Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Scotty Meredith ran for mayor of Clarksdale, Mississippi. The mayor at the time, Chuck Espy, challenged whether Meredith was qualified to run for mayor on the basis that Meredith was not a Clarksdale resident. The Clarksdale Municipal Democratic Executive Committee found that Meredith was not a resident of Clarksdale and was not qualified to run for mayor. The trial court, similarly, found that Meredith was unqualified to run for mayor. Meredith appealed the judgment of the Circuit Court of Coahoma County. Under Mississippi Code Section 23-15-300, if a candidate fails to prove in their qualifying information that they meet the two-year residency requirement, the candidate had to prove by absolute proof that they meet or will meet the residency requirement on or before the applicable deadline. Finding no error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court was affirmed. View "Meredith v. Clarksdale Democratic Executive Committee, et al." on Justia Law

Karen McGee was the president of a collections agency. When the company ran into financial trouble, she directed her business administrator to delay remitting the money it had collected for Comprehensive Radiology Services, PLLC. Meanwhile, the agency still billed for (and received commissions on) the money collected. When McGee’s scheme was discovered, her company had withheld almost $800,000 of Comprehensive Radiology’s money. McGee was sued for conversion and fraud. And the chancellor found her individually and personally liable to the radiology group for $785,549.71. On appeal, McGee argued she could not have committed conversion because, as a matter of Mississippi law, funds collected and deposited into a bank account cannot be the subject of conversion. The Mississippi Supreme Court disagreed with McGee's contention: "While the tort of conversion cannot be used to recover a mere debt, it can be used to recover identifiable money belonging to the plaintiff. ... McGee’s company had no right to keep this money to cover its own expenses but instead was obligated to remit it at the end of the month in which it was collected. By directing her employee to delay remittance of Comprehensive Radiology’s money, McGee committed conversion and is thus liable to Comprehensive Radiology for $785,549.71." View "McGee v. Comprehensive Radiology Services, PLLC" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, the issue presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review involved a premises liability claim against Riverboat Corporation of Mississippi (Riverboat). In 2014, Treslya Davis and her stepmother visited the Golden Nugget Biloxi Hotel and Casino, which was owned by Riverboat. While at the casino, Davis was playing the slot machines when the chair in which she was sitting fell backward. Davis claimed she suffered physical and emotional injuries as a result of the fall. Riverboat argued the trial court committed reversible error “by granting [Tresyla Davis’s] request to reopen the case, when the two alleged instances of fraud are demonstrably incorrect and the trial court failed to consider all of the elements of fraud necessary to justify the extraordinary relief under Rule 60(b)(1)[.]” The Supreme Court found Davis failed to prove all the necessary elements of fraud by clear and convincing evidence and that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the Rule 60(b)(1) motion. Therefore, the Court reversed the grant of the Rule 60(b)(1) motion and reinstated the summary judgment previously granted to Riverboat. View "Riverboat Corporation of Mississippi v. Davis" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review involved the award of a construction contract by the Mississippi State Port Authority at Gulfport (the MSPA) to the low-bidder, W.C. Fore Trucking, Inc. (Fore). Eutaw Construction Company, Inc. (Eutaw), another bidder, challenged that award, and the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County reversed the MSPA’s decision to award the contract to Fore. The MSPA appealed. The Supreme Court found after review that Fore's errors involved instances in which the error was minor, and the intended correct bid was evident on the face of the bid. Also, Fore’s corrected bid was a decrease in price. For these reasons, the MSPA properly followed Rule 3.106.12.4 in allowing Fore to correct its bid. Its decision was not arbitrary and capricious. The record reflected that the MSPA clearly articulated Fore’s errors, the rules that allowed for the correction of those errors, and the MSPA’s reasons for allowing the corrections. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s decision and rendered judgment in favor of the MSPA. View "Mississippi State Port Authority at Gulfport v. Eutaw Construction Company, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this interlocutory appeal was whether the circuit court had jurisdiction to hear defendant Rayvon Altman's case. In August 2020, Altman was indicted in on four counts of aggravated assault in violation of Mississippi Code Section 97-3-7(a)(1) (Rev. 2020). The indictment alleged that Altman intentionally drove his motor vehicle into another vehicle, which was occupied by four people, in an attempt to injure the occupants. It was subsequently acknowledged that the occupants of the other vehicle were Altman’s mother, siblings, and stepfather. In early 2021, Altman filed a motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that the indictment should have been dismissed because the youth court had exclusive jurisdiction under Section 43-21-151 because he was under eighteen years of age at the time of the alleged offense. The Mississippi Supreme Court found both Altman and the State agreed that the deadly weapon exception was inapplicable because Section 97-37-1 did not prohibit the concealed carrying of an automobile. Thus, the circuit court did not have jurisdiction over Altman because he was a minor at the time the alleged offense was committed. The circuit court’s order was reversed and the case remanded to the circuit court for it to render a judgment dismissing Altman’s indictment and to “forward all documents pertaining to the cause to the youth court[.]” View "Altman v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

This interlocutory appeal centered on two provisions in a will related to an estate’s attorney’s fees: (1) the testator directed that his Co-Executrices not be personally liable for any expenses incurred in administering the estate, including attorney’s fees; and (2) the testator directed that the cost of any judicial challenge to the Co-Executrices’ actions or decisions would be borne by the beneficiary lodging the challenge, regardless of the outcome. One of ten beneficiaries lodged a challenge to the Co-Executrices’ actions. But the chancellor did not order that beneficiary to bear the estate’s attorney’s fees. Instead, the chancellor ordered the Co-Executrices to personally pay the attorney’s fees incurred by the estate. Because the chancellor’s decision on attorney’s fees appeared to contradict both provisions in the will, the Mississippi Supreme Court granted the Co-Executrices’ petition for interlocutory appeal. After review, the Supreme Court found the second provision shifting the attorney’s fees from the estate to the beneficiary is unenforceable. While a testator has authority to control his own assets, he does not have authority to compel a beneficiary to pay attorney’s fees. Thus, the Court affirmed the chancellor’s order to the extent it denied the Co-Executrices’ request that the beneficiary who judicially challenged their actions to pay the estate’s attorney’s fees. That said, the Court found the first provision relieving the Co-Executrices of personal responsibility for attorney’s fees was enforceable and consistent with Mississippi public policy. That portion of the chancellor’s decision was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Estate of Michael N. Bakarich v. Bakarich" on Justia Law

Ernest Jones appealed a circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Board of Trustees of the State of Institutions of Higher Learning of the State of Mississippi (IHL) because the doctrine of judicial estoppel barred his claims. Jones became the head football coach at Alcorn State University. Subsequently, he filed a breach of contract action against the IHL on in 2008. Jones was fired in January 2009. In October 2015, Jones petitioned a bankruptcy court in Florida for protection from his creditors. Jones failed to disclose the breach of contract suit against the IHL in the bankruptcy schedule’s “list of suits and administrative proceedings to which the debtor was a party within one year immediately preceding the filing of this bankruptcy case.” A jury returned a verdict in Jones’ favor in his breach of contract suit. On the day of the verdict, he voluntarily dismissed his bankruptcy proceeding. IHL moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and the circuit court set aside the verdict. Then in April 2017, while Jones’s appeal was pending before the Court of Appeals, he filed a second bankruptcy petition, this time, Jones proposed and filed a Chapter 13 plan. Despite the pending appeal, Jones again failed to disclose the IHL suit to the bankruptcy court, attesting under oath that no such claims existed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the IHL suit. Back at the circuit court, IHL moved for summary judgment, arguing judicial estoppel barred Jones from recovery. Within ten days of the IHL’s seeking dismissal, Jones moved to amend his bankruptcy plan and for the first time disclosed the IHL lawsuit. Thereafter, the circuit court held a hearing on the IHL’s motion for summary judgment. The Mississippi Supreme Court found no abuse of the circuit court’s discretion in applying judicial estoppel to the facts found in this record. View "Jones v. Alcorn State University, et al." on Justia Law

The question presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court in this case “boils down to one of statutory interpretation:” whether plaintiff Crystal Bufkin was “legally entitled to recover” damages from her employer under the uninsured motorist statute, Mississippi Code Section 83-11-101(1) (Supp. 2021). The Supreme Court previously held that employees are not legally entitled to recover from their employers and thus could not make a claim under uninsured motorist coverages. Bufkin acknowledged that precedent precluded her claim, but she argued Medders v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 623 So. 2d 979 (Miss. 1993 )and its progeny were wrongly decided because the uninsured motorist law should be liberally construed in her favor. The Supreme Court concluded it already rejected the arguments Bufkin presented here, and declined to overrule Medders. View "Bufkin v. Geico Insurance Agency, Inc." on Justia Law

Charles McRae and the McRae Law Firm, PLLC, filed a notice of appeal of a non-final judgment. The Mississippi Supreme Court entered an order that treated the notice of appeal as a petition for an interlocutory appeal, granted the petition, and stayed the proceedings at the trial court. Mississippi appellate rules provided that a petition for an interlocutory appeal had to be filed “within 21 days after the entry of such order in the trial court . . . .” The time for taking an appeal under Rule 5 may not be extended. Because McRae filed the petition for an interlocutory appeal more than twenty-one days after the entry of the order from which he sought an appeal, the petition for an interlocutory appeal was untimely. Therefore, the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal and, accordingly, it was dismissed. View "McRae v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Tony Clark was convicted by jury of capital murder, attempted murder, and possession of a firearm by a previously convicted felon. Clark was sentenced to death by lethal injection. After careful review of the record and Clark’s arguments, the Mississippi Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "Clark v. Mississippi" on Justia Law