Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Almost two decades prior to this decision, the Mississippi Supreme Court handed down Farmland Mutual Insurance Co. v. Scruggs, 886 So. 2d 714 (Miss. 2004). In that opinion, the Court held that Farmland Mutual Insurance Co., the liability insurer for Mitchell Scruggs, Eddie Scruggs, Scruggs Farms & Supplies LLC, and Scruggs Farm Joint Venture (collectively, Scruggs), had no duty to defend Scruggs in a federal lawsuit by Monsanto Company. The reason no coverage applied was because Monsanto had alleged that Scruggs committed the intentional act of conversion by saving and using unlicensed seeds. Eight years later, a district court judge overturned a jury’s verdict that Scruggs had willfully violated Monsanto’s patents. Consequently, Scruggs was not liable for treble damages and attorney’s fees. Scruggs returned to state court in 2013. Citing Rule 60(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, Scruggs asked the Lee County Circuit Court to reopen and vacate the final judgment entered in 2004 in favor of Farmland on the coverage issue. Scruggs asserted the Mississippi Supreme Court’s opinion had been erroneously decided based on facts that came to light in the federal case. The state court rejected the motion as untimely under Rule 60(b). Scruggs appealed. While Scruggs asserted the motion was timely, the Mississippi Supreme Court found the motion’s timing is irrelevant: Rule 60(b) was not a procedural vehicle for a trial court to overturn a mandate issued from the Mississippi Supreme Court. Because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant Scruggs’s request, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of the motion. View "Scruggs, et al. v. Farmland Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The City of Biloxi and Harrison County, Mississippi adopted a joint resolution that authorized the lease of a piece of property to RW Development, LLC, for the development of a joint public/private pier seaward of Veterans Avenue. As a result, the State initiated this case seeking a declaratory judgment that the State was the sole and exclusive authority to lease Public Trust Tidelands, that the City had no authority to lease the subject property to RW, and that preliminary and permanent injunctive relief should issue against the actions of the City and RW. The Chancery Court of Harrison County denied the State’s requested relief and ultimately determined that the City and County had statutory authority to lease the property to RW for public use. Because the Mississippi Supreme Court agreed that Mississippi statutory law granted the City authority to build the pier, the court granted the chancery court's judgment. View "Mississippi v. RW Development, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Lorenzo Manuel was convicted by jury of second-degree murder and aggravated assault. At sentencing, the trial judge found that Manuel was a habitual offender and sentenced him to forty years for second-degree murder and twenty years for aggravated assault. The judge ordered that these sentences were to run consecutively and without reduction, suspension, or possibility of parole. Manuel appealed, and the Mississippi Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment. The Mississippi Supreme Court granted Manuel’s petition for writ of certiorari to review the trial judge’s imposition of a habitual offender sentence. The Supreme Court found that the trial judge lacked sufficient evidence to sentence Manuel as a habitual offender. Additionally, the Court found that the Court of Appeals erred when it allowed the State to supplement the record with copies of the indictments for Manuel’s prior offenses. Therefore, the Court vacated Manuel’s habitual offender sentence and remanedd the case to the trial court to resentence Manuel as a nonhabitual offender. View "Manuel v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Judge Carlos Moore was a municipal court judge for the Mississippi cities of Grenada and Clarksdale. He also practiced law with The Cochran Firm. The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance filed a formal complaint against Judge Moore, alleging that he improperly summoned two local police officers to the municipal courtroom in Grenada and criticized them publicly concerning a discussion about a private client of Moore’s that had occurred several days earlier at Judge Moore’s private law office. The Commission and Judge Moore asked the Mississippi Supreme Court to accept the stipulated findings of fact and to approve the recommended sanctions of a public reprimand and fine of $1,500. After careful consideration of the judicial misconduct at issue, the Supreme Court was unable to agree fully with the recommendation of the Commission. "Because Judge Moore abused the power of his office to chastise and embarrass police officers in open court concerning a matter related to the judge’s private law practice, we order a 60-day suspension from judicial office without pay in addition to the recommended sanctions." View "Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Moore" on Justia Law

Alberto Garcia confessed to raping and murdering five-year-old JT. He pled guilty to capital murder and waived jury sentencing. After a hearing, the trial judge sentenced Garcia to death. He appealed his sentence, and the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. He sought post-conviction relief from his sentence or leave to proceed in the trial court for further post-conviction proceedings. In his motion, Garcia argues his trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance. While he asserted his attorneys were deficient for three reasons, his primary claim was that counsel failed to pursue and present at the sentencing hearing evidence of fetal alcohol syndrome disorder (FASD) as a mitigating factor. After review, the Supreme Court found Garcia failed to present a substantial showing that his trial attorneys were deficient in investigating potential FASD, let alone that any prejudice resulted. "[T]here is no reasonable probability that FASD evidence would have caused the sentencing judge to find that the mitigators outweighed the aggravators, which included the heinous nature of Garcia’s crime." The Court likewise found Garcia failed to show deficiency and resulting prejudice on his other two ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. Therefore, his motion was denied. View "Garcia v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Heritage Hunter Knoll, LLC (Heritage), appeals the circuit court’s dismissal of its appeal for a lack of jurisdiction. The Lamar County Board of Supervisors (Board) amended the Unauthorized Dumping and Litter Ordinance (waste ordinance) to discontinue the county’s garbage collection service to multifamily residences, duplex developments, apartment complexes, and commercial properties. Notably, the amendment advised that “[a]ny citizen who [wa]s affected or aggrieved by this Ordinance may apply to the Lamar County Board of Supervisors (at its regularly scheduled meetings) for a Variance to the terms, provisions and applications of this Ordinance.” Heritage, a limited liability company, owned three properties in Lamar County: Hunter Lane, Heritage Cove, and Knoll Cutoff. Heritage received notice of the Board’s amendment to the waste ordinance by letter dated July 23, 2018. In August 2018, the Board passed a second, clarifying amendment to the waste ordinance. In September 2018, the Board approved Heritage’s variance request for the Knoll Cutoff property, but it denied the variance requests for Hunter Lane and Heritage Cove. Heritage did not appeal the Board’s amendment to the waste ordinance or the Board’s denial of its variance requests. In January 2019, the county implemented the amended waste ordinance. On February 1, 2019, Heritage filed suit in federal court claiming that the Board’s amendment to the waste ordinance was unlawful and that it violated Heritage’s constitutional rights. The Mississippi Supreme Court determined Heritage’s appeal was untimely as to the amendment to the waste ordinance but timely as to the Board’s denial of Heritage’s variance requests. The circuit court’s judgment of dismissal was affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. View "Heritage Hunter Knoll, LLC v. Lamar County, Mississippi" on Justia Law

TransMontaigne Operating Company, LP, sought to enjoin Loresco I, LLC, from using an easement conveyed by Loresco’s predecessor, Amerada Hess Corporation (Hess), for any other purpose or at any other time than Hess had used it. The chancellor found the clear language of the express reciprocal easement had no such limitation. Because TransMontaigne attempted to limit Loresco’s use of the express easement in a manner inconsistent with the easement’s clear terms, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor’s denial of TransMontaigne’s request for declaratory and injunctive relief. View "TransMontaigne Operating Company, L.P. v. Loresco I, LLC" on Justia Law

Niyokia Lee and James Cooper sustained damages in separate, independent automobile accidents caused by negligent city emergency responders. Lee’s accident happened in Harrison County, and Cooper’s happened in Rankin County. The Mississippi Tort Claims Act afforded immunity to the negligent police officer, the fireman, and the governmental entities employing them. Because Lee and Cooper could not recover from the responders or municipalities, both sought recovery under their car insurance policies’ uninsured motorist provisions. Lee and Cooper had the same UM coverage carrier—State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. And State Farm denied UM coverage to both, citing Mississippi Code Section 83-11-101(1) of Mississippi’s Uninsured Motorist Act. As State Farm saw it, because the officer and fireman enjoyed police and fire protection immunity under the MTCA, neither policyholder was legally entitled to recover from the immune responders or their city employers. State Farm thus denied UM coverage to Lee and Cooper despite the fact that, in 2009, the state legislature had revised Mississippi Code Section 83-11-103(c) of the UM Act by adding a new subsection expanding the definition of “uninsured motor vehicle” to include “[a] motor vehicle owned or operated by a person protected by immunity under the [MTCA.]” The two trial courts considering the UM coverage issue reached opposite results. The Harrison County Circuit Court granted summary judgment in State Farm’s favor and dismissed Lee’s claims against State Farm, finding because the officer was immune, Lee was not "legally entitled to recover" and consequently, was not eligible for UM coverage. The Rankin County Court granted summary judgment in Cooper’s favor, against State Farm, ruling UM coverage did apply because, otherwise, the 2009 amendment to the UM Act, which expanded the definition of “uninsured motor vehicle” to include vehicles operated by persons who are immune under the MTCA, would be "rendered virtually meaningless." The Mississippi Supreme Court consolidating the two cases found that the plain language of the two provisions made it apparent that Lee and Cooper were entitled to UM coverage. It therefore reversed and remanded the decision of the Harrison County Circuit Court, and affirmed and remanded the decision of the Rankin County Circuit Court. View "Lee v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Marlon Howell was indicted by grand jury for the sale of a controlled substance in 1998. The indictment charged Howell with one count of the sale of 6.8 grams of marijuana, a Schedule 1 controlled substance. At the time of Howell’s charging, Mississippi Code Section 41-29-139(b)(3) (Rev. 1993) provided for a penalty of three years’ imprisonment and/or a fine up to $3,000 for the sale of one ounce or less of marijuana. In 1999, the State and Howell agreed to reduce Howell’s felony charge from the sale of a controlled substance to possession of a controlled substance. The parties presented an agreed order reducing Howell’s felony charge to possession. On the same day, Howell pled guilty to the reduced felony charge of possession of a controlled substance. Howell was thereafter sentenced to three years in custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections with one year of house arrest and the remaining two years of post-release supervision in addition to $200 in restitution. In 2016, Howell moved to vacate the sentence for felony possession, arguing the sentence he received was illegal. The trial court treated Howell’s motion as a post-conviction relief petition and found that Howell lacked standing under Mississippi’s post-conviction relief statutes because Howell had already completed his sentence for drug possession. Howell then appealed. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that “[o]n the narrow question presented, interpreting Mississippi Code Section 99-39-5(1), we hold that Howell has standing.” On remand, the trial court found that Howell’s post-conviction relief petition was time-barred. The court also found that the original sentence was not illegal and that Howell had benefitted from a more lenient sentence for the crime with which he was originally charged. Howell appealed the trial court’s denial of his motion for post-conviction relief. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Howell v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

This case presented an issue of first impression for the Mississippi Supreme Court: whether an attorney’s representation of a general partnership created an implied attorney-client relationship between the attorney and the individual members of the general partnership, and, if so, whether the Mississippi Rule of Professional Conduct prohibiting communication by a lawyer with an individual represented by other legal counsel was violated. James Pettis, III, attorney for the plaintiff, appealed a chancery court order disqualifying him for a violation of Mississippi Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2, which prohibited a lawyer from communicating with a person they know to be represented about the subject of the representation. After a careful review of the law, the Supreme Court reversed the chancery court’s order, rendered judgment in favor of Pettis, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Pettis v. Simrall" on Justia Law