Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs sought to overturn a chancellor’s decision confirming a partition sale. They argued they were entitled to a new sale because the COVID-19 pandemic rendered the prior sale unfair. The Mississippi Supreme Court determined Plaintiffs did not claim the chancellor abused his discretion, nor did the Court found an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the decision was affirmed. View "Osby v. Janes" on Justia Law

At issue before the Mississippi Supreme Court in this interlocutory appeal was whether the trial court erred by finding cause to grant a 120-day extension of time to serve process on Progressive Gulf Insurance Company. Plaintiffs, Jaswinder Kaur, Harvinder Singh, Karanveer Kamboj, and Gurdev Kamboj, were occupants of a vehicle that was involved in a collision with a vehicle operated by Mary Orebo and owned by Cassandra Mann. Plaintiffs’ vehicle had uninsured-motorist coverage provided by Progressive Gulf Insurance Company. Each Plaintiff filed a separate suit against all three Defendants on the eve of the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations. Progressive contended that difficulty locating other Defendants, the owner and driver of the vehicle, was not adequate cause. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in that decision. However, all parties agreed that the circuit court erred by refusing to dismiss the suits of three of the Plaintiffs who failed to seek extensions of time to serve process on Progressive before the end of the original 120-day period. View "Progressive Gulf Insurance Company v. Kaur, et al." on Justia Law

Bettye McNutt filed a complaint against Dr. Vivian Sze Ting Lo, Methodist-Olive Branch Hospital (Methodist), and others asserting the wrongful death of her son due to medical malpractice. Because Dr. Lo had not been served with a presuit notice of claim, the circuit court dismissed the claims against Dr. Lo and, because the statute of limitations had expired, the dismissal was with prejudice. After Dr. Lo’s dismissal, Methodist filed a motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that McNutt’s vicarious liability claims based on Dr. Lo’s conduct were extinguished when Dr. Lo was dismissed with prejudice. The circuit court denied the motion for partial summary judgment, and Methodist appealed. The Mississippi Supreme Court found the circuit court properly denied partial summary judgment. Although Dr. Lo was dismissed with prejudice, the dismissal was not an adjudication on the merits, and McNutt did not enter into a settlement release and indemnity agreement with Dr. Lo. View "Methodist Healthcare-Olive Branch Hospital v. McNutt" on Justia Law

Eric Parish and Parish Transport LLC (Parish Transport) emailed Doug Jordan, the Vice President of Jordan Carriers Inc. (Jordan Carriers), to inquire about purchasing heavy haul equipment from Jordan Carriers. After several email exchanges, Doug Jordan offered to sell the equipment for $1,443,000. Months later, Eric Parish responded, submitting Parish Transport’s offer to buy the equipment for $1,250,000. Later that day, Jordan replied, informing Parish Transport that he needed to discuss the offer and would get back with an answer. Jordan concluded his email with his name and contact information. After discussing the deal with his partner, Jordan replied to Parish’s email, stating, “Ok. Let’s do it.” But this time, Jordan’s email concluded with “Sent from my iPhone” instead of his name and contact information. The next day, Jordan received a higher bid for the equipment from Lone Star Transportation LLC (Lone Star), which Jordan accepted verbally over the telephone. After receiving a confirmation email from Lone Star, Jordan emailed Parish Transport informing the company that “a contract has already been entered into for the sale of [the equipment].” Parish Transport sued for breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation. The matter was later transferred and consolidated with Jordan Carriers’ motion for declaratory judgment. After the cases were consolidated, Jordan Carriers moved for summary judgment, arguing “that it did not have an enforceable contract with Parish [Transport] for the sale of the equipment.” The circuit court agreed and granted Jordan Carriers’ motion for summary judgment. Parish Transport appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment because “[w]ithout a signature, an enforceable contract does not exist.” The Court of Appeals determined that “[m]erely sending an email does not satisfy the signature requirement” and that “[a]n email that states ‘Sent from my iPhone’ does not indicate that the sender intended to sign the record.” The Mississippi Supreme Court granted certiorari to address an issue of first impression: an interpretation or application of Mississippi’s Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA). After careful analysis, the Court found the UETA permitted contracts to be formed by electronic means, i.e, emails. Further, the Court found that the determination of whether an email was electronically signed pursuant to the UETA was a question of fact that turned on a party’s intent to adopt or accept the writing, which was a determination for the fact finder. Because there was a genuine issue of material fact about Doug Jordan’s intent, judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Parish Transport LLC, et al. v. Jordan Carriers Inc." on Justia Law

The crux of this interlocutory appeal was whether Plaintiffs, complaining of personal injury and property damage as a result of the alleged improper use of an oil-disposal well, had to exhaust their administrative remedies before the Mississippi State Oil and Gas Board (MSOGB) prior to proceeding on their common-law claims in the circuit court. Because the Mississippi Supreme Court determined the MSOGB could provide no adequate remedy for the Baucums’ personal-injury and property-damage claims, the Baucums were not required to exhaust administrative remedies before proceeding in the circuit court. View "Petro Harvester Oil & Gas Co., LLC, et al. v. Baucum" on Justia Law

In March 2017, Sybil Brooks hired Jason Sebren to make repairs to a mobile home that she owned, and she allowed Sebren to live in the mobile home in exchange. Allegedly unbeknownst to Brooks, defendant Michael Buford began helping Sebren make the repairs, and he and his wife also moved into the mobile home. Subsequently, Sebren and Brooks had an argument, and Sebren moved out of the mobile home. Brooks stated that, because she did not have any agreement with Buford, told him to leave the mobile home. That same morning, Brooks also called the Pearl Police Department and stated that people were living in her rental house who did not have permission to be there. Four officers were dispatched to the property. One officer testified she asked Buford for any documents or proof that he was supposed to be at the home. Buford could not provide documentation. Another officer asked Buford “did he have any issues with me searching him and he advised he did not.” That officer conducted a search of Buford’s person and felt a can of smokeless tobacco. He opened the tobacco can and observed what he believed to be crystal methamphetamine. The issue this case presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review centered on whether a police officer who obtained consent to search the person of another, had to obtain additional consent to search a specific, innocuous container found on that person. The Court of Appeals found that the defendant’s consent to the search encompassed the search of the smokeless tobacco can found in his pocket. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court agreed and affirmed the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. View "Buford v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

This case arose from a custody dispute between a natural mother and an adoptive mother. The chancellor allowed the natural mother to withdraw her surrender of parental rights and consent to adoption. The chancellor also found that the natural mother was under duress when she signed the surrender and revoked the order granting temporary custody of the child to the adoptive mother. Finding no reversible error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor’s judgment. View "In the Adoption of A.M." on Justia Law

Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company issued two public-official bonds as surety for Eddie Carthan, a member of the Holmes County, Mississippi Board of Supervisors. On appeal, the State Auditor claimed Nationwide was liable under both bonds. The undisputed facts showed the Board never paid the premium for the first bond, which was only for a year. Instead, the Board asked if the first bond could be “converted” to a four-year bond that would cover Carthan’s entire term. Nationwide complied with the Board’s request. It cancelled the first bond and issued a second bond covering Carthan’s entire term for which the Board paid the premium. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court found no evidence that Carthan was actually secured simultaneously by two separate bonds. Rather, the Court found the undisputed facts showed the Board intended to procure and did in fact obtain one public-official bond in the amount of $100,000 as surety for Carthan. Because Nationwide paid $100,000 under the second, paid-for bond, the chancellor did not err by granting Nationwide summary judgment on all claims based on the first bond. View "White v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Richard and Stacy Andreacchio invoked Mississippi Code Section 23-15-951 (Rev. 2018), not to challenge the determination that the Republican candidate, Kassie Coleman, received more legal votes than her Democrat opponent in the November 2019 election for district attorney of the Tenth Circuit District. The Andreacchios conceded Coleman won her election. However, they contended Coleman was not qualified to run in the first place. The Mississippi Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not err in dismissing the Andreacchios complaint: the mechanism to challenge a candidate who was qualified to run for his or her political party’s nomination was provided in Mississippi Code Section 23-15-961 (Rev. 2018). View "Andreacchio v. Coleman" on Justia Law

Stacie Murray was driving home from work in the northbound lane on Highway 35 in Scott County, Mississippi. Kevin Parker, while in the course and scope of his employment with James Gray d/b/a Gray Trucking (Gray), was driving a fully loaded log truck in the southbound lane. The two vehicles collided. Murray sued Parker and Gray alleging she suffered personal injuries and property damage as a result of Parker’s negligence. The issue this case presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review centered on whether allowing cross-examination of an expert witness with the accident report and a judicial opinion from another case amounted to reversible error. The Court also considered whether cumulative error required a new trial. James Hannah testified for Murray as an expert in accident reconstruction. Hannah testified that he visited the accident scene about two months after the accident and found a “gouge mark” in the highway that, in his opinion, indicated the area of impact. Hannah admitted that the highway patrolman who investigated the wreck, Trooper Greg Lucas, did not find or photograph a gouge mark. Hannah also admitted that he did not know whether the gouge mark was actually caused by the collision. Gray and Parker filed a pretrial motion to exclude Hannah’s testimony and opinions regarding the alleged gouge mark. They argued that Hannah’s testimony was based on “mere speculation” and was neither relevant nor reliable. But the trial court denied the motion and allowed Hannah to testify about the gouge mark. Over Murray’s objections, defense counsel cross-examined Hannah regarding the Uniform Crash Report (UCR) (i.e., the accident report) that Trooper Lucas prepared after the accident. The jury returned a nine-to-three verdict in favor of Gray and Parker. Murray filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. The Supreme Court found the Court of Appeals properly concluded that “[b]ecause Trooper Lucas was not qualified as an expert in accident reconstruction, his opinions on the paths of the subject vehicles and fault did not satisfy Rule 803(8)’s trustworthiness requirement. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the UCR’s narrative and diagram.” Further, the Court of Appeal properly concluded the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the cross-examination of Hannah because “it had no relevance to the present case and yet created a risk of unfair prejudice, misleading the jury, and confusing the issues.” The Court found Murray was entitled to a new trial. View "Murray v. James Gray d/b/a Gray Trucking" on Justia Law