Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

While driving a forklift at work, Lori Chandler was hit by another forklift and injured. She retained Turner & Associates to file a workers’ compensation claim. But Turner & Associates failed to file her claim within the statute of limitations. Adding to that, the firm’s case manager engaged in a year-and-a-half-long cover-up, which included false assurances of settlement negotiations, fake settlement offers, and a forged settlement letter purporting to be from Chandler’s former employer. Because of this professional negligence, Chandler filed a legal malpractice action. The only issue at trial was damages. The trial judge, sitting as fact-finder, concluded that Chandler had suffered a compensable work-related injury—an injury that caused her to lose her job and left her unemployed for nearly two years. Based on her hourly wage, the trial judge determined, had Turner & Associates timely filed Chandler’s workers’ compensation claim, Chandler could have reasonably recovered $50,000 in disability benefits. So the trial judge awarded her $50,000 in compensatory damages. The trial judge also awarded Chandler $100,000 in punitive damages against the case manager due to her egregious conduct. The Court of Appeals affirmed the punitive-damages award. But the court reversed and remanded the compensatory-damages award. Essentially, the Court of Appeals held that Chandler had failed to present sufficient medical evidence to support a $50,000 workers’ compensation claim. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the appellate court: "Were this a workers’ compensation case, we might agree with the Court of Appeals. But this is a legal malpractice case. And part of what Chandler lost, due to attorney negligence, was her ability to prove her work-related injury led to her temporary total disability. ... the Court of Appeals erred by applying exacting statutory requirements for a workers’ compensation claim to Chandler’s common-law legal malpractice claim." The Court reversed on the issue of compensatory damages and reinstated the trial judge’s $50,000 compensatory-damages award. Because this was the only issue for which Chandler sought certiorari review, it affirmed the remainder of the Court of Appeals’ decision, which affirmed the punitive-damages award but reversed and remanded the grant of partial summary judgment against attorney Angela Lairy in her individual capacity. View "Turner & Associates, PLLC, et al. v. Chandler" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review centered on whether Allen Russell’s life sentence without the possibility of parole for possession of marijuana, as an habitual offender under Mississippi Code Section 99-19-83 (Rev. 2020), violates his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The Court of Appeals stalemated five to five, resulting in an affirmance of the trial court's judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed: "Based on both this Court’s precedent and the rulings of the United States Supreme Court in Rummel, 445 U.S. 263, Harmelin, 501 U.S. 263, Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, and Ewing, 538 U.S. 11, Russell’s sentence as an habitual offender was not grossly disproportionate. His sentence meets the prescribed statutory punishment. There is no legal basis to vacate Russell’s sentence. It is neither cruel nor unusual. As Russell has failed to prove that the threshold requirement of gross disproportionality was offered and met, because his sentence fell within the statutory requirement, and because his sentence is a constitutionally permissible sentence, we should affirm Russell’s conviction and sentence." View "Allen v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

In 2008, the City of Gulfport undertook a project to replace the infrastructure associated with its water and sewer systems relating to damage caused by Hurricane Katrina in 2005. The repair project involved federal, state, and local agencies and ultimately cost approximately $85 million to complete. The original design of the Area 3B project, the sewer infrastructure that crossed the Cowan Road property located north of U.S. Highway 90 and east of Highway 605 were to be replaced, and the new infrastructure was to be installed within the City’s existing easements across the properties. The Cowan Road property at issue was located in the Area 3B geographic zone. Robert “Kris” Riemann, P.E., then-director of the City’s department of public works, was notified that John Felsher had inquired about relocating the sewer infrastructure in Area 3B. Based on an agreement with Felsher to relocate the utilities, the City had the Area 3B design drawings redrafted to move the utilities. The City's project manager was notified that the discovery of underground telephone lines and other utilities required that the sewer line being relocated had to cut the northwest corner of the property. Cowan Road filed a complaint in the Chancery Court of Harrison County, Mississippi, advancing a claim for inverse condemnation against the City. The chancery court transferred the case to the Special Court of Eminent Domain in Harrison County. Due to the jurisdictional limits of county court, the case ended up in Harrison County Circuit Court. The circuit court entered an order granting the motion for partial summary judgment filed by the City on the issue of the date of the taking. The parties eventually settled the reverse condemnation claim, and the City agreed to pay $100,000 to Cowan Road & Hwy 90, LLC, for the improper and unlawful taking of its property. The issue before the Mississippi Supreme Court centered on the circuit court's grant of attorneys' fees and expenses: Gulfport argued that Cowan Road should not have been allowed to recover attorneys’ fees under Section 43-37-9. Finding that the statute applied and fees were appropriate, the Supreme Court affirmed. However, the Court found the trial judge abused his discretion by disallowing requests for postjudgment interest. View "City of Gulfport v. Cowan Road & Hwy 90, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Kendall Magee pled guilty to second-degree murder and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. For his conviction of second-degree murder, Magee was sentenced to thirty-five years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC), with ten years suspended and five years’ post-release supervision. For his conviction of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, Magee was sentenced to ten years in the custody of the MDOC, with ten years suspended and five years’ post-release supervision. The sentences were ordered to run consecutively. In his motion for post-conviction relief, Magee claimed his guilty plea was involuntary because: (1) his attorney was ineffective and misrepresented the consequences of the plea and sentence; (2) his attorney was ineffective and failed to properly investigate his case; and (3) the circuit judge coerced him into pleading guilty. Regarding his misrepresentation claim, Magee asserted his trial counsel “advised [him] to take the plea because he would only serve six to seven years in prison.” According to Magee, after he entered his guilty plea, he learned that he was not eligible for early release and “that his actual time to serve in prison would be 25 years.” The Mississippi Supreme Court concluded Magee was entitled to a second evidentiary hearing about “whether Magee was misinformed as to the consequences of his pleas of guilty and whether those pleas were given in reliance on the alleged misinformation.” The circuit court's judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Magee v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Scotty Meredith ran for mayor of Clarksdale, Mississippi. The mayor at the time, Chuck Espy, challenged whether Meredith was qualified to run for mayor on the basis that Meredith was not a Clarksdale resident. The Clarksdale Municipal Democratic Executive Committee found that Meredith was not a resident of Clarksdale and was not qualified to run for mayor. The trial court, similarly, found that Meredith was unqualified to run for mayor. Meredith appealed the judgment of the Circuit Court of Coahoma County. Under Mississippi Code Section 23-15-300, if a candidate fails to prove in their qualifying information that they meet the two-year residency requirement, the candidate had to prove by absolute proof that they meet or will meet the residency requirement on or before the applicable deadline. Finding no error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court was affirmed. View "Meredith v. Clarksdale Democratic Executive Committee, et al." on Justia Law

Karen McGee was the president of a collections agency. When the company ran into financial trouble, she directed her business administrator to delay remitting the money it had collected for Comprehensive Radiology Services, PLLC. Meanwhile, the agency still billed for (and received commissions on) the money collected. When McGee’s scheme was discovered, her company had withheld almost $800,000 of Comprehensive Radiology’s money. McGee was sued for conversion and fraud. And the chancellor found her individually and personally liable to the radiology group for $785,549.71. On appeal, McGee argued she could not have committed conversion because, as a matter of Mississippi law, funds collected and deposited into a bank account cannot be the subject of conversion. The Mississippi Supreme Court disagreed with McGee's contention: "While the tort of conversion cannot be used to recover a mere debt, it can be used to recover identifiable money belonging to the plaintiff. ... McGee’s company had no right to keep this money to cover its own expenses but instead was obligated to remit it at the end of the month in which it was collected. By directing her employee to delay remittance of Comprehensive Radiology’s money, McGee committed conversion and is thus liable to Comprehensive Radiology for $785,549.71." View "McGee v. Comprehensive Radiology Services, PLLC" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, the issue presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review involved a premises liability claim against Riverboat Corporation of Mississippi (Riverboat). In 2014, Treslya Davis and her stepmother visited the Golden Nugget Biloxi Hotel and Casino, which was owned by Riverboat. While at the casino, Davis was playing the slot machines when the chair in which she was sitting fell backward. Davis claimed she suffered physical and emotional injuries as a result of the fall. Riverboat argued the trial court committed reversible error “by granting [Tresyla Davis’s] request to reopen the case, when the two alleged instances of fraud are demonstrably incorrect and the trial court failed to consider all of the elements of fraud necessary to justify the extraordinary relief under Rule 60(b)(1)[.]” The Supreme Court found Davis failed to prove all the necessary elements of fraud by clear and convincing evidence and that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the Rule 60(b)(1) motion. Therefore, the Court reversed the grant of the Rule 60(b)(1) motion and reinstated the summary judgment previously granted to Riverboat. View "Riverboat Corporation of Mississippi v. Davis" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review involved the award of a construction contract by the Mississippi State Port Authority at Gulfport (the MSPA) to the low-bidder, W.C. Fore Trucking, Inc. (Fore). Eutaw Construction Company, Inc. (Eutaw), another bidder, challenged that award, and the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County reversed the MSPA’s decision to award the contract to Fore. The MSPA appealed. The Supreme Court found after review that Fore's errors involved instances in which the error was minor, and the intended correct bid was evident on the face of the bid. Also, Fore’s corrected bid was a decrease in price. For these reasons, the MSPA properly followed Rule 3.106.12.4 in allowing Fore to correct its bid. Its decision was not arbitrary and capricious. The record reflected that the MSPA clearly articulated Fore’s errors, the rules that allowed for the correction of those errors, and the MSPA’s reasons for allowing the corrections. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s decision and rendered judgment in favor of the MSPA. View "Mississippi State Port Authority at Gulfport v. Eutaw Construction Company, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this interlocutory appeal was whether the circuit court had jurisdiction to hear defendant Rayvon Altman's case. In August 2020, Altman was indicted in on four counts of aggravated assault in violation of Mississippi Code Section 97-3-7(a)(1) (Rev. 2020). The indictment alleged that Altman intentionally drove his motor vehicle into another vehicle, which was occupied by four people, in an attempt to injure the occupants. It was subsequently acknowledged that the occupants of the other vehicle were Altman’s mother, siblings, and stepfather. In early 2021, Altman filed a motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that the indictment should have been dismissed because the youth court had exclusive jurisdiction under Section 43-21-151 because he was under eighteen years of age at the time of the alleged offense. The Mississippi Supreme Court found both Altman and the State agreed that the deadly weapon exception was inapplicable because Section 97-37-1 did not prohibit the concealed carrying of an automobile. Thus, the circuit court did not have jurisdiction over Altman because he was a minor at the time the alleged offense was committed. The circuit court’s order was reversed and the case remanded to the circuit court for it to render a judgment dismissing Altman’s indictment and to “forward all documents pertaining to the cause to the youth court[.]” View "Altman v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

This interlocutory appeal centered on two provisions in a will related to an estate’s attorney’s fees: (1) the testator directed that his Co-Executrices not be personally liable for any expenses incurred in administering the estate, including attorney’s fees; and (2) the testator directed that the cost of any judicial challenge to the Co-Executrices’ actions or decisions would be borne by the beneficiary lodging the challenge, regardless of the outcome. One of ten beneficiaries lodged a challenge to the Co-Executrices’ actions. But the chancellor did not order that beneficiary to bear the estate’s attorney’s fees. Instead, the chancellor ordered the Co-Executrices to personally pay the attorney’s fees incurred by the estate. Because the chancellor’s decision on attorney’s fees appeared to contradict both provisions in the will, the Mississippi Supreme Court granted the Co-Executrices’ petition for interlocutory appeal. After review, the Supreme Court found the second provision shifting the attorney’s fees from the estate to the beneficiary is unenforceable. While a testator has authority to control his own assets, he does not have authority to compel a beneficiary to pay attorney’s fees. Thus, the Court affirmed the chancellor’s order to the extent it denied the Co-Executrices’ request that the beneficiary who judicially challenged their actions to pay the estate’s attorney’s fees. That said, the Court found the first provision relieving the Co-Executrices of personal responsibility for attorney’s fees was enforceable and consistent with Mississippi public policy. That portion of the chancellor’s decision was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Estate of Michael N. Bakarich v. Bakarich" on Justia Law