Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Cephus Terry was charged with possession of cocaine with intent to sell, possession of methamphetamine, possession of Tramadol, and two counts of possession of a firearm by a felon. He was convicted on all five counts, and the circuit court sentenced him as a habitual offender to serve forty-six years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. The trial court denied his motion for a new trial, and the Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed. A majority of the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the jury's verdict. Additionally, Terry’s argument that the trial judge erred by improperly instructing the jury as to the issue of constructive possession was subject to a procedural bar. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "Terry v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Kadedria Hampton appealed her convictions for two counts of felony child abuse for burning and starving a minor child. She claimed on appeal that there constitutional right to be present at every stage of her jury trial was violated, and that the evidence was constitutionally insufficient to support either of her convictions. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court found no merit to Hampton's claim her right to be present at trial was violated. Nor did the Court find the State presented insufficient evidence to support a conviction for felonious starvation of a minor child. The Court did find, however, the State presented insufficient evidence to support Hampton's conviction of the felonious burning of a minor child. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hampton v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Ashley Bionte Johnson filed a petition for presumption of death and requested that the chancellor presume her father, Audray Johnson, dead. She claimed that her father, Audray, had been gone from his physical body for more than seven years and should be presumed dead. Audray suffers from mental illness and has been treated for dissociative identity disorder. In 2017, Audray changed his name from Audray Johnson to Akecheta Andre Morningstar. In February 2020, a hearing was held on Ashley’s petition. Morningstar was present at the hearing and testified regarding Audray’s death. According to Morningstar, Audray’s spirit expired more than seven years ago, and Morningstar occupied Audray’s physical body. Morningstar testified that he was “an ambassador . . . a hybrid . . . part angel, part human” who originated “from the heavens.” He explained that he was “dispatched” to earth “to save the world.” Although Morningstar admitted he occupied Audray’s physical body, he asserted he “shouldn’t have the responsibility of taking care of a dead man’s family.” The chancellor denied Ashley’s petition, and Ashley timely appealed. The Mississippi Supreme Court determined Audray had not been absent from, and did not conceal himself in Mississippi for seven years, therefore the chancellor’s denial of the petition was affirmed. View "In the Matter of the Presumption of Death of Audray Johnson" on Justia Law

Kenneth Rogers appealed a chancery court order granting authority to the executor of the Estate of Costas E. Pavlou (the estate) to disburse funds to the estate’s attorneys. The chancellor found that Rogers lacked standing to challenge the disbursement because he had not probated a claim against the estate. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court found it had jurisdiction over the appeal, but Rogers did not designate the documents on which he based his appellate challenge to the chancellor's decision. Because the Supreme Court was unable to review Rogers' arguments due to his not having designated relevant portions of the record, the chancery court order was affirmed. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Costas E. Pavlou" on Justia Law

The Speaker of the Mississippi House or Representatives and the Speaker Pro Tempore alleged the Governor "ignored the dictates of [the Mississippi] Constitution, and exceeded his authority to strike parts of House Bill 1782 to partially veto appropriation bills. The Governor denies his acts were unconstitutional. Having reviewed the record of the chancery court proceeding, pertinent sections of the Mississippi Constitution, and case law addressing partial vetoes, the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded the Governor did not exceed the power of his office. "His partial veto comports with section 73 of our Constitution and therefore carried with it the authority endowed that office by the people of Mississippi." Accordingly, the judgment of the chancery court holding otherwise was reversed. View "Reeves v. Gunn" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Keith Havard was convicted by jury and sentenced to death for capital murder. The Mississippi Supreme Court granted Havard’s third petition for post-conviction relief and allowed him to proceed in the trial court based on his claim that newly discovered evidence pertaining to shaken-baby syndrome required a new trial and vacating his death sentence. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial judge determined that Havard failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that new evidence existed that would have caused a different result as to his guilt or innocence. But the trial judge did vacate Havard’s death sentence and resentenced him to life without parole. Havard appealed the trial judge’s denial of a new trial. Finding no reversible error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. View "Havard v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Mississippi Sand Solutions (Solutions) appealed a judgment by the Warren County Special Court of Eminent Domain denying its petition to establish a private right-of-way across lands owned by the defendants (the Fishers). Because the Mississippi Supreme Court fount the special court did not err by applying collateral estoppel to claims relating to access to Solutions’ property, judgment was affirmed. "When a party has been given voluntary access to its property over the land of another and that party continues to have access for the purposes of ingress and egress, that party cannot assert a claim under Mississippi Code Section 65-7-201 for a private road through the land of their obliging neighbor. Even without applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel, Solutions, by its own arguments and testimony of its own witnesses, demonstrated it could not make a prima facie case under this statute." View "Mississippi Sand Solutions, LLC v. Otis, et al." on Justia Law

Robert Sharp shot and killed John Gorman during a firearm-training exercise ("a multitude of lapses in safety protocols"). Sharp and Gorman were employees of the Mississippi Gaming Commission and were acting in the course and scope of their employment. The Commission Shooting Review Board concluded that the incident “was an accidental discharge of an agency weapon,” it also concluded that the “failure to follow the prescribed policies, procedures and lesson plans” was the most significant contributing factor. After the incident, Gorman’s heirs began receiving automatic workers’ compensation payments. Each heir brought independent actions against the Commission that were later consolidated. Once consolidated, the Commission filed a joint motion for summary judgment in August 2017, stating the exclusivity of Mississippi Workers’ Compensation law barred further remedy. Gorman’s heirs opposed the motion by way of a pleading, memorandum, and a supplement with affidavits and admissions purportedly deemed admitted. The circuit court later granted summary judgment for the Commission. On appeal, the heirs argued: (1) the circuit court erred in determining the Workers' Compensation Act was the exclusive remedy to recover for the wrongful death of John Gorman; and (2) the circuit court erred in determining complete immunity applied regarding the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. Finding no triable issues of material fact in the record, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court. View "Estate of Gorman v. Mississippi Gaming Commission" on Justia Law

Following a narrow loss to David Archie in the Hinds County Mississippi Board of Supervisors for District 2 Primary Election, Darrell McQuirter filed a Petition to Contest Qualifications of Archie as nominee for supervisor, claiming that Archie was not a resident of District 2 at the time of the primary election. The Hinds County circuit court found in favor of Archie. Specifically, the trial court found Archie established he domicile within Hinds County District 2. The record did not indicate that the trial judge acted alone. But the trial judge’s final order did not expressly mention elections commissioners’ concurrences, and there was no evidence of any dissent. McQuirter argued on appeal: (1) the trial judge erred by failing to allow the election commissioners to either concur or dissent on either the record or in the trial judge’s order; and (2) the trial court erred by finding that Archie qualified as a resident of the district. The Mississippi Supreme Court concluded McQuirter bore the burden of supplying the Court with evidence through the record that established his claim of error, but failed to do so. If the requisite number of election commissioners attend and none dissent, per the applicable statute, the “facts shall not be subject to appellate review.” A majority of the Supreme Court found the statute did not require concurrences of commissioner be placed in the record: "Together, Sections 23-15-931 and -933 bar appellate review of the factual findings without evidence of any commissioner’s dissent or lack of attendance, not concurrence. Here, the commissioners were in attendance, and none dissented." If actual dissents existed, the Court held McQuirter had a duty to supply the Court with a record that evidenced a dissent or the inability to provide record of a dissent; the trial judge’s lack of indicating the commissioners’ concurrence does not suggest that one or more had dissented. The Court thus determined review of Archie's residence was precluded. Judgement of the trial court was affirmed. View "McQuirter v. Archie" on Justia Law

Mattie Harris filed a premises-liability action against Venture, Inc., d/b/a/ Save-A-Lot after Harris allegedly tripped over the base of a temporary iron display rack while shopping at a Save-A-Lot grocery store. Harris claimed that Venture created a dangerous condition on the premises by placing a temporary iron display rack on the edge of a shopping aisle so that the base and the legs of the display rack protruded into the aisle and obstructed the walking clearance of customers. Harris claimed that Venture negligently maintained the premises by creating a dangerous condition on the premises and failed to warn invitees of the condition. The dangerous condition, Harris claimed, was the proximate cause of her fall and the resulting injuries. Both Harris and Venture moved for summary judgment, and Venture filed a motion to stay proceedings for the parties to complete discovery. The trial court granted in part Harris' motion on the issue of liability, and denied Venture's two motions. Aggrieved, Venture sought interlocutory appeal and argued the trial court abused its discretion by denying its Rule 56(f) motion and by granting Harris’s motion for summary judgment. Venture further asserted that the trial court erred by denying its motion for summary judgment because no unreasonably dangerous condition existed on the premises. Because this case was fact intensive and the two parties submitted conflicting evidence as to whether the rack constituted a dangerous condition, the Mississippi Supreme Court found that summary judgment in favor of either party was inappropriate and that the question of whether the rack constituted a dangerous condition should have been resolved by a trier of fact in a trial on the merits. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Venture, Inc. d/b/a Save-A-Lot v. Harris" on Justia Law