Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A caller informed Claiborne County Sheriff's deputies that Wendell Barnes was in Port Gibson driving a car with Texas plates. Officers knew Barnes had three warrants against him. They happened upon a vehicle matching the caller's description and initiated an investigatory stop. A deputy searched and arrested the driver, Defendant Terrance Eaddy, for possession of cocaine and weapons. Defendant moved to suppress evidence of the drugs and gun discovered in the search. At the suppression hearing, on cross-examination of the arresting deputy, defense counsel pointed out that the deputy's report contained a different version of events that took place at the time of Defendant's arrest than his testimony. In ruling on Defendant's motion, the court recognized the deputy's report differed from his testimony, but that "an arrest report does not represent the officer's entire description of the arrest." Accordingly, the court denied Defendant's motion to suppress. A jury convicted Defendant of the charges against him. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant argued that the trial court should have suppressed the evidence presented at trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the deputies did not have reasonable grounds to justify the investigatory stop and subsequent search and seizure of evidence from Defendant. Accordingly, the Court vacated Defendant's conviction.

Defendant Curtis Gause was indicted on capital murder charges in addition to burglary, and aggravated assault. A jury found him guilty of manslaughter and burglary, and not guilty of assault. The circuit court sentenced Defendant to twenty years for manslaughter and twenty-five years for burglary, with sentences to run consecutively in the state Department of Corrections. Defendant appealed, arguing multiple errors at trial. Principal among them, Defendant contended the trial court erred when it allowed the jury to consider a verdict on burglary. Upon careful consideration of the trial court's record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that the trial court erred by granting the burglary jury instruction. The Court found that burglary was not a "lesser-included" offense to capital murder, and only Defendant could have asked for the "lesser-included" instruction. The Court affirmed Defendant's conviction on manslaughter, but reversed his conviction on burglary. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance filed a formal complaint against Walthall County Justice Court Judge Marion McKenzie for alleged ticket-fixing and for certain ex-parte communications. During a three-year period from January 2006 to January 2009, the Judge disposed of or attempted to dispose of nine citations for misdemeanor offenses. The offenses involved hunting over bait, failing to wear hunter orange, hunting without a license, and littering. On three occasions, the Judge attempted to intervene in cases assigned to another judge. On each occasion, the Judge obtained the violator's ticket and asked the deputy clerk to give the ticket to the citing officer so that the officer could "help" the defendant. The Judge acknowledged his wrongdoing and joined the motion for approval of a recommended public reprimand and $500 fine. After conducting its independent inquiry and giving consideration to the Commission's finding of fact, the Supreme Court ordered a thirty-day suspension from office without pay in addition to the recommended sanctions.

A grand jury indicted Vanessa Decker under the state Vulnerable Adults Act of 1986 for using her elderly mother's money "without her consent." But at trial, the evidence established that Ms. Decker did obtain her mother's consent to use the money. The State requested a jury instruction that allowed the jury to find Ms. Decker guilty, even if her mother had given consent. The judge granted the State's request. Subsequently, Ms. Decker was convicted by the court and sentenced to four months' imprisonment. Additionally, Ms. Decker was sentenced to pay restitution, fines and court costs. Ms. Decker appealed her conviction. Upon review of the trial record, the Supreme Court found that the trial judge gave a jury instruction that materially changed the charge made by the grand jury in the indictment. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's conviction and sentence. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

In 2003, Respondent Cedric Byrd misjudged a turn along a Rankin County highway. The trailer he was towing got stuck in the highway. A car in which Jonathan Dooley was traveling with his mother collided with the trailer, killing Jonathan instantly. On behalf of Jonathan's heirs, Leah Dooley, Jonathan's mother, filed a wrongful death action against Mr. Byrd and his employer Independent Roofing Systems. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Mr. Byrd and Independent Roofing. The trial court denied Ms. Dooley's post-trial motions, and she appealed to the Supreme Court. Ms. Dooley argued that there were multiple errors at trial that ended with a verdict against the weight of the evidence presented. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court agreed that the errors at trial warranted a new trial. Of note, the Court found that Jonathan's heirs were not allowed to fully participate in the proceedings. On this basis, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment in this case and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Anthony Smith died in a plane crash in 2001. His estate contained two separate life insurance policies. Mr. Smith's father Raymond was named as sole beneficiary of one policy, and Mr. Smith's ex-wife Ruth was named as beneficiary on the other. At the time of his death, Mr. Smith owned a life estate in 657 acres of land in Tate County. One hundred and sixty of the acres were set aside in fee simple for Raymond and his wife Dorothy as part of their homestead. This case came before an appellate court three separate times. Each time, the issue before the court involved the proper way to apportion the tax liability among the beneficiaries to the estate. The Supreme Court issued an opinion holding that taxes should be based on the taxable estate, rather than the gross estate. On remand, the Estate filed two motions demanding that Raymond and Ruth reimburse the Estate for taxes paid plus interest on the insurance policies. Raymond filed a motion demanding that the Estate pay him for rent for the time he was excluded from his homestead. The chancery court ultimately held that Raymond and Ruth were responsible for their portions of tax liability owed to the Estate, and that Raymond was entitled to twenty-four months' rent. The Estate appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon careful consideration of the case record, the Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court.

Respondent Tim Norris failed to pay his 2005 property taxes on his restaurant in Jackson. In 2006, Sass Muni purchased the restaurant in a tax sale. When Mr. Norris did not redeem the property within the statutory two-year period, a tax deed was issued to Sass Muni, who then deeded the property to Petitioner Rebuild America, Inc. When Rebuild America filed suit to confirm its title, Mr. Norris intervened, arguing that he was never served with notice of the tax sale. He moved to have the tax sale set aside. The chancellor set the tax sale aside, and Rebuild America appealed. The appellate court affirmed the chancery court's ruling. Rebuild America appealed again to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court's analysis of the issues presented on appeal, and affirmed its holding.

Petitioner Barry Gregg challenged a Workers’ Compensation Commission (Commission) holding that denied him permanent partial disability benefits. Petitioner was injured on the job for Respondent Natchez Trace Electric Power (Natchez) and was unable to satisfactorily return to his job nor earn on-call compensation. Petitioner unsuccessfully appealed the Commission’s decision to the circuit court and the Court of Appeals. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioner argued that the Commission erred in reaching its decision. In the decision adopted by the Commission, the administrative law judge observed that Petitioner made more money after his injury than before he was injured. The appellate court affirmed the Commission’s decision on the basis of a presumption that because of that earning discrepancy, Petitioner failed to prove that he suffered a loss of “wage-earning capacity.” The Supreme Court found that the Commission erred by considering Petitioner’s higher wage post-injury as determinative of his earning capacity. The Court found that Petitioner had rebutted the presumption regarding his earning capacity. Subsequently, the Court reversed both the Commission’s and the appellate court’s holdings and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiff-Appellee Terrance Shanks filed a personal-injury action against Defendants-Appellants Kimball Glassco Residential Center and van driver Vera Richardson on behalf of his mother Lois Shanks. Ms. Shanks was injured when the van Ms. Richardson was driving went out of control. Ms. Richardson moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting that the action was barred by a one-year statute of limitations under state tort law. In its answer to the action, Kimball Glassco also raised the statute of limitations as a defense and argued that it was a state entity entitled to a level of immunity under the state tort law. The trial court denied Ms. Richardson's motion to dismiss and held that both Defendants had waived the statute of limitations defense earlier in the litigation. Furthermore, the court found that the state tort law did not give either Defendant immunity from liability. Upon consideration of the briefs and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that the trial court erred by finding that Defendants waived the statute of limitations as their defense. The Court found that Mr. Shanks filed his complaint one year after the expiration of the statute. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's order, and rendered judgment in favor of Defendants.

Defendant Gregory Redmond appealed his conviction of statutory rape. He was sentenced to life. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant argued that the trial court made errors by admitting some and excluding other testimony that was ultimately prejudicial to his case. Upon consideration of the record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found no error by the trial court. The Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence.