Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-Appellee Terrance Shanks filed a personal-injury action against Defendants-Appellants Kimball Glassco Residential Center and van driver Vera Richardson on behalf of his mother Lois Shanks. Ms. Shanks was injured when the van Ms. Richardson was driving went out of control. Ms. Richardson moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting that the action was barred by a one-year statute of limitations under state tort law. In its answer to the action, Kimball Glassco also raised the statute of limitations as a defense and argued that it was a state entity entitled to a level of immunity under the state tort law. The trial court denied Ms. Richardson's motion to dismiss and held that both Defendants had waived the statute of limitations defense earlier in the litigation. Furthermore, the court found that the state tort law did not give either Defendant immunity from liability. Upon consideration of the briefs and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that the trial court erred by finding that Defendants waived the statute of limitations as their defense. The Court found that Mr. Shanks filed his complaint one year after the expiration of the statute. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's order, and rendered judgment in favor of Defendants.

Defendant Gregory Redmond appealed his conviction of statutory rape. He was sentenced to life. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant argued that the trial court made errors by admitting some and excluding other testimony that was ultimately prejudicial to his case. Upon consideration of the record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found no error by the trial court. The Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence.

Defendant Dennis Taylor appealed his conviction for conspiracy and robbery. He was sentenced to fifteen years. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant argued that the verdicts against him at trial were against the weight and sufficiency of the evidence. Upon consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdicts, and that the verdicts were not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. The Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence.

Dr. Daniel Dare appealed a ruling of the Chancery Court that denied him the ability to intervene in the modification of a marital property agreement entered into by Paul and Sharon Stokes. Mr. and Mrs. Stokes were married in 1985. In 2007, Mrs. Stokes had an affair with Dr. Dare. Shortly after the affair began, Mr. Stokes filed for divorce. With the entry of a divorce decree, the Chancery Court incorporated a child-custody and property-settlement agreement that was "executed" by Mr. and Mrs. Stokes. Pertinent to the Supreme Court's review of this matter was a "covenant not to sue" included in the property agreement. Mr. Stokes filed a petition to modify the property agreement and sought to delete that part of the provision that barred him from bringing suit against "any other person for alienation or affection." Mrs. Stokes did not contest Mr. Stokes' petition, and the court deleted the term "any other person." Mr. Stokes then sued Dr. Dare for "alienation of affection." Dr. Dare sought to intervene in Mr. Stokes' modification matter. The court held that Dr. Dare was not a party to the divorce or the property agreement, and as such, had no legally cognizable interest in the divorce. Dr. Dare argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the modified "covenant not to sue" implicitly targeted Dr. Dare as a party, and that he should be allowed to intervene in the modification proceedings. The Supreme Court agreed with the Chancery Court that Dr. Dare had no legally protected interest in the Stokes' divorce and affirmed the lower court's decision.

A grand jury indicted Defendant Harold Hargett for selling marijuana and hydrocodone. A jury found Defendant guilty, and he was sentenced as a habitual offender to six years for the marijuana charge, and sixty years for the hydrocodone charge. The appellate court affirmed Defendant's sentence. Defendant appealed to the Supreme Court by arguing that the trial court erred by admitting testimony that referenced certain "prior bad acts" that should have been excluded. Before trial began, defense counsel argued in a motion to exclude evidence that Defendant's prior convictions would be too prejudicial. The trial court granted the motion. Despite the ruling, the State continually elicited inadmissible testimony that referenced the prior convictions. The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the trial and appellate courts and remanded the case for a new trial. The Court found that the testimony that referenced Defendant's prior bad acts should have been excluded.

