Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Following a back surgery, Daniel Shope continued to experience lower back pain. Shope was referred to Dr. Michael Winkelmann at NewSouth Neurospine for an evaluation. Dr. Winkelmann recommended a course of opioid medication to enable Shope to participate in physical therapy and to return to work. In January 2013, Shope signed a NewSouth Neurospine Pain Management Policy, which specifically provided that Dr. Winkelmann could stop prescribing any or all medications if Shope used any illegal substances. In May 2014, Dr. Winkelmann informed Shope that he had been noncompliant with the policy and ceased his patient-physician relationship with Shope. Shope filed a complaint against Dr. Winkelmann in November 2018 in county court. The county court granted summary judgment to Dr. Winkelmann and NewSouth, finding that the claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations. Two days later, Shope appealed and designated the record. That same day, Dr. Winkelmann filed a Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 59 motion to alter or amend the judgment, which requested that the trial court consider relief under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and the Litigation Accountability Act. Shope received a cost estimate from the court clerk for $4,825.20 for the designation of the entire record. Shope revised his request for only Plaintiff's pleadings. The revised estimate was $2,593.20, which Shope paid. The trial court then ruled on Dr. Winkelmann's motion; Dr. Winkelmann and NewSouth then designated the record. Based on those designations, the clerk amended the estimate of the cost of preparing the record to $4,297.50; minus Shope's prepayment, the balance was $2,052. By October 4, 2020, thirty days after the trial court had ruled on Dr. Winkelmann’s posttrial motion, Shope had not paid the balance. Shope argued that under the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure, he was only obligated to pay for the portions of the record that he designated. On October 16, 2020, Dr. Winkelmann filed a motion to dismiss Shope’s appeal due to lack of appellate jurisdiction. On October 23, 2020, Shope paid the balance of the cost bond in the amount of $2,052, plus an additional $500. That same day, he filed a certificate of compliance. On November 3, 2020, the circuit court issued an order dismissing the appeal. Shope appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court November 4, 2020. The Supreme Court found that becanse Shope failed to pay the cost bond within the time frame provided by statute, his appeal was not perfected, and the circuit court lacked jurisdiction. Therefore, Dr. Winkelmann’s motion to dismiss the appeal was appropriately granted. View "Shope v. Winkelmann, et al." on Justia Law

A jury returned a $4 million verdict in favor of Plaintiff Jana Bracewell, Administratix of the Estate of Cameron Chase Hill, in a medical negligence/wrongful-death suit against Defendants, B. Michael Weber, M.D., and The OB-GYN Group of Laurel, P.A. Defendants appealed the judgment, claiming the trial court erred by denying their posttrial motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or, in the alternative, a new trial. Plaintiff cross-appealed, claiming the trial court erred by reducing the jury’s noneconomic-damages award. Dr. Weber’s partner, Dr. Robert DeSantis, was Erica Shae Hill’s primary OB-GYN throughout her pregnancy. On November 23, 2001, Hill went into labor around 2:30 a.m.; she went to South Central Regional Medical Center in Laurel, Mississippi. Dr. Weber, who was on call for Dr. DeSantis that night, managed Hill’s care throughout labor, and he delivered Cameron Chase Hill by vaginal delivery at approximately 1:10 p.m. that afternoon. Cameron and Hill were discharged on November 25, 2001. The next day, Cameron was taken to Forrest General Hospital because he was not eating. Cameron ultimately was diagnosed with hypoxic ischemic encephalopathy (HIE), a neurological injury resulting from lack of oxygen to the brain. According to Defendants, Cameron’s Forrest General Hospital records for his admission shortly after birth included a secondary diagnosis of “viral meningits – NOS.” Cameron lived only to age five. Plaintiff filed a complaint in December 2002 on behalf of Cameron, alleging negligence on the part of Dr. Weber and The OB-GYN Group of Laurel. The complaint claimed that Dr. Weber breached the applicable standard of care by failing to recognize, appreciate, and respond to the signs and symptoms of fetal distress, ischemia, and/or hypoxia during the labor and delivery of Cameron. The Mississippi Supreme Court found no error in the trial court’s decision to deny Defendants’ motion for a JNOV or a new trial. As to Plaintiff’s cross-appeal, the Court agreed that the trial court erred by reducing the jury’s noneconomic-damages award, given that this action was filed before September 1, 2004, the date the amended version of Section 11-1-60(2)(a) went into effect. View "Weber, et al. v. Estate of Hill" on Justia Law

Antwoine Cork was convicted by jury on three counts of sale of a controlled substance for selling cocaine to a police informant three times. Pursuant to the habitual and subsequent offender sentencing enhancements, the trial judge sentenced him to sixty years for each of the three convictions to run concurrently. On appeal, Cork argued: (1) his convictions for three separate counts of sale of a controlled substance violated the prohibition against double jeopardy; (2) his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment; (3) the trial court misapplied the law when sentencing Cork pursuant to Section 41-29-147; (4) the trial court erred by granting the State’s motion to amend the indictment; (5) the trial court erred by denying Cork’s motion for a continuance; (6) the trial judge should have recused; (7) Cork was denied effective assistance of counsel; and (8) Cork’s convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed Cork's convictions and sentence. View "Cork v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, Schaffner Manufacturing Company, Inc., argued that the circuit court erred by denying a portion of its motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Schaffner contended Darius Powell’s claims of negligence, negligent hiring, retention, and supervision all fell within the ambit of the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Act. Powell alleged that on December 11, 2017, Rederick Kelly and O’Derrick Clark severely injured him while in the course and scope of their employment. The trial court ruled that the claims of assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Kelly and Clark were barred by the statute of limitations. However, the trial court found that Powell’s claims of “Negligence, Negligent Hiring, Retention, and Supervision, and Vicarious Liability” against Schaffner did not fall within the scope of the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Act and denied the joint motion to dismiss those claims. The Mississippi Supreme Court agreed with Schaffner that Powell’s claims of negligent hiring, retention, supervision, and general negligence for failing to provide a safe work environment were all claims of direct negligence against Schaffner. "These claims properly fall within the scope of the Act. Therefore, the Act is Powell’s exclusive remedy for those claims, and those claims should have been dismissed." View "Schaffner Manufacturing Company, Inc. v. Powell" on Justia Law

Timothy and Rebecca Hillhouse entered into a contract with Chris Cook Construction for the construction of their home. The contract contained an arbitration provision mandating that arbitration be conducted before a forum that was unavailable at the time the contract was executed. The trial court entered an order compelling arbitration and appointing an arbitrator. The Mississippi Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in so doing: because the forum was a contract requirement, the arbitration provision was unenforceable, and appointing an arbitrator required courts to reform the contractual agreement between the parties. Judgment was reversed and the trial court’s order compelling arbitration and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hillhouse v. Chris Cook Construction, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Tommie Queen was convicted of three counts of dog fighting in violation of Mississippi Code Section 97-41-19 (Rev. 2014). Queen appealed, arguing: (1) the trial court erred by admitting expert testimony; (2) there was not a sufficient evidentiary basis to support his convictions; and (3) the trial judge erred by not recusing. Finding no error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed Queen’s convictions and sentences. View "Queen v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Dr. Edwin Holt died tragically by his own hand at age forty-five. He left five minor children. At the time of his death, Dr. Holt was finalizing a divorce in Texas and seeking to have his dental license reinstated in Mississippi. Dr. Holt had hired first-year attorney Joshua Stretch to represent him in the dental-licensure matter. Due to his inexperience, Stretch associated more seasoned attorneys at Obert Law Group, Keith Obert and William Brown. When Dr. Holt died, Stretch still held $73,000 as a yet-to-be-earned retainer on the licensure issue. Stretch drove Dr. Holt’s mother, Janet Holt, to the funeral. He told her he wanted to handle estate matters. In all, Stretch, Obert, and occasionally Brown's efforts included locating and protecting estate assets and dealing with Dr. Holt’s ex-wife, who strenuously asserted the divorce was never finalized so she was Dr. Holt’s heir and not her five minor children. Stretch did not return the remainder of the prior dental-licensure retainer to Dr. Holt’s estate. Instead, he submitted this money to Obert Law Group, which in turn used this money to pay its first $73,000 in bills to the estate. After exhausting this money, Obert Law Group billed the executrix. The attorneys did not seek prior court approval of their attorney’s fees. Nor did they advise the executrix the bills should be court-approved before she paid them. Instead, because Janet believed she had no reason to question the invoices, she simply wrote checks from the estate to pay the invoices submitted to her, totaling $110,800. Their representation of the estate ended when Janet petitioned the court to replace Stretch, Obert, and Brown with new counsel. At this point, their motion for final accounting and attorney’s fees had yet to be approved by the court. And before approval, the trustee of the revocable trust established by Dr. Holt, to which he had bequeathed the residuary of his estate for the benefit of his family, petitioned the court for the return of all the fees they had collected. The trustee asserted Obert Law Group had never sought preapproval of its attorney’s fees and had never advised Janet of her duty to first seek court approval before paying Obert Law Group with estate assets. The trustee also alleged Obert Law Group padded its bills and mismanaged the estate. After a two-day hearing, the chancellor determined only $96,951 of the attorney’s fees in the estate matter were reasonable. So he ordered Obert Law Group reimburse the estate $84,945. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor's decision, finding the chancellor carefully considered Obert Law Group’s evidence and the factors for reasonable attorney’s fees set forth in Mississippi Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5, and it was not an abuse of discretion to order return of the fees. View "Obert Law Group, P.A.et al. v. Holt" on Justia Law

The issue presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review in this case involved the temporary termination of a father’s child-support obligation. Because the Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals did not apply the abuse-of-discretion standard of review applicable to the chancery court’s decision, the Court of Appeals' decision was reversed, and the chancery court's judgment was reinstated and affirmed. View "Davis v. Henderson" on Justia Law

KD Oak Grove and KP Westwood entered into two separate contracts with Coumanis Allen, a general contractor. Subsequently, Coumanis did not pay subcontractors for their work, and Warren & Warren, one of Coumanis’s subcontractors, filed construction liens on Oak Grove’s and Westwood’s separate real property. In both payment actions, Warren admitted to failing to file its lis pendens notice along with its construction liens, waiting 110 days to file it. The two separate legal actions were brought before the Chancery Court of Lamar County, Mississippi, and were assigned to separate chancellors. Oak Grove and Westwood filed separate motions for summary judgment, which were denied by the chancellors; they timely appealed. The crux of the appeals was one of statutory interpretation: whether the failure to comply with Mississippi Code Section 85-7- 405(1)(c)(i) (Supp. 2020), which required the simultaneous filing of a lis pendens notice with the commencement of the payment action, rendered Warren’s liens unenforceable and ineffective. Chancellor Sheldon erred by denying Oak Grove’s motions for summary judgment, and Chancellor Gambrell erred by denying Westwood’s motion to dissolve. Therefore, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the chancellors’ decisions and entered summary judgment in favor of KD Oak Grove and KP Westwood. View "KD Oak Grove, LLC v. Warren & Warren Asphalt Paving, LLC" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review arose from a single-car accident involving a 2005 Santa Fe Hyundai, which had been rented by Joyce Hutton, and driven by Derek Bell on U.S. Highway 61. It was reported to the police officer that the car drifted into the median, and Bell lost control. Both Bell and Hutton were injured. Hutton filed suit against Hyundai Motor America, Hyundai Motor Company, and Bell, and Bell filed a cross-claim against Hyundai. Hutton settled her injury claims against Bell prior to trial. Bell and Hutton proceeded against Hyundai. At trial, both alleged the car was defectively designed. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged the Hyundai was defectively designed due to an exposed, unprotected component of the anti-lock braking system (ABS). Plaintiffs claimed that an unseen and never-discovered object of unknown elements and composition struck a component part, dislodging an ABS tone ring temporarily, which caused the vehicle’s computer to send erratic braking signals. The erratic signals in turn caused the ABS computer to assume that the front right wheel was not turning, which in turn caused braking to occur on the front left side. The alleged one-sided braking caused Bell to lose control before the vehicle overturned multiple times. Hyundai countered that a phantom object was never seen, found, or identified by Bell, Hutton, the state trooper who investigated the accident, eyewitnesses to the accident, Plaintiffs’ witnesses (experts or otherwise), or anyone else. Further, Hyundai argued that, assuming arguendo that Plaintiffs’ multiple-chain-reaction theory were possible, the trajectory of any object would have occurred within fifty milliseconds - a scientific, physical impossibility. After a two-week trial, the jury returned a verdict for Plaintiffs: $193,000 for Hutton and $2 million for Bell. Hyundai appealed, claiming a number of errors by the trial court. The Supreme Court the trial court committed reversible error, therefore the verdict was reversed, and judgment rendered in favor of Hyundai. View "Hyundai Motor America et al. v. Hutton et al." on Justia Law