Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Mark Gibson and Court Properties, Inc., appeal the circuit court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of their county-court appeal. In 2009, the Bells acquired a loan from Tower Loan. The Bells’ house was collateral for the loan. The Bells later experienced financial hardship. As a result, Tower Loan recommended that the Bells contact Gibson and Court Properties, Gibson’s wholly owned corporation, for financial assistance. On September 20, 2013, the Bells executed a promissory note, a deed of trust, and an assumption warranty deed with Court Properties. Approximately three months later, Gibson evicted the Bells and shortly thereafter, sold their house. The Bells sued Gibson and Court properties alleging fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, bad faith and wrongful foreclosure. A jury returned a verdict unanimously in favor of the Bells. Gibson and Court Properties moved for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The motion was denied, and the Bells' request for attorneys' fees was granted. Gibson appealed within thirty days of the trial court's denial of his motions, but did not pay the cost bond within thirty days of the final judgment as required by statute. Gibson paid the estimated costs on April 18, 2018, which was one day before the circuit clerk’s deadline, but five days after the thirty-day statutory deadline required by Section 11-51-79. The Bells moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, which was granted. Because Gibson and Court Properties failed to pay the cost bond within thirty days of the final judgment as required by Mississippi Code Section 11-51-79 (Rev. 2019), the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Gibson v. Bell" on Justia Law

Following an investigation, the Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance determined that Copiah County Justice Court Judge Teresa Bozeman had violated Canons 1, 2A, 2B, 3B(2), 3B(7), and 3C(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct as well as Mississippi Code Section 9-11-9 (Rev. 2019). During her tenure on the bench, Judge Bozeman’s conduct resulted in violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Mississippi Code Section 9-11-9. Specifically, Judge Bozeman (1) initiated improper ex parte communications to investigate a pending civil matter, (2) failed to comply with the statutory limitations of money judgments in justice court, and (3) retaliated against a complainant who filed a complaint with the Commission. The Commission found that Judge Bozeman’s conduct constituted willful misconduct in office and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brought the judicial office into disrepute, actionable under article 6, section 177A, of the Mississippi Constitution. The Commission recommended that Judge Bozeman be suspended from office without pay for thirty days, be publicly reprimanded, and be fined $1,000. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court found the agreed recommendation was appropriate and commensurate with similar cases of misconduct. Thus, the joint motion was granted, and Judge Bozeman was suspended from office without pay for thirty days, was publicly reprimanded, and fined $1,000. View "Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial Perf. v. Bozeman" on Justia Law

After the Mississippi Department of Public Safety (MDPS) reinterpreted a provision in a contract between it and the Mann Agency, LLC, the MDPS refused to pay more than $700,000 in invoices submitted by the Mann Agency. The Mann Agency filed suit against the MDPS for breach of contract. The trial court dismissed each party’s breach-of-contract claim, found that the case involved a bona fide dispute, and denied the Mann Agency’s claim for interest and attorneys’ fees. The Mann Agency appealed the trial court’s decision to deny its claim for interest and attorneys’ fees, arguing that the MDPS acted in bad faith. The MDPS cross-appealed, arguing the trial court erred by dismissing as moot its breach-of-contract claim. Finding no reversible error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decisions. View "Mann Agency, LLC v. Mississippi Department of Public Safety" on Justia Law

Bobby Batiste was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. His conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Mississippi Supreme Court. The Court later granted him the right to file a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR), finding he was entitled to a hearing regarding alleged communications between bailiffs and/or others and members of the jury. During the hearings, a motion was made requesting that the trial judge recuse. This motion was denied, and, ultimately, the PCR was denied. Batiste appealed both the denial of the request to recuse as well as the denial of the PCR on its merits. Because the Supreme Court found that evidentiary questions remained relating to the recusal issue, it did not address the merits of the PCR. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Batiste v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

The mayor and the board of aldermen of the City of Laurel, Mississippi unanimously passed an ordinance to extend Laurel’s boundaries, but the Pendorff Community Association contested the annexation. Following a bench trial, the Chancery Court of Jones County ruled in favor of Laurel and entered an order approving the annexation. Pendorff appealed the chancery court’s ruling. After reviewing the record, the Mississippi Supreme Court could the chancery court’s approval of the annexation was reasonable. Therefore, the Court affirmed. View "Pendorff Community Association, LLC v. City of Laurel" on Justia Law

Six plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment regarding the meaning of the absentee-ballot provision under Mississippi law and its most recent addition in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. Their claims dealt exclusively with Mississippi Code Section 23-15-713(d). In partially granting plaintiffs' request, the chancery court ruled: "as it pertains to the issue of . . . whether [Section] 23-15-713(d) permits any voter with pre-existing conditions that cause COVID-19 to present a greater risk of severe illness or death to vote by absentee ballot during the COVID-19 pandemic – is well taken and the relief sought is hereby GRANTED to the extent that such pre-existing 'physical . . . condition impairs, interferes with, or limits a person’s ability to engage in certain tasks or actions or participate in typical daily activities and interactions' or in an 'impaired function or ability' that interferes thereof." The chancery court denied the Plaintiffs’ second request, finding that Section 24-15- 713(d) did not permit any voter to vote absentee if he or she wanted to avoid voting in-person at a polling place due to guidance from the MDH, the CDC, or public-health authorities to avoid unnecessary public gatherings during the COVID-19 pandemic. The chancery court declared, however, that “a voter will be allowed to vote absentee if he or she or any dependent has consulted with a physician who recommends, because of that individual’s physical disability or that of their dependent, not attending any public gathering because of the possibility of contracting COVID-19[.]” The chancery court denied the Plaintiffs’ third request for injunctive relief. Secretary of State Michael Watson, Jr. appealed the chancery court’s order, arguing the plain terms of Section 24-15-713(d), a voter must have a “physical disability,” and “because of” that disability, voting in-person “could reasonably cause danger” to the voter or others. The Secretary of State maintained a preexisting condition that was not itself a “physical disability” cannot satisfy the statute, whether or not the voter believed that COVID-19 might make voting in person dangerous. The Secretary of State contended the chancery court erred to the extent its order suggested that Section 23-15-713(d) applied to voters otherwise. The Mississippi Supreme Court concluded the chancery court erred to the extent its order declared Section 25-15-713(d) permitted any voter with preexisting conditions that cause COVID-19 to present a greater risk of severe illness or death to vote by absentee ballot during the COVID-19 pandemic. Further, the chancery court erred to the extent that its order allowed a “recommended” quarantine to qualify as a “physician-imposed quarantine.” The court's order was affirmed in all other respects. View "Watson v. Oppenheim" on Justia Law

Robert Casey was convicted by jury of possession of cocaine, for which the circuit court sentenced him to serve twenty years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, with four years suspended pending completion of four years’ post-release supervision. Casey appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by declining to suppress cocaine found on his person and that his constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy trial were violated. Because Casey’s arguments were without merit, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence. View "Casey v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

The City of Petal’s March 30, 2017 Amended Annexation Ordinance sought to add six square miles, spread across five different locations, to the City’s limits. The proposed annexation would have also added 296 residents to the City. For the Special Chancellor to approve the City’s petition to ratify, the City had to prove the annexation was reasonable. The chancellor found the City did not fully meet that burden. After trial, the chancellor found a modified annexation acceptable, determining the City already had sufficient available land within its current limits for residential and commercial development. And he found it more beneficial and reasonable for the City to update zoning and improve infrastructure than to approve annexation of an industrial area and two mostly undeveloped and unpopulated areas. There were two smaller proposed areas the judge deemed reasonable for annexation. The City’s last annexation, finalized in 2003, resulted in some parcels or tracts of land erroneously split between the City and Forrest County. So the chancellor granted the City's petition (as modified) to correct those errors. The City appealed. Finding the chancellor's decision supported by substantial and credible evidence, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed his decision. View "In the Matter of the Enlargement & Extension of the Municipal Boundaries of the City of Petal, Mississippi" on Justia Law

Cynthia Robinson was convicted of conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute hydrocodone after being intercepted by police on her way to meet a confidential informant. On appeal, Robinson contended the trial court erred by denying her motion for a mental evaluation. Robinson’s counsel asserted that Robinson was not effectively assisting in her own defense and pointed to Robinson’s YouTube videos espousing conspiracy theories and to her prior diagnosis of a drug-induced psychotic disorder. Robinson personally asked the court to deny the motion, which it ultimately did: the trial judge cited his prior experience with Robinson and his prior findings that she was “reasonable and rational” and had “presented herself well . . . before the Court.” Robinson testified in her own defense, and she appeared fully aware of the allegations against her and presented a coherent theory of her defense. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed Robinson’s convictions and sentences. View "Robinson v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

The Mississippi Supreme Court accepted this case on certiorari review from the Court of Appeals. Shaun Seals worked for the Pearl River Resort; he alleged he was terminated for reasons relating to a work-related injury. Donna Brolick, Pearl River Resort’s director of employment compliance, was called as a witness at the hearing before an administrative judge (AJ). Brolick testified that she was previously vice president of human resources at Pearl River Resort at the time Seals’s position was phased out and he was let go in January of 2013. Brolick further testified that in 2012 the resort changed its management. Multiple upper-level positions were eliminated or consolidated. Seals’s position as director of transportation was one of several positions that were eliminated. The Workers' Compensation Commission reversed the AJ’s order. The Commission found that Seals had reached maximum medical improvement on November 13, 2015, but failed to prove any permanent disability or loss of wage-earning capacity for two reasons. The Commission found that Seals was let go for unrelated economic reasons, noting his receipt of severance pay and other benefits as well as the testimony and evidence adduced by the Resort. Seals appealed the Commission's decision to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court held the Commission was correct in its assessment of the date of maximum medical improvement but that the Commission erred by finding Seals failed to prove any loss of wage-earning capacity. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the decision of the Commission and directed the Commission to calculate Seals’s loss of wage-earning capacity and to award corresponding compensation. The Resort petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted. The Supreme Court adopted "the well-reasoned analysis of the opinion concerning maximum medical improvement," but was "constrained to reverse the Court of Appeals’ majority regarding loss of wage-earning capacity. Sufficient evidence supported the Commission’s decision that Seals had not suffered loss of wage-earning capacity." The Commission's decision was reinstated in toto. View "Seals v. Pearl River Resort & Casino" on Justia Law