaint and obtained a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction and permanent injunction against Ms. Blossom enjoining her from any contact with their children. At the time the trial court issued the protective order, Ms. Blossom was being prosecuted for sexual battery in the circuit court. One of the witnesses was the minor victim in the criminal case. In the criminal case, Ms. Blossom eventually pled guilty to having committed sexual battery. The other potential deponent, another minor, was identified by Ms. Blossom as having knowledge about the the sexual battery from the criminal case. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the chancellor of the court below erred by granting the protective orders without meeting the requirements set out in the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure: "the fact that a witness is an 'alleged minor victim of a crime' alone does not constitute sufficient grounds to deny a party the right to depose that witness." Therefore, the Court reversed the decision of the lower court and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings.