Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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The City of Biloxi (City), the Secretary of State on behalf of the State of Mississippi (State), and the Board of Trustees of the State Institutes of Higher Learning (IHL) settled an ownership dispute over coastal property leased to a casino, and agreed how to divide the annual casino rent. Seventeen years later, the City asked the chancery court to declare that it could adjust for inflation its base amount of rent received before divvying up its rent with the State and the IHL. But the City’s only support of its new inflation-adjustment claim was the three public entities’ lease with the casino. While the casino lease required the minimum amount of rent owed be adjusted for inflation every five years, the casino lease did not govern how the City, the State, and the IHL were to divide the rent. Instead, the manner in which rent was divided is governed solely by the settlement agreement. And the settlement agreement was silent with respect to an inflation adjustment. The Mississippi Supreme Court found, however, the agreement was clear: the City received a specific sum, and any rent in excess of that exact amount had to be shared with the State and the IHL. View "In the Matter of The Stewardship of the Public Trust Tidelands" on Justia Law

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This case arose from a two-car accident in Mississippi in which a Hyundai Excel was traveling southbound at a closing speed of 68 to 78 mph and, for reasons unknown, crossed the center line into the oncoming lane of traffic, striking a Lincoln Continental passenger car traveling northbound. None of the three Excel occupants survived the collision. This case made it to the Mississippi Supreme Court after an earlier appeal and remand for a new trial. During the remand proceedings, multiple discovery disputes ensued before the trial court ultimately held two 606(b) hearings on October 30, 2018, and January 23, 2019 (nearly four years after the trial court’s original denial of relief). The trial court expressly found that one of Applewhite’s counsel, Dennis Sweet, III, misrepresented his relationship with a witness, Carey Sparks, during the April 2015 hearing. It was not until a January 25, 2018 hearing, that Sweet admitted that he had paid Sparks to perform services during the Applewhite trial. This admission was made only after documents evidencing multiple payments to Sparks by Sweet surfaced in the discovery ordered by the Supreme Court. During discovery, multiple witnesses, including six attorneys, testified that Sparks stated that he had knowledge of discussions of the jurors during the trial. Following the 606(b) hearings, the trial court issued a one-paragraph order, finding that the posttrial testimony of the jurors offered no evidence supporting Defendants’ allegations. Reviewing the trial court proceedings, the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded "a fair and impartial trial was not had." The Court found "overwhelming evidence of actual impropriety, which destroys any confidence in the jury verdict. The facts developed in this record threaten the public’s confidence in our system of justice. We find that this case is permeated by actual deception upon the trial court, which led to Plaintiffs’ obtaining a favorable ruling. Such improper acts of misconduct leave a indelible stain on these proceedings. We are loathe to overturn jury verdicts, yet justice dictates a reversal and a retrial, unencumbered by extraneous assaults on our justice system. We considered the ultimate sanction of dismissal of this case with prejudice. We decline to impose such a severe sanction, for no evidence suggests that any Plaintiff employed Sparks or had knowledge of Sparks’s actions. But the judgment must be reversed." This case was remanded for a new trial. View "Hyundai Motor America, et al. v. Applewhite, et al." on Justia Law

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D.G.E.C. was born on June 1, 2016. Her biological parents were Rachel Coulter and Cody Jones. Coulter and Jones never married. On the evening of August 6, 2016, Jones took the nine-week-old baby to a room in their two-bedroom trailer to change her diaper. He noticed that her leg appeared limp. He told Coulter “her leg flopped over like it had no life in it” and expressed concern that it was broken. Eventually, Coulter and Jones took the baby to an emergency room. Coulter suggested that the baby might be suffering due to a reaction to her first round of vaccinations received three days earlier. X-rays of the leg revealed that it was fractured. The baby was transferred to University of Mississippi Medical Center (UMMC) for further evaluation and treatment. Upon admission to UMMC, medical professionals identified bruising to the baby’s forehead and cheek, acute posterior rib fractures on both sides of her chest, lateral rib fractures, an intertrochanteric femur fracture or hip fracture, corner fractures above and below both knees, and left ankle fractures. Given the baby’s medical condition upon admission, a UMMC social worker contacted the Jefferson Davis County Department of Human Services (DHS) to report the injuries. Coulter appealed a chancery court judgment terminating her parental rights. She challenged the chancellor’s finding of fact that she was the custodial parent of her daughter when her daughter was abused, and its conclusion of law that responsibility for abuse can be imputed to custodial parents. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor’s findings of fact, finding the judgment was supported by "ample evidence as is legally sound." View "Coulter v. Dunn" on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law
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In 2017, Plaintiffs filed suit against the Defendants. Between 2002 and 2005, Plaintiffs (all retirees from BellSouth) rolled most of their retirement assets over to Steven Savell, their financial advisor at Morgan Keegan. Savell assured Plaintiffs “he would invest [their] money in a way that would provide [them] with income for the remainder of [their] life and that [their] principal would grow over time.” Savell remained in control of these accounts until 2013. During the years Savell handled these accounts, the Plaintiffs continually sustained sizeable losses. Plaintiffs claimed that Savell improperly recommended that they invest in two unsuitable penny stocks and then marked the purchases “unsolicited” so as to prevent detection by the brokerage firm’s policy against soliciting such stock. Plaintiffs also alleged that Savell purchased for them certain annuities designed to be held for the long term, which Savell had them cash out early in order to purchase new annuities that would pay him and Morgan Keegan and/or Raymond James large commissions. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, finding that all of the Plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred. The Court of Appeals reversed with respect to the Plaintiffs’ common-law claims, finding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to when Plaintiffs learned or through reasonable diligence should have learned of Defendants’ alleged malfeasance. The Mississippi Supreme Court granted certiorari on Defendants’ claim that the Court of Appeals misapplied the latent-injury discovery-rule exception to the catch-all three-year limitations period provided by Mississippi Code Section 15-1-49 (Rev. 2019). Because the Supreme Court found no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Plaintiffs’ common-law claims were time barred, it reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision and reinstated the trial court’s judgment. View "Baker v. Raymond James & Associates Inc." on Justia Law

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James Fannings had his former attorney served with a handwritten summons that deviated from requirements set out in the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. At issue was whether the summons substantially complied with Rule 4(b). The Mississippi Supreme Court was satisfied that the circuit court should have dismissed the complaint because the summons failed to substantially comply with the form required by Rule 4(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, the Court reversed the circuit court’s denial of the motion to dismiss and remanded the case for the trial court to enter an order dismissing the complaint. View "Webster v. Fannings" on Justia Law

Posted in: Civil Procedure
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Linda Battise was the mother of Joseph Aucoin, deceased. Joseph and Sheila Aucoin were married and had two daughters. After Joseph’s death, Sheila began restricting Linda’s visitation with the children because Linda was not abiding by Sheila’s parental decisions. Through counsel, Linda petitioned for grandparent visitation. The chancellor encouraged the parties to confer because Sheila made some statements showing that they could come to a visitation agreement without court involvement. Linda and Sheila reached an agreement; however, the chancellor declined to sign the agreed order. The chancellor advised Sheila to retain an attorney because she did not believe that Sheila fully understood the implications of the agreement. Furthermore, the chancellor told Sheila that she was entitled to attorney’s fees. Shiela hired an attorney, and filed a motion to dismiss or stay proceedings until fees were paid in advance. The chancellor denied Linda’s motion to recuse, and ordered Linda to pay $3,500 to Sheila for attorney’s fees within thirty days or else she could not proceed with her case. Linda appealed, arguing that: (1) the chancellor erred by requiring her to prepay attorney’s fees to Sheila before Linda’s case could be heard; (2) the chancellor erred by not entering a final judgment; and (3) the chancellor erred by not recusing. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor's denial of the motion to recuse. The Court reversed the prepayment order, and remanded for further proceedings on the merits. View "Battise v. Aucoin" on Justia Law

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This interlocutory appeal stemmed from a trial judge granting partial summary judgment, dismissing a claim of malicious prosecution. Richard and Victoria Wilbourn were in a longstanding domestic matter. Victoria accused Richard of misconduct towards their children, but the chancellor determined that the accusations were unfounded. Victoria went to the Ridgeland Police Department for help and filed an eight-page report against Richard, restating his alleged misconduct. The Ridgeland Police Department followed protocol, investigated, and referred the case to the district attorney’s office. The case was presented to a grand jury; the grand jury returned no bill. Notably, Richard was never charged, indicted, or arrested in connection with the investigation, and Victoria did not swear an affidavit against him. In the summer of 2016, Richard discovered the investigation and grand jury presentment and responded by filing suit, claiming malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. In response, Victoria moved for summary judgment. And after a hearing, the trial judge granted partial summary judgment, dismissing Richard’s claim of malicious prosecution but retaining the others. Definitively, the trial judge found that “no criminal proceedings were instituted and therefore [Richard] cannot satisfy the first element of his claim.” With no arrest or indictment, or Richard otherwise being subjected to oppressive litigation of criminal charges for the report that Victoria gave to the Ridgeland Police Department, the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not err in dismissing Richard's malicious-prosecution claim. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Wilbourn v. Wilbourn" on Justia Law

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Following the death of his four-month-old daughter and his subsequent indictment for murder, Joshua Clark was convicted of depraved-heart murder. The prosecution relied heavily on the testimony of Dr. Karen Lakin, a pediatrician who opined that the daughter's death resulted from Shaken Baby Syndrome (SBS) (now referred to as Abusive Head Trauma (AHT)). The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded Clark’s conviction after finding that crucial parts of Dr. Lakin’s testimony were unreliable and therefore inadmissible. The Mississippi Supreme Court disagreed with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that Dr. Lakin’s opinion testimony was inadequately supported to meet the reliability prong of the Daubert standard and was thus improperly admitted. Instead, the Court found the circuit court did not err by admitting Dr. Lakin’s testimony. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed, and the judgment of the trial court was reinstated and affirmed. Furthermore, the Supreme Court found Clark’s six additional assignments of error not previously addressed by the Court of Appeals were without merit. View "Clark v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

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Darron Thames was indicted by grand jury for conspiracy to commit murder and accessory after the fact to murder. Thames was acquitted by a jury of the conspiracy charge, but he was found guilty of accessory after the fact to murder under Mississippi Code Section 97-1-5 (Rev. 2014). Thames appealed his conviction claiming he was unfairly prejudiced by the State’s use of impeachment evidence and transcript testimony of a prosecution witness who had previously testified at a guilty-plea proceeding and at another trial. Thames further claimed his conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence, and that the jury’s guilty verdict was not supported by overwhelming weight of evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed Thames’s conviction. View "Thames v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

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A tax sale was found void due to the Jackson County, Mississippi Chancery Clerk's failure to comply with the notice requirements of Mississippi Code Section 27-43-3 (Rev. 2017). After Deborah Hallford came home to find that her locks had been changed, she went to the tax collector’s office and learned that the issue was delinquent property tax. Hallford had never received notice in person or through certified mail that the redemption period on her property was soon expiring. Hallford filed a complaint seeking to set aside the tax sale of her property to Pierre Thoden, d/b/a ETC FBO Pierre H. Thoden IRA 47473. The chancery court set aside the tax sale and awarded Thoden the amount he paid for the property at the tax sale, plus interest. Thoden, believing he was owed for the taxes he paid on the property in the years following his purchase at the tax sale and for the value of the improvements he made on the land, appealed. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor’s decision to void the tax sale for lack of notice. This matter was remanded for a hearing on any damages, statutory and otherwise, to which Thoden was entitled. View "Thoden d/b/a ETC FBO Pierre H. Thoden IRA 47473 v. Hallford" on Justia Law