Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2019, Margaret Parks and Veda Horton were candidates in the Democratic Primary runoff election for Humphreys County, Mississippi Tax Assessor and Collector. Horton received the most votes, and Parks contested the election. The circuit judge ruled that the primary should have been nullified and ordered a special election (a ruling not contested in this appeal). The circuit judge’s order was entered seven days after Horton was sworn. Parks moved the circuit court to declare her, the incumbent, the holdover officeholder, or, in the alternative, to declare the office vacant pending a special election. The circuit judge ruled that Horton was the lawful officeholder and denied the motion. This appeal challenged the circuit judge’s ruling, and the Mississippi Supreme Court had to consider whether the office should have been declared vacant or, if it was not, who the proper officeholder should have been until the new election is completed. The Supreme Court held that because Horton entered the term of office before the final adjudication of the election contest, under Mississippi Code Section 23-15-937, Horton was the lawful holder of the office until the special election. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the circuit judge’s decision to deny Parks’s motion to declare her the holdover officeholder or to declare the office vacant. View "In Re: Democratic Primary for Humphreys County Tax Assessor and Collector: Parks v. Horton" on Justia Law

The Mississippi Department of Revenue (MDOR) appealed a chancellor’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Comcast of Georgia/Virginia, Inc., n/k/a Comcast Communications, LLC. In July 2012, the MDOR commenced an audit of Comcast’s Corporate Income and Franchise Tax Returns for 2008, 2009, and 2010. At the conclusion of the audit, the MDOR determined that Comcast owed additional corporate franchise tax. Specifically, the MDOR found that Comcast’s preapportioned capital base and its Mississippi apportionment ratios should have been increased for each applicable year. The increase in Comcast’s capital base was attributable to the MDOR’s disallowance of the holding-company exclusion. The increase in Comcast’s Mississippi apportionment ratios was attributable to MDOR’s inclusion of all of Comcast’s Mississippi destination sales as gross receipts. The application of the audited apportionment ratios to the audited capital base resulted in additional taxable capital apportioned to Mississippi for each year, with a corresponding increase in franchise tax due for each year. The Mississippi Supreme Court determined that because the MDOR’s franchise-tax assessment does not fairly represent the true value of Comcast’s capital in Mississippi, the chancellor’s judgment was correct. View "Mississippi Dept. of Revenue v. Comcast Cable Communications, LLC" on Justia Law

Michael Montgomery, an employee of Taylor Construction working as a truck dispatcher, called Superior Mat Company, Inc. to rent mats for Taylor Construction’s use. From June 9, 2017, to June 27, 2017, Taylor employees drove to Superior’s location in Covington County, Mississippi, and picked up several hundred mats. Taylor Construction trucks returned the mats to Covington County on July 17, 2017. Superior alleged the mats came back in varying degrees of dirtiness or, in some cases, damaged beyond repair. Taylor Construction paid Superior for the mats until Superior additionally billed Taylor Construction for the mats it alleged Taylor Construction did not return. Taylor Construction later stopped payment on all invoices from Superior. Superior filed suit against Taylor Construction at the Covington County Circuit Court, alleging breach of contract, open account, quantum meruit, and bad-faith breach of contract. Taylor Construction filed its answer along with a motion to transfer venue under Rule 82(d). After hearing arguments, the circuit court denied Taylor Construction’s motion. Taylor Construction appealed, but finding the record demonstrated credible evidence that substantial events or acts occurred in Covington County, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. View "Taylor Construction Company, Inc. v. Superior Mat Company, Inc." on Justia Law

Dalvin Latham was convicted by jury of robbery. He was sentenced to serve five years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Latham appealed, arguing that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in two ways: (1) by failing to object to the admission of an overly suggestive photographic lineup; and (2) by refusing the trial court’s proffered jury instruction C–8: an instruction concerning the accuracy and reliability of the victim’s out-of-court identification of Latham as one of the persons who robbed her. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court found Latham failed to show the victim’s out-of-court identification was unreliable, and Latham failed to rebut the strong presumption that his trial counsel’s refusal of jury instruction C–8 was anything other than tactical and strategic. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed Latham’s conviction and sentence, and dismissed his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim with prejudice. View "Latham v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Former Southern Farm Bureau Life Insurance Company employees Regina Thomas and Pam Pilgrim filed suit against the company claiming they were wrongfully discharged. While recognizing Mississippi is an at-will-employment state, the former employees alleged Southern Farm Bureau’s employee handbook altered their at-will status. They insisted the handbook conferred certain substantive and procedural rights, including the right not to be discriminated against based on gender and age, which they suggest they were denied. But upon review, the Mississippi Supreme Court found the employee handbook expressly disclaimed the formation of any employment contract. "So under Mississippi law, Thomas and Pilgrim remained at-will employees. This meant they could be fired for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all, except for reasons independently declared legally impermissible." Rather than having exhausted their administrative remedies, as was required when bringing a gender-discrimination claim, they asked the Supreme Court to create an exception to an already existing exception to the at-will doctrine, which would have allowed them to avoid the express procedural requirements for federal discrimination claims. But the Mississippi Supreme Court has recognized that creating exceptions to the at-will doctrine was a legislative concern, not a judicial task. "Because Congress has already created a discrimination-based exception to the at-will doctrine—which Thomas and Pilgrim failed to pursue - we reject their request." View "Southern Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Thomas" on Justia Law

In February 2019, Gregory “Peanut” Walker was convicted of one count of fondling and two counts of sexual battery. Walker was sentenced to serve fifteen years on Count I, twenty-five years on Count II, and twenty-five years on Count III. These three sentences were made to run concurrently. Walker appealed, arguing the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict only on Count II, digital sexual penetration. Walker contends also that his due process rights and his right to a fair trial were violated because the State adduced testimony regarding Walker’s post-Miranda silence. Finding the evidence sufficient to sustain Walker's convictions, and that Walker "opened the door" for the State when he testified he had refused to give a statement to the police, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Walker v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Robert Stratton, Sr. owned an antique truck and, in 2006, delivered it to John Shivers’s vehicle repair and restoration business in Liberty, Mississippi. Stratton and Shivers contemplated that Shivers would restore the truck at some point in the future, but they made no firm plans for the restoration, and they never agreed that Shivers would charge a storage fee. Stratton’s truck remained at Shivers’s shop until Jerry McKey bought the business from Shivers in May 2009. Shivers told McKey that Stratton owned the truck, but neither Shivers nor McKey notified Stratton of the change in the business’ ownership. When Stratton learned that the business had changed hands, he contacted McKey and requested possession of the truck. But McKey refused to let Stratton have his truck unless he paid storage fees. Stratton sued McKey for replevin, and the circuit court ruled that Stratton was entitled to possession of the truck conditioned upon his paying McKey $880 for storage fees within thirty days. Stratton appealed; the Court of Appeals affirmed. But the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed both the trial and appellate courts, rendering judgment for Stratton. When McKey failed to relinquish possession of the truck, Stratton filed another complaint against him, and McKey filed a counterclaim for fees for storing the truck. McKey conceded that because he had sold the truck during the pendency of Stratton’s appeal, he owed Stratton the truck’s value. After a bench trial, the Circuit Court of awarded Stratton $350, which represented the value of the truck after the deduction of $1,000 in storage fees owed to McKey. Stratton appealed, challenging the amount of damages and challenging the circuit court’s award of storage fees to McKey. McKey did not file an appellee’s brief. In this case's second trip before the Mississippi Supreme Court, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court found McKey's counterclaim for storage fees was untimely, and the circuit court erred in awarding storage fees. View "Stratton v. McKey" on Justia Law

Bettye Turner invested approximately $2 million into a securities brokerage account that was created and managed by David Carrick, an investment broker then employed with Morgan Stanley Smith Barney (Morgan Stanley). Carrick later worked for Stern, Agee & Leach, Inc. (Stern Agee). Turner and Carrick signed an Account Application in order to transfer Turner’s funds to a Stern Agee account. The Account Application incorporated by reference a Client Account Agreement that contained an arbitration provision. Eventually, Stifel, Nicolaus & Company, Inc. (Stifel), acquired and merged with Stern Agee. Turner filed a lawsuit against Carrick and Stifel alleging negligent management and supervision of her investment account. Carrick and Stifel moved to compel arbitration. The trial court denied their motion to compel arbitration, and Carrick and Stifel appealed. Because the trial court erred by failing to compel arbitration, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Carrick v. Turner" on Justia Law

David and Jill Landrum began developing land in Livingston, Madison County, Mississippi, in approximately 2006. David sought financial assistance from Michael Sharpe. Michael invested substantial sums in the business, and his wife, Marna Sharpe, gained a membership interest in the business. In 2010, Livingston Holdings, LLC (Livingston), a Mississippi limited-liability company, was formed. The original members of the company were Jill, Marna, and Sara Williams. Livingston acquired Williams’s ownership interests, and Marna later assigned her membership interest to B&S Holdings, LLC (B&S). The development became the Town of Livingston. The members of Livingston consisted of B&S and Jill. In this dispute between the members of the limited-liability company, the question presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review was whether statutory provisions prevented the enforcement of an arbitration provision and waiver contained in the operating agreement of the company. Because the Court determined the statutory provisions did not control over the terms of the operating agreement, it affirmed the trial court’s decision to compel arbitration. View "B&S MS Holdings, LLC v. Landrum" on Justia Law

After two felony convictions and consecutive sentences for selling cocaine, Atiba Parker later pled guilty to a third felony, cocaine possession. The judge sentenced Parker as a subsequent offender to eight years on the possession charge, to be served concurrently with Parker's two cocaine sales convictions. Based on the two drug dealing convictions, the judge also sentenced Parker as a habitual offender. After serving a quarter of each of his first two felony sentences, Parker asked the Mississippi Department of Corrections for a parole date on his cocaine possession sentence. MDOC determined Parker was parole eligible on the two cocaine sale sentences. But because Parker had been sentenced as a habitual offender on his cocaine possession charge, and had not yet completed his mandatory eight year possession sentence, he was ineligible for parole. So no parole date was set on his cocaine possession conviction. After exhausting MDOC’s Administrative Remedy Program (ARP), Parker filed a complaint in circuit court seeking judicial review. The circuit court agreed with MDOC and affirmed its parole decision. Parker then appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court. Because time remained on Parker’s habitual offender sentence, he was statutorily prohibited from receiving parole for his cocaine possession conviction. The Supreme Court thus affirmed MDOC’s parole denial. View "Parker v. Mallett" on Justia Law