Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Christine Barton (Jorgensen) appealed a chancery court ruling, arguing it was an abuse of the court's discretion in failing to enter a final domestic-violence protection order and by failing to appoint a guardian ad litem. The pleadings revealed that Jorgensen not only failed to seek an extension of the temporary domestic-abuse protection order previously issued by a justice court judge but she also failed to request a final domestic-violence protection order. By statute, the justice court order expires thirty days after entry, as here, when the party seeking protection and the respondent have minor children in common. The Mississippi Supreme Court concluded there was no abuse of discretion and affirmed. View "Barton a/k/a Jorgensen v. Barton" on Justia Law

William Wilson was charged with capital murder and felonious child abuse. A trial court set aside William Wilson's death sentence, but not his guilty plea. Wilson did not appeal that decision in the time allowed under Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 4. Wilson argued that the failure to file an appeal was through no fault of his own and that good caused existed to grant his out- of-time appeal. The circuit court found that it did not have jurisdiction to grant the out-of- time appeal or, in the alternative, that Wilson had failed to demonstrate that good cause existed to grant an out-of-time appeal. Wilson appealed. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court determined Wilson’s attorney failed to advise him regarding his right to appeal the trial court’s refusal to set aside his guilty plea. The attorney also advised him that he was no longer his attorney. Wilson, therefore, not knowing he could appeal the refusal to set aside the guilty plea, and believing that he did not have an attorney, failed to timely perfect his appeal. The Supreme Court granted Wilson’s application for an out-of-time appeal and allowed the case to proceed on the merits. View "Wilson v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

The jury in this case was presented with two options: find the tractor driver 100 percent liable for the motorcycle riders’ injuries or not liable at all. Neither party requested a comparative-negligence instruction. And none was given. The jury found the tractor driver liable, but only awarded the motorcycle riders a fraction of their uncontested damages. Both parties filed posttrial motions: the motorcycle riders sought more damages; the tractor driver requested a new trial. The trial court granted a new trial, agreeing with the tractor driver that the jury had rendered a “compromise verdict.” At the second trial, the jury found in favor of the tractor driver. The motorcycle riders appealed, arguing the trial court erred by granting a new trial following the first verdict. The Mississippi Supreme Court determined the trial court did not abuse its discretion: the record supported the trial judge’s finding the jury had reached a compromise verdict in the first trial. Therefore, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Richards v. Wilson" on Justia Law

James Williams suffered a severe brain injury from complications following cervical spine surgery. A lawsuit was brought against the hospital and the surgeon for medical malpractice, which included a claim for wrongful death after Williams died. Dr. Orhan Ilercil was ultimately found to be 15 percent responsible for Williams’s injuries and death, which amounted to a judgment against him for $205,800. Dr. Ilercil appealed, contending, among other things, that the trial court erred by refusing to give an intervening/superseding-cause instruction. To this, the Mississippi Supreme Court agreed, reversed judgment and remanded for a new trial. View "Ilercil v. Williams" on Justia Law

After suffering two work-related injuries, Sheree Cleveland settled her workers’ compensation claims with Advance Auto Parts and its workers’ compensation insurance carrier, Indemnity Insurance Company of North America. The Workers’ Compensation Commission approved the settlement. Approximately one month later, the Employer/Carrier filed a Form B-31 indicating the last payment had been made. More than a year after that, Cleveland filed a motion asserting that the Employer/Carrier had not paid all compensation due under the settlement and that two medical bills remained outstanding. The Commission found that, because a one-year statute of limitations had expired, it lacked jurisdiction to enforce its order approving the settlement agreement. Cleveland appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed, questioning whether the one-year statute of limitations applied to the claim. But instead of answering that question, the Court of Appeals found that the Employer/Carrier had been estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense because it had agreed to pay the outstanding bills and had represented to the administrative law judge that it would do so. Further, the Court of Appeals also found Cleveland's contact with the Employer/Carrier within the limitations period tolled the statute of limitations, if, in fact, it applied. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed, but for different reasons than the appellate court. The Supreme Court determined the statute of limitations did not apply to Cleveland's motion for enforcement of the settlement order, therefore, her motion was timely filed. View "Cleveland v. Advance Auto Parts" on Justia Law

The Mississippi Department of Child Protection Services (MDCPS) sought to terminate involuntarily the parental rights of Jack Bynum, the putative father of a child in MDCPS' custody. The chancery court determined Bynum was both indigent and entitled to counsel. The chancellor appointed Bynum counsel and ordered MDCPS to pay his attorney's fees. MDCPS appealed. The agency argued Covington County should have paid for Bynum’s representation, just as it would if Bynum were an indigent criminal defendant. But the Mississippi Supreme Court found this was not a criminal case. "And the statutory scheme that directs the initiating county in criminal prosecutions to pay for indigent representation is expressly limited. It only applies to those 'charged with a felony, misdemeanor punishable by confinement for ninety (90) days or more, or commission of an act of delinquency.'” Thus, absent a legislative directive to assess an indigent parent’s attorney’s fees to Covington County, the chancery court did not abuse its legislatively conferred discretion by ordering MDCPS to pay Bynum’s attorney’s fees. View "Mississippi Department of Child Protection Services v. Bynum" on Justia Law

Kasey Boomer Kelly was convicted of possession of a weapon by a convicted felon. Kelly appealed his conviction, claiming that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After review of the trial court record, the Mississippi Supreme Court found Kelly's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated because he failed to assert that right and because he failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the delay. The Court also found the State presented sufficient evidence to show constructive possession of the weapon. Therefore, the Court affirmed Kelly's conviction and sentence. View "Kelly v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Timothy Williams challenged the sufficiency and weight of the evidence supporting his felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm conviction. Though he argued his conviction should have been reversed, Williams stipulated he was indeed a felon and was prohibited from possessing firearms. And he admitted to a detective, in a recorded interview and then in a signed statement, that he purchased a Colt .45 semi-automatic pistol “off the street.” Williams also described how he loaned the pistol to a woman - a woman who later testified Williams indeed left a gun with her. Williams also insisted the State violated his constitutional and statutory speedy trial rights due to an eighteen-month delay between his arrest and trial. The Mississippi Supreme Court found no merit to Williams' first contention, and determined that even if the delay between arrest and trial was presumptively prejudicial, Williams failed to show any actual prejudice from the delay. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Williams' conviction and the ten-year sentence he received as a habitual offender. View "Williams v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

TM Wood Products, M Wood Products, Inc., Marty Wood, and Kim Whitlow (collectively, “TM Wood”) appeal the trial court’s denial of their motion to set aside the judgment under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6). Marietta Wood Supply, Inc., and Marietta Dry Kiln, LLC (collectively, “Marietta”), contracted with TM Wood to sell lumber. TM Wood acted as broker and agreed to sell Marietta’s green lumber and dry kiln for a $10-$40 commission per thousand feet. Under the agreement, TM Wood also hired or employed various trucking companies to haul the lumber after it was sold. Marietta filed a complaint against TM Wood alleging breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of fiduciary duty, as well as fraudulent inducement, concealment, misrepresentation, and negligence. Marietta alleged that TM Wood had been wrongfully billing both the purchaser and the seller for shipping costs. It also alleged that TM Wood had been charging and receiving extra commissions on the lumber units TM Wood sold for Marietta from 2004 to 2012. After a bench trial, the court entered a final judgment in favor of Marietta in the amount of $800,000. The trial court found that TM Wood had been properly served at the addresses provided in an Agreed Order Allowing Withdrawal of Counsel. Marietta alleged that it sent a copy of the final judgment to Wood and Whitlow the following day. Marietta then hired an attorney in Arkansas to collect the judgment. TM Wood retained new counsel the following business day and served its motion to set aside the Mississippi judgment. TM Wood argued on appeal to the Mississippi Supreme Court that its right to a jury trial was violated, that it failed to receive notice of the bench trial, and that the judgment was excessive. The Supreme Court found the circuit clerk failed to send notice of the impending trial to TM Wood in accordance with Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 40(b), therefore, it reversed the trial court’s decision. View "TM Wood Products v. Marietta Wood Supply, Inc." on Justia Law

Using a cell-phone app that simulated a flashing police light, Louis Scott impersonated an undercover police officer and pulled over a young woman late at night. Scott approached the woman’s vehicle and threatened her with a knife through the car window, but the woman escaped by driving away suddenly. Based on this, Scott was convicted of attempted kidnapping. Evidence admitted at trial revealed Scott had kidnapped and raped another young woman later the same evening. On appeal, Scott contended the evidence of the second attack was substantially more prejudicial than probative under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 403. The Mississippi Supreme Court determined that argument was without merit: Scott’s kidnapping and rape of the second victim was highly probative of his intent with regard to the attempted kidnapping charge. Scott also contended for the first time on appeal, that his indictment was defective because it failed to specifically allege Scott failed in the kidnapping attempt. The Court held in the past that such allegation was not required. Therefore, the Court affirmed Scott’s conviction and sentence. View "Scott v. Mississippi" on Justia Law