Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Johnny Nevels appealed his convictions on three counts of drug possession. He claimed he was entitled to a circumstantial evidence instruction, which the trial court refused. He also argued his trial should not have proceeded in his absence. After reviewing Nevels’s circumstantial-evidence-instruction claim, the Mississippi Supreme Court overruled its previous case law that required a special instruction ramping up the burden of proof in circumstantial evidence cases. Because the jury in this case was properly instructed on the burden of proof, the Court found no reversible jury instruction error. Furthermore, the Court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determining Nevels had waived his right to be present and thus could be tried in absentia. Nonetheless, Nevels could not waive his right to be present at his later felony sentencing, making it an error for the trial court to sentence Nevels in absentia. Nevels’ convictions on three counts of drug possession were affirmed, but his sentences were vacated, and the case remanded to the trial court for resentencing with Nevels present. View "Nevels v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Talib Mujahid was convicted by jury of selling methamphetamine. He was sentenced to eight years in prison. His appellate counsel filed a Lindsey brief, certifying he found no arguable issues to appeal. Mujahid opted to file a pro se brief, arguing the judge should recused, a witness was wrongly allowed to testify, he was incorrectly sentenced as a habitual offender, and his trial counsel was ineffective. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court found no merit to any of Mujahid’s claims, and affirmed Mujahid’s conviction and sentence for sale of methamphetamine. View "Mujahed v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

In the aftermath of her divorce from ex-Methodist minister Andrew Johnson, Kim Miller sued not only Johnson but also his employer, the Mississippi Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church (MUMC). Miller also sued fellow MUMC minister Susan Woodard. Her claims against Johnson were aimed at his risky extramarital sexual behavior, which led to Johnson contracting HIV and later infecting Miller with the virus. Miller based her claims against MUMC and Woodard on her allegation that, had the conference and the fellow minister followed United Methodist policy and procedure, they would have discovered Johnson’s behavior and remedied it or warned Miller before she contracted HIV. The question before the Mississippi Supreme Court on interlocutory appeal was whether she established a wrong for which she could legally recover. After review, the Court found "it is clear that Miller seeks to hold MUMC and Woodard legally accountable for failing to follow religious doctrine and procedure. Under the First Amendment, this Court has no authority to consider and enforce religious standards. Thus, MUMC and Woodard are entitled to summary judgment." The Court found Miller’s claims against her ex-husband, Johnson, were not barred by the First Amendment. Still, Johnson insisted he was entitled to summary judgment based on a mutual release in Miller and Johnson’s divorce settlement. The Court found Johnson did not pursue his affirmative defense based on the release for more than two and a half years. By that time, the trial court deemed this defense waived. And after review, the Court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Johnson summary judgment on this basis. The trial court's orders denying MUMC’s and Woodard’s motions for summary judgment were reversed; the order denying Johnson’s motion for summary judgment was affirmed and Miller’s claims against Johnson remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Woodard v. Miller" on Justia Law

Kemily and Kelvin Rankin were married in July 2007 and had two children during the course of their marriage. In December 2017, Kemily filed a complaint for divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment or, in the alternative, irreconcilable differences. At the conclusion of Kemily’s case-in-chief, Kelvin moved to dismiss the complaint for divorce and argued that the evidence “wholly, completely, [and] totally fail[ed] to make out a case for habitual cruel and inhuman treatment.” The chancellor entered a fifteen-page memorandum opinion and final judgment that denied Kemily’s complaint for divorce, finding “that the evidence presented [wa]s insufficient to grant [Kemily] a divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment.” Kemily timely appealed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals found that “there was sufficient evidence to support granting the divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment” and therefore reversed the chancellor’s judgment and remanded the case “for further findings in accordance with [its] opinion.” Kelvin filed a petition for writ of certiorari and argued that the Court of Appeals’ decision was (1) in direct conflict with well-established law regarding appellate review; and (2) in direct conflict with a prior decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court. The Supreme Court found the appellate court's decision was based on the absence of an express finding by the chancellor regarding Kemily's credibility, thus failing to recognize the required assumption “that the chancellor resolved [the credibility] issue[] in favor of [Kelvin].” The Supreme Court ultimately reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, and affirmed the chancery court’s denial of the complaint for divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. View "Rankin v. Rankin" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sought to overturn a chancellor’s decision confirming a partition sale. They argued they were entitled to a new sale because the COVID-19 pandemic rendered the prior sale unfair. The Mississippi Supreme Court determined Plaintiffs did not claim the chancellor abused his discretion, nor did the Court found an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the decision was affirmed. View "Osby v. Janes" on Justia Law

At issue before the Mississippi Supreme Court in this interlocutory appeal was whether the trial court erred by finding cause to grant a 120-day extension of time to serve process on Progressive Gulf Insurance Company. Plaintiffs, Jaswinder Kaur, Harvinder Singh, Karanveer Kamboj, and Gurdev Kamboj, were occupants of a vehicle that was involved in a collision with a vehicle operated by Mary Orebo and owned by Cassandra Mann. Plaintiffs’ vehicle had uninsured-motorist coverage provided by Progressive Gulf Insurance Company. Each Plaintiff filed a separate suit against all three Defendants on the eve of the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations. Progressive contended that difficulty locating other Defendants, the owner and driver of the vehicle, was not adequate cause. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in that decision. However, all parties agreed that the circuit court erred by refusing to dismiss the suits of three of the Plaintiffs who failed to seek extensions of time to serve process on Progressive before the end of the original 120-day period. View "Progressive Gulf Insurance Company v. Kaur, et al." on Justia Law

Bettye McNutt filed a complaint against Dr. Vivian Sze Ting Lo, Methodist-Olive Branch Hospital (Methodist), and others asserting the wrongful death of her son due to medical malpractice. Because Dr. Lo had not been served with a presuit notice of claim, the circuit court dismissed the claims against Dr. Lo and, because the statute of limitations had expired, the dismissal was with prejudice. After Dr. Lo’s dismissal, Methodist filed a motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that McNutt’s vicarious liability claims based on Dr. Lo’s conduct were extinguished when Dr. Lo was dismissed with prejudice. The circuit court denied the motion for partial summary judgment, and Methodist appealed. The Mississippi Supreme Court found the circuit court properly denied partial summary judgment. Although Dr. Lo was dismissed with prejudice, the dismissal was not an adjudication on the merits, and McNutt did not enter into a settlement release and indemnity agreement with Dr. Lo. View "Methodist Healthcare-Olive Branch Hospital v. McNutt" on Justia Law

Eric Parish and Parish Transport LLC (Parish Transport) emailed Doug Jordan, the Vice President of Jordan Carriers Inc. (Jordan Carriers), to inquire about purchasing heavy haul equipment from Jordan Carriers. After several email exchanges, Doug Jordan offered to sell the equipment for $1,443,000. Months later, Eric Parish responded, submitting Parish Transport’s offer to buy the equipment for $1,250,000. Later that day, Jordan replied, informing Parish Transport that he needed to discuss the offer and would get back with an answer. Jordan concluded his email with his name and contact information. After discussing the deal with his partner, Jordan replied to Parish’s email, stating, “Ok. Let’s do it.” But this time, Jordan’s email concluded with “Sent from my iPhone” instead of his name and contact information. The next day, Jordan received a higher bid for the equipment from Lone Star Transportation LLC (Lone Star), which Jordan accepted verbally over the telephone. After receiving a confirmation email from Lone Star, Jordan emailed Parish Transport informing the company that “a contract has already been entered into for the sale of [the equipment].” Parish Transport sued for breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation. The matter was later transferred and consolidated with Jordan Carriers’ motion for declaratory judgment. After the cases were consolidated, Jordan Carriers moved for summary judgment, arguing “that it did not have an enforceable contract with Parish [Transport] for the sale of the equipment.” The circuit court agreed and granted Jordan Carriers’ motion for summary judgment. Parish Transport appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment because “[w]ithout a signature, an enforceable contract does not exist.” The Court of Appeals determined that “[m]erely sending an email does not satisfy the signature requirement” and that “[a]n email that states ‘Sent from my iPhone’ does not indicate that the sender intended to sign the record.” The Mississippi Supreme Court granted certiorari to address an issue of first impression: an interpretation or application of Mississippi’s Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA). After careful analysis, the Court found the UETA permitted contracts to be formed by electronic means, i.e, emails. Further, the Court found that the determination of whether an email was electronically signed pursuant to the UETA was a question of fact that turned on a party’s intent to adopt or accept the writing, which was a determination for the fact finder. Because there was a genuine issue of material fact about Doug Jordan’s intent, judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Parish Transport LLC, et al. v. Jordan Carriers Inc." on Justia Law

The crux of this interlocutory appeal was whether Plaintiffs, complaining of personal injury and property damage as a result of the alleged improper use of an oil-disposal well, had to exhaust their administrative remedies before the Mississippi State Oil and Gas Board (MSOGB) prior to proceeding on their common-law claims in the circuit court. Because the Mississippi Supreme Court determined the MSOGB could provide no adequate remedy for the Baucums’ personal-injury and property-damage claims, the Baucums were not required to exhaust administrative remedies before proceeding in the circuit court. View "Petro Harvester Oil & Gas Co., LLC, et al. v. Baucum" on Justia Law

In March 2017, Sybil Brooks hired Jason Sebren to make repairs to a mobile home that she owned, and she allowed Sebren to live in the mobile home in exchange. Allegedly unbeknownst to Brooks, defendant Michael Buford began helping Sebren make the repairs, and he and his wife also moved into the mobile home. Subsequently, Sebren and Brooks had an argument, and Sebren moved out of the mobile home. Brooks stated that, because she did not have any agreement with Buford, told him to leave the mobile home. That same morning, Brooks also called the Pearl Police Department and stated that people were living in her rental house who did not have permission to be there. Four officers were dispatched to the property. One officer testified she asked Buford for any documents or proof that he was supposed to be at the home. Buford could not provide documentation. Another officer asked Buford “did he have any issues with me searching him and he advised he did not.” That officer conducted a search of Buford’s person and felt a can of smokeless tobacco. He opened the tobacco can and observed what he believed to be crystal methamphetamine. The issue this case presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review centered on whether a police officer who obtained consent to search the person of another, had to obtain additional consent to search a specific, innocuous container found on that person. The Court of Appeals found that the defendant’s consent to the search encompassed the search of the smokeless tobacco can found in his pocket. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court agreed and affirmed the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. View "Buford v. Mississippi" on Justia Law