In 2007, Plaintiff Lyshell Wilson entered Defendant CitiTrends' clothing store. While shopping, Ms. Wilson was brutally injured by Defendant Jocelyn Howard, who attacked her with a pair of scissors. Ms. Howard moved to dismiss Ms. Wilson's claims, arguing that Ms. Wilson failed to file her complaint within a one-year statute of limitations for assault and battery. Ms. Wilson denied she sued for assault and battery. Instead, she sued on a negligence claim. The trial court denied Ms. Howard's motion to dismiss. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Ms. Howard argued that Ms. Wilson attempted to circumvent the statute of limitations by characterizing her claim as one for negligence when it was really assault and battery. Ms. Howard maintained that Ms. Wilson's claim is barred by the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court agreed with Ms. Howard. The Court held that the trial court erred in denying Ms. Howard's motion to dismiss. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

Appellee Charles Buckner filed a personal-injury action against the Copiah County School District and Kenneth Funches. Appellee failed to serve process on either Defendant within the 120-day period provided by the state rules of civil procedure. After running the statute of limitations, Appellee moved for an extension of time to effect service of process. The trial court granted the motion, and allowed Appellee an additional 120 days to effect service. Appellee failed to serve Defendants under the second 120-day period. Defendants moved to set aside the extension granted to Appellee and moved to dismiss the case, but the trial court denied the motions. Defendants appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in granting Appellee two 120-day periods to effect service of process. The Supreme Court found that the statute of limitations had run before Appellee first asked for an extension of time. It ruled, therefore, that the trial court did abuse its discretion by granting the extension. The Court reversed the trial court, effectively dismissing Appelleeâs case against Defendants.

In September, 2007, a grand jury returned a two-count indictment against Defendant Albert Joiner. One count charged Defendant with âfelony flight,â and the second count charged Defendant with being a felon in possession of a deadly weapon. The indictment did not charge Defendant as being a âhabitual offender.â In a separate case, Defendant had a pending indictment for armed robbery as a habitual offender. Defendant and the State reached a plea agreement: the State would dismiss the possession charge and reduce the armed-robbery charge if Defendant would plead guilty to felony flight and robbery as a âlesser habitual offender.â Defendant accepted the deal, pled guilty, and was sentenced to a total of nineteen years as a habitual offender. Defendant moved for post-conviction relief, arguing that the trial court erred by charging him as a habitual offender when the grand juryâs indictment made no mention of it. The trial judge summarily denied his petition, and Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court found that because of Defendantâs âknowing an voluntary guilty plea,â Defendant waived his right to contest any deficiency in the indictment. The Court affirmed the lower courtsâ decisions.

Cable company employee David Marble was injured when he touched a live electrical wire while attempting to splice a new cable into an old one. He brought suit against Deviney Construction Company, Inc. (Deviney), alleging that Deviney negligently dug up the electrical wire and failed to secure it. Before trial, the trial judge ruled that witnesses could only be called once. Deviney objected, arguing that the defense should not be âhandcuffedâ and should be able to call its witnesses in its own case-in-chief. Mr. Marble ultimately called fourteen witnesses in his case, including two of Devineyâs fact witnesses. During trial, Deviney renewed its objection to the trial judgeâs ruling, but the trial judge affirmed her earlier ruling. Mr. Marble would win a $2.5 million verdict against Deviney. Deviney appealed the verdict, arguing among other things, that the trial judgeâs ruling on the presentation of witnesses constituted reversible error. The Supreme Court agreed that âa court has broad discretion . . . to manage the pace of a trial by placing âreasonableâ limitsâ on the presentation of evidence but found that the trial judge âundulyâ interfered with Devineyâs presentation of its case. The Court reversed the trial courtâs decision, and remanded the case for a new trial.

James Littletonâs employment as Greenwoodâs city attorney was terminated by the newly elected Mayor, Carolyn McAdams. Littleton announced to the Greenwood City Council that he was statutorily authorized to continue to serve as a holdover appointee until the council approved his replacement. The mayorâs first appointee was initially rejected by the council. The newly elected mayor sued to have the council terminate Littleton and confirm her choice as the new city attorney. The chancellor granted the Mayorâs petition for declaratory relief, and Littleton appealed the decision. The Supreme Court found Littleton had no legal authority to holdover when his term had ended, and that the chancellor properly granted the declaratory judgment.