Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries
Fitch v. Wine Express Inc.
The Mississippi Department of Revenue (MDOR) and the Office of the Attorney General of the State of Mississippi filed suit against Wine Express, Inc., Gold Medal Wine Club, and Bottle Deals, Inc., in Mississippi Chancery Court. In early 2017, the Alcohol Beverage Control (ABC) Division of the Mississippi Department of Revenue and the Alcohol and Tobacco Enforcement Division of the Mississippi Attorney General’s Office investigated the shipment of wine and other alcoholic beverages into the state. The investigation revealed that most Internet retailers made it “impossible” to place an order for alcoholic beverages once it was disclosed that the shipment would be to a location in Mississippi. This, however, was not so for the Defendants’ websites. In December 2017, the State sued the Defendants for injunctive relief to enforce the provisions of the “Local Option Alcoholic Beverage Control Law.” The State sought injunctive relief, disgorgement, monetary relief, attorneys’ fees, and punitive damages. Defendants moved for dismissal claiming that Mississippi courts lack personal jurisdiction over Defendants. After a hearing on the matter, the trial court granted Defendants’ motion. The State appