Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The dispute underlying this appeal began with the failure of Camille Village, LLC, the owner of an apartment complex, to deposit additional money in escrow for repairs after it was demanded by Lenders Federal National Mortgage Association and Barings Multifamily Capital, LLC. The Lenders held Camille Village to be in default, lengthy settlement negotiations failed, and the amount demanded for repairs increased dramatically after additional inspections. After a trial, the chancery court concluded that Camille Village was in default and had failed to prove the Lenders had acted in bad faith. Finding no reversible error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Camille Village, LLC v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n, et al." on Justia Law

An explosion at the Omega Protein Plant in Moss Point, Mississippi killed one man and seriously injured several others. Multiple lawsuits were filed against Omega in federal district court. Colony Insurance Company filed a declaratory judgment action in state circuit court seeking a declaration that it did not cover bodily injuries arising out of the Moss Point facility explosion. Evanston Insurance Company intervened also seeking a declaration of no coverage for the same injuries: Evanston provided a $5 million excess liability policy, which provided coverage after Colony’s $1 million policy was exhausted. Because Colony settled one of the underlying personal injury cases for $1 million (the limits under its policy), Omega sought excess coverage from Evanston for the injuries that occurred at its plant. A special master was appointed, and the trial court granted Evanston’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the pollution exclusion in the insurance contract barred coverage. Omega appealed that grant of summary judgment. The Mississippi Supreme Court found that a pollution exclusion in the insurance contract was ambiguous, and should have been construed in favor of the insured, allowing coverage. Further, the Court found the question of whether coverage was triggered was governed by the language of the contract, and that Evanston failed to prove there could be no coverage under the excess liability policy. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment as to all issues and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Omega Protein, Inc. v. Evanston Insurance Company" on Justia Law

After a sinkhole formed on the leasehold of Jad Khalaf, the Pearl River Valley Water Supply District (District) filed a complaint against Khalaf to recoup the costs of repairing the sinkhole and for other relief. Khalaf moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, which the chancery court granted. The District appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed dismissal. View "Pearl River Valley Water Supply District v. Khalaf" on Justia Law

Two employees of RGH Enterprises, Inc. (RGH), stole valuables that belonged to the Ghafarianpoors while cleaning their residence in preparation of restoration the residence. The Ghafarianpoors sought recovery under alternative theories, negligence and vicarious liability. RGH sought summary judgment in the trial court on both. The trial court granted summary judgment for RGH as to the Ghafarianpoors’ claims of negligence, but it denied RGH summary judgment as to the Ghafarianpoors’ claims of vicarious liability. Because the record revealed the employees were without actual or apparent authority to steal from the Ghafarianpoors, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and remanded the judgment of the county court denying summary judgment. View "RGH Enterprises, Inc. v. Ghafarianpoor" on Justia Law

Summary judgment was granted to Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (Ocwen), as were motions to dismiss filed by Jennifer Shackelford (Shackelford), Liberty Home Equity Solutions, Inc. (Liberty), and Professional Services of Potts Camp, Inc. (Potts Camp). As to the summary-judgment motion, the chancery court granted it on grounds that the deed under which Julia Kelly claimed her property interest was a void conveyance under long-standing homestead law, codified in Mississippi Code Section 89-1-29 (Rev. 2011). As to the motions to dismiss, the chancery court granted those motions after determining Kelly’s claims were time-barred by the relevant statutes of limitation. In 1993, Harvey Lamb and his wife Idele, conveyed the Subject Property to their son, Harvey Lamb (Lamb), via warranty deed. Lamb lived on this property with his wife, Sydney. Years later, in March 2010, Lamb executed a “Warranty Deed With Restriction” that conveyed the Subject Property to him and his wife, “for their lifetime, with the remainder at their death or revocation of life estate, to their daughter, Julia L. Kelly[.]” Sydney never joined in the execution of the 2010 Warranty Deed. At some point after the 2010 Warranty Deed, Lamb and Sydney divorced. In connection with their divorce, Sydney executed a “Quit Claim Deed & Relinquishment of Life Estate” in May 2012. In 2015, Lamb received a reverse mortgage from Liberty; a deed of trust relating to this mortgage encumbered the property. Lamb died in 2017. Kelly was Lamb’s sole heir, and she was appointed administratrix of his estate. In January 2018, Liberty assigned the 2015 Deed of Trust to Ocwen. Ocwen alleged that Lamb was in default under the 2015 Deed of Trust and that the loan had been accelerated. Ocwen sought a declaration that the conveyance to Kelly under the 2010 Warranty deed was void because Sydney did nto join in it, and that the conveyance should have been set aside as a cloud on title. Kelly counterclaimed against Ocwen and cross-claimed against Shackleford, Liberty and Potts Camp. Finding no reversible in the chancery court's order granting summary judgment and dismissing the other claims, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. View "Kelly v. Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC, et al." on Justia Law

After losing their bids for the November 2019 elections for Quitman County Chancery and Circuit Clerk, Shirley Smith Taylor and Tea “Windless” Keeler, respectively, filed election contests. In July 2020, following a two-day trial of the consolidated contests, the court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dismissing the election contests with prejudice and finding that six enumerated claims brought by Taylor and Keeler were frivolous.Further, the court denied Brenda Wiggs’s and T.H. “Butch” Scipper’s requests that Taylor and Keeler be sanctioned, and that Wiggs and Scipper be awarded attorneys’ fees under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) and the Litigation Accountability Act of 1988 (LAA). The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed in part the circuit court’s denial of an award of attorneys’ fees under Rule 11(b) since the court’s decision was not an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded in part the circuit court’s decision to deny the imposition of sanctions and award of attorneys’ fees under the LAA in light of its finding that six of Taylor’s and Keeler’s claims were frivolous. View "In Re: Contest of the November 5, 2019 General Election for the Chancery Clerk of Quitman, Mississippi" on Justia Law

A circuit court denied Brittany Spiers leave to amend her complaint, and granted a motion to dismiss brought by Oak Grove Credit, LLC (OGC), and other companies, including, Columbia Credit, LLC, Pine Belt Credit, LLC, and “John Does Business 1-5” (collectively, “the Creditor Companies”). Spiers worked for OGC, a creditor business located just outside Hattiesburg, Mississippi, until February 2019. At that time, OGC terminated Spiers for reasons Spiers alleged were discriminatory. According to Spiers, OGC terminated her because of her gender and her pregnancy. Specifically, Spiers alleged that her supervisor raised concerns about her pregnancy in regards to work and childcare and even called her pregnancy a “disease.” Spiers also alleged that her supervisor declined to hire another person because that person was pregnant. In February 2020, Spiers filed her complaint primarily alleging pregnancy and sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Even though Spiers only worked for OGC, she brought her lawsuit collectively against OGC and the Creditor Companies because she alleged that these companies “constitute an integrated enterprise/joint employer in relation to Spiers as employees from each location are fluid and work for and between the sister companies.” Alternatively, Spiers alleged that “the Defendant’s actions constitute the torts of negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, termination in violation of public policy, gross negligence, and negligent supervision.” OGC and the Creditor Companies removed the case to federal district court, which issued an order as to Spiers’s Title VII claim, finding that Spiers “did not plead sufficient facts for the Court to infer that Defendants meet Title VII’s definition of an employer.” The district court “dismiss[ed] Plaintiff’s Title VII claims without prejudice.” The district court, however, “declin[ed] to exercise pendent jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state-law claims and remand[ed] the case [back] to the Circuit Court of Lamar County, Mississippi.” Upon remand to the circuit court, Spiers filed a motion for leave to amend her complaint. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the state circuit court's order dismissing the state-law claims, but reversed to the extent that the order denied Spiers leave to amend her complaint. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Spiers v. Oak Grove Credit, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Two cases were consolidated for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review. In the first appeal, Singing River MOB, LLC (MOB), argued that the leases between itself and Singing River Health System (SRHS) and the lease between Jackson County, Mississippi (County), and SRHS were valid and that the chancery court erred by finding the leases invalid under Mississippi’s “minutes rule.” In the second appeal, Jackson County and SRHS contended the chancery court erred by fashioning its own equitable relief as a result of the first ruling. MOB also raised its own objection as to the manner in which the equitable relief was fashioned. After careful review, the Supreme Court affirmed and remanded the partial summary-judgment order as to the first appeal (No. 2019-IA-01630-SCT); however, the Court reversed and remanded that order as to the second appeal (No. 2019-IA-01653-SCT). View "Singing River MOB, LLC v. Jackson County" on Justia Law

In 2018, five of the late Richard Redd’s six children (Petitioners) sought the appointment of a conservator and guardian over their mother, Joyce Redd. They also sought various temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunctions to prevent Joyce from taking further financial action without their approval. Petitioners claimed their brother, Brian Redd, unduly coerced Joyce into financial decisions detrimental to her estate. Joyce filed a motion for summary judgment as to the conservatorship issue, which the chancery court granted. The chancellor found Petitioners failed to produce certificates from at least two examining physicians stating that Joyce was unable to manage her own personal and financial affairs. Regions Bank, as the trustee of the trusts at issue, moved for mediation regarding the remaining issues. The chancellor granted Regions’ motion and, after mediation, the parties settled the case. Disagreements later arose regarding the terms of the settlement, which the chancery court resolved in favor of Petitioners. Both Joyce and Petitioners appealed the final judgment. Finding no reversible error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the final judgment. View "In the Matter of the Conservatorship of Joyce G. Redd" on Justia Law

This appeal raised a question of first impression for the Mississippi Supreme Court's consideration concerning the unit of prosecution in felon-in-possession cases. Stanley McGlasten, a convicted felon, was caught with four guns in a small residence. He was charged with and convicted of four separate violations of of Mississippi Code Section 97-37-5(1) (Rev. 2020). And he was sentenced to separate terms of ten years’ imprisonment on each of the four counts, to be served consecutively. Specifically, the issue for the Court's resolution was what the phrase, "any firearm" meant: did it mean one firearm—thus permitting the State to stretch the four firearms McGlasten simultaneously possessed into four separate counts, exposing him to four times the punishment? Or did it encompass the possession of multiple guns, thereby exposing McGlasten to just one count of unlawfully possessing the four firearms found that day in the house? After review, the Court felt it had no choice but to hold that the answer to both of these questions was yes. "[T]he statute’s use of the phrase 'any firearm' to define the unit of prosecution is susceptible to both the singular and plural meaning of 'any.' So it is without question ambiguous." When a criminal statute was ambiguous, the rule of lenity mandated the Court to interpret the statute in favor of the accused. "That means we must adopt the interpretation that 'any firearm' includes multiple firearms possessed at the same time and in the same place. Therefore, McGlasten’s multiple convictions cannot stand." Because the State presented evidence that McGlasten possessed the four weapons at the same time in the same small house, his four convictions merge into one count of conviction. Thus, only one of McGlasten’s convictions can be affirmed. The matter was remanded to the circuit court to vacate McGlasten's sentences, merge the four counts to one, and to resentence him on the one remaining count. View "McGlasten v. Mississippi" on Justia Law