Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A Mississippi trial court dismissed David Saunders’s claims against the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) based on judicial estoppel because Saunders did not list these claims in his prior Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Until December 2010, Saunders served as football operations coordinator at the University of Mississippi. From January 2011 to October 2014, Saunders worked as an assistant football coach for the University of Louisiana. Based on Saunders’s alleged rule violations while at each institution, the NCAA conducted separate investigations and enforcement proceedings against both schools. The NCAA concluded Saunders had violated NCAA rules while at Louisiana. As punishment, the NCAA issued a show-cause directive to any NCAA member institution that may want to employ Saunders in an athletics position from January 2016 to January 2024. Saunders retained an attorney to represent him in NCAA proceedings. The attorney insisted financial strain prevented Saunders from traveling to defend himself personally. After a second show-cause directive, Saunders and his attorney discussed suing the NCAA, but at that time he did not pursue a lawsuit. Months later, Saunders filed a voluntary petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy averring he had no claims against third parties. Saunders received a bankruptcy discharge in July 2018. Almost two years later, Saunders sued the NCAA: it was not until another football coach sued the NCAA, and made it past the summary judgment stage, that Saunders believed he had an actual shot at taking on the NCAA in court. The NCAA simultaneously filed an answer and a motion for summary judgment. In both, it asserted Saunders’s claims were barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel because Saunders had not disclosed these claims against the NCAA in his 2018 bankruptcy proceedings. The court ruled that Saunders’s claims against the NCAA belonged to Saunders’s bankruptcy estate, so the bankruptcy trustee was substituted as the real party in interest and plaintiff in the action. Further, while judicial estoppel did not bar the trustee from pursuing these claims for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate, Saunders himself was barred by judicial estoppel from pursuing his claims against the NCAA, including the declaratory-relief claim abandoned by the bankruptcy trustee. The Mississippi Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred for two reasons: (1) the trial judge erred by estopping Saunders from pursuing this type of declaratory relief; and (2) it was error for the trial court to presume Saunders should be estopped based on his mere knowledge of the facts giving rise to his claims against the NCAA, coupled with his failure to list these claims on his bankruptcy schedule. View "Saunders v. National Collegiate Athletic Association" on Justia Law

Joseph Bland was convicted by jury of first-degree murder after he shot and killed his girlfriend, Olletta Jones. Bland appealed, claiming the trial court erred by excluding Bland’s testimony regarding his post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), thereby depriving him of the right to assert his defense. Finding no error in the trial court’s decision, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed Bland’s conviction. View "Bland v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

The Greenville Public School District (“GPSD”) challenged the sufficiency of the bond amount that Yolanda Thomas posted to perfect her appeal pursuant to the requirements of Mississippi Code Section 37-9-113 (Rev. 2019). GPSD argued that, pursuant to Section 37-9-113, Thomas was required to post bond in an amount equal to the full cost of the hearing transcript. The chancellor ruled that, based on the language of Section 37-9-113 and Mississippi Code Section 37-9-111 (Rev. 2019), Thomas’s $200 bond was sufficient to perfect her appeal in the Washington County Chancery Court. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor's decision. View "Greenville Public School District v. Thomas" on Justia Law

In April 2012, Bobby Gibson signed a contingency fee contract with Barry Wade Gilmer and the Gilmer Law Firm regarding a legal malpractice case. When the contract was signed, Seth Little, an associate of the Gilmer Law Firm, was assigned to the case. During the summer of 2013, Little left the Gilmer Law Firm and began working for Chuck McRae at the McRae Law Firm. Little continued to work on Gibson’s case while employed at the McRae Law Firm. A settlement was ultimately reached in Gibson’s case, but the McRae Law Firm never received any money. McRae hired Michelle Biegel and Bettie Ruth Johnson to sue Gilmer over the attorneys’ fees generated by the settlement of the legal malpractice case. Later, Gilmer filed a lawsuit against McRae, Little, Biegel, and Johnson, alleging, among other claims, that McRae, Biegel, and Johnson committed civil conspiracy. Gilmer’s suit was ultimately dismissed, and this appeal followed. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Gilmer’s October 2, 2017 complaint and the trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees. The Court also concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Gilmer’s amended motion to amend. Finally, the Supreme Court found that Gilmer was procedurally barred from raising the issue of whether the trial court abused its discretion by assigning the costs of the interlocutory appeal to Gilmer. View "Gilmer v. McRae, et al." on Justia Law

A Mississippi trial court denied Watercolor Salon LLC’s motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction filed against Watercolor’s former employee Nealie Hixon. The motion was based on an employment, confidentiality, and noncompetition agreement. Because Nealie was twenty years old and thus legally a minor when she entered the agreement, the trial court held the agreement was unenforceable. On appeal, Watercolor argues its employment agreement meets the statutory exception that permits minors eighteen years or older to enter into enforceable contracts “affecting personal property.” The Mississippi Supreme Court found Watercolor's logic was flawed and stretched the statutory minor disability exception too far. "Just because an employment contract restricts an employee from taking intellectual property or covers what happens upon breach or termination does not completely change the fundamental nature of the contract. And here the fundamental nature of the contract was a noncompetition agreement that Nealie would give up her ability to work in a certain geographical area for a fixed time in exchange for continued employment at a higher hourly wage. So this employment contract was simply a contract affecting Nealie’s right to work, not her personal property. Thus, the statutory exception does not apply. And because Nealie disaffirmed the contract, it is unenforceable against her." The Court affirmed the denial of Watercolor's motion for injunctive relief, which was based solely on the unenforceable agreement. Whether Watercolor had any remaining claims against Nealie that were not based on the contract, such as the taking of trade secrets, remained to be determined on remand. View "Watercolor Salon, LLC v. Hixon" on Justia Law

In this divorce and custody case, the chancellor excluded the testimony of the parties’ minor children per se, without first interviewing the children and determining their competency and best interests. The chancellor then interviewed the children in chambers, but did not make a record of the interviews. The Court of Appeals affirmed the chancellor’s decision on all issues, including child custody. On certiorari review, the Mississippi Supreme Court found the chancery court erred in the procedures used and findings made attendant to the issue of the children’s testimony. It therefore reversed the chancellor’s judgment regarding child custody, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Denham v. Denham" on Justia Law

Robert Fisher appealed his convictions for several drug possession and trafficking charges, and his sentence as a habitual offender. Fisher argued his right to testify was violated, that officers unlawfully searched a storage unit he was leasing, and that the trial judge sentenced him as a habitual offender without sufficient evidence. Finding no reversible error in the circuit court's judgment, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. View "Fisher v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

After being arrested twice in a two-day span, once in Lauderdale County (Mississippi) and once in Jones County, for being suspected of driving under the influence and public intoxication, Shelley Rose allegedly drove a rental van the wrong way down Interstate 59 in Pearl River County. A motor vehicle collision ensued, killing Jada Bright. Plaintiff Estate of Jada Bright (Bright) filed a wrongful death suit at the Pearl River County Circuit Court against Defendants Estate of Shelley Rose; EAN Holdings, LLC; Enterprise Leasing Company-South Central, LLC; Elco Administrative Services Company; Enterprise Holdings, Inc.; National Car Rental System, Inc.; Lauderdale County; Jones County; City of Ellisville; Beech’s Towing & Recovery LLC; ABC 1-5; and John Does 1-5, and asserted that venue was proper per Mississippi Code Section 11-11-3 (Rev. 2019) because the claim arose out of a motor vehicle accident which occurred in Pearl River County. Defendants Jones County, Lauderdale County, and the City of Ellisville, filed motions to change venue, alleging that they had not been sued in the proper venue, based on the specific venue statute, Mississippi Code Section 11-46-13(2) (Rev. 2019), of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. The trial court ultimately denied the motions, and the Counties and City petitioned for an interlocutory appeal. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s judgment denying the change of venue motions, and remanded the case with instructions to transfer venue either to Jones County or Lauderdale County. View "Jones County, et al. v. Estate of Jada Bright, et al." on Justia Law

In a matter of first impression before the Mississippi Supreme Court, the issue presented for review required an interpretation and application of the federal Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA). 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d). Jonathan Carr registered five domain names that included variations of the identifying marks of the Mississippi Lottery Corporation (MLC). After an unfavorable decision from a national arbitration board, Carr brought a reverse domain name hijacking claim against the MLC, which countersued for cybersquatting. The Mississippi Supreme Court dismissed Carr’s first appeal in this case for lack of a final appealable judgment. Carr appealed the trial judge’s Order Granting and Denying Motions for Injunctive Relief, Order on Motion for New Trial, or In the Alternative, Motion for a Trial By Jury, and Order on Motion for New Trial and/or In the Alternative, to Alter or Amend the Judgment. After a careful review of federal and state law, the Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court on all issues. View "Carr v. Mississippi Lottery Corporation" on Justia Law

The Mississippi Court of Appeals dismissed Omar Humphrey's appeal relating to a public records request. In 2020, Humphrey filed a singular document titled "Complaint for Violation of the Mississippi Public Records Act of 1983." The defendants to this complaint were Steve Holts, police chief of Senatobia, and John Champion, district attorney for the Seventeenth Circuit Court District. Humphrey’s complaint alleged that neither Holts nor Champion had responded to his letters requesting evidence and documents that related to his conviction. Humphrey’s complaint alleged the same basis for his claims against both Holts and Champion and made very little, if any, distinction between the two other than referencing the individual letters sent to each defendant. The Court of Appeals dismissed Humphrey's direct appeal for want of an appealable judgment. The Mississippi Supreme Court found there was in fact, a final, appealable judgment, and that the Court of Appeals should have decided Humphrey’s appeal on the merits. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remanded the case for that court to decide on the merits of the appeal. View "Humphrey v. Holts, et al." on Justia Law