Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellee Charles Buckner filed a personal-injury action against the Copiah County School District and Kenneth Funches. Appellee failed to serve process on either Defendant within the 120-day period provided by the state rules of civil procedure. After running the statute of limitations, Appellee moved for an extension of time to effect service of process. The trial court granted the motion, and allowed Appellee an additional 120 days to effect service. Appellee failed to serve Defendants under the second 120-day period. Defendants moved to set aside the extension granted to Appellee and moved to dismiss the case, but the trial court denied the motions. Defendants appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in granting Appellee two 120-day periods to effect service of process. The Supreme Court found that the statute of limitations had run before Appellee first asked for an extension of time. It ruled, therefore, that the trial court did abuse its discretion by granting the extension. The Court reversed the trial court, effectively dismissing Appelleeâs case against Defendants.

In September, 2007, a grand jury returned a two-count indictment against Defendant Albert Joiner. One count charged Defendant with âfelony flight,â and the second count charged Defendant with being a felon in possession of a deadly weapon. The indictment did not charge Defendant as being a âhabitual offender.â In a separate case, Defendant had a pending indictment for armed robbery as a habitual offender. Defendant and the State reached a plea agreement: the State would dismiss the possession charge and reduce the armed-robbery charge if Defendant would plead guilty to felony flight and robbery as a âlesser habitual offender.â Defendant accepted the deal, pled guilty, and was sentenced to a total of nineteen years as a habitual offender. Defendant moved for post-conviction relief, arguing that the trial court erred by charging him as a habitual offender when the grand juryâs indictment made no mention of it. The trial judge summarily denied his petition, and Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court found that because of Defendantâs âknowing an voluntary guilty plea,â Defendant waived his right to contest any deficiency in the indictment. The Court affirmed the lower courtsâ decisions.

Cable company employee David Marble was injured when he touched a live electrical wire while attempting to splice a new cable into an old one. He brought suit against Deviney Construction Company, Inc. (Deviney), alleging that Deviney negligently dug up the electrical wire and failed to secure it. Before trial, the trial judge ruled that witnesses could only be called once. Deviney objected, arguing that the defense should not be âhandcuffedâ and should be able to call its witnesses in its own case-in-chief. Mr. Marble ultimately called fourteen witnesses in his case, including two of Devineyâs fact witnesses. During trial, Deviney renewed its objection to the trial judgeâs ruling, but the trial judge affirmed her earlier ruling. Mr. Marble would win a $2.5 million verdict against Deviney. Deviney appealed the verdict, arguing among other things, that the trial judgeâs ruling on the presentation of witnesses constituted reversible error. The Supreme Court agreed that âa court has broad discretion . . . to manage the pace of a trial by placing âreasonableâ limitsâ on the presentation of evidence but found that the trial judge âundulyâ interfered with Devineyâs presentation of its case. The Court reversed the trial courtâs decision, and remanded the case for a new trial.

James Littletonâs employment as Greenwoodâs city attorney was terminated by the newly elected Mayor, Carolyn McAdams. Littleton announced to the Greenwood City Council that he was statutorily authorized to continue to serve as a holdover appointee until the council approved his replacement. The mayorâs first appointee was initially rejected by the council. The newly elected mayor sued to have the council terminate Littleton and confirm her choice as the new city attorney. The chancellor granted the Mayorâs petition for declaratory relief, and Littleton appealed the decision. The Supreme Court found Littleton had no legal authority to holdover when his term had ended, and that the chancellor properly granted the declaratory judgment.

Appellant Shirley Collins filed suit against Appellees-Defendants Koppers, Inc. and several others, alleging she was injured as a result of environmental contamination caused by a wood-treatment facility. The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss after Collins repeatedly failed to comply with a court order to provide expert opinions that causally linked her injuries to the alleged contamination. The trial court granted the Defendantsâ motion to dismiss and awarded them attorneyâs fees. On appeal, Appellant argued that the trial court abused its discretion when it did not grant her enough time to respond to Defendantsâ discovery requests. âIt is obvious that the trial judge exercised considerable patience and restraint in dealing with the delays caused by [Appellantâs] counsel. The record is replete with examples of instances of the failure of [Appellantâs] counsel to abide by the orders of the trial court.â Finding no abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial courtâs ruling.

In September, 2008, after a jury trial, Appellant Timmy Harden was convicted of the statutory rape of his stepdaughter. In December, Appellant was sentenced to twenty yearsâ imprisonment, to be followed by ten years of post-release supervision, with five years reporting. Appellant appealed his sentence, arguing among other things, that the trial court should have granted him a continuance in order that he could obtain a mental evaluation to decide whether he was fit to stand trial. Furthermore, Appellant argued that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to convict him. The Supreme Court was unconvinced that any additional evidence provided at the trial would have reasonably raised doubt as to the Appellantâs competence to stand trial. In addition, the Court found that the evidence did not âpreponderate so heavily against the verdict as to cause an unconscionable injustice.â The Court affirmed Appellantâs conviction and sentence.

The City of Jackson appealed a judgment made against the city for damages based on a police officerâs pursuit of a vehicle. The suspectâs vehicle collided with another vehicle owned by Eric and Kristina Law. The Jackson Police Department has a written pursuit policy which stipulates all police officers perform a balancing test when in pursuit of suspects. This means that police officers should weigh the immediate danger posed by their pursuit to that of allowing the suspect to remain at large. The trial court held that the officer acted recklessly when he pursued the suspect causing damage to the vehicle owned by Eric and Kristina Law. The court awarded each of the Laws $250,000. The Supreme Court found that the officer had violated the applicable pursuit policy by failing to weigh the potential harm to the public. The Court affirmed the lower courtâs ruling.

Sixteen former clients (Clients) sued two lawyers (Lawyers) who had represented them in a mass-tort litigation, claiming the lawyers had breached their fiduciary duty by prematurely settling their cases in order to maximize attorney fees. Responding to a motion for summary judgment, the Clients produced a witness who testified that he had worked for the Lawyers and had settled numerous similar cases for much more than the Clients received. The witness also produced a document he prepared that the Lawyers used as a settlement template. The trial judge found the witnessâ testimony and template were inadmissible as hearsay, and that the Clients could not prove they would have won their mass-tort case at trial in order to sue their Lawyers for breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court granted summary judgment against the Clients, and they appealed. The Supreme Court found that the trial court erred by requiring the Clients prove they would have won their mass-tort case at trial. Furthermore, the Court held that the witnessâ testimony should not have been excluded at trial as hearsay. The Court found that the witnessâ testimony was offered to establish facts already in the record: â[w]hile those decisions may have been based on [the witnessâ] opinions at the time, the decision-making process and the resultant [template] wasâ a matter of fact. The Court reversed the decision and remanded the case to the lower court for further proceedings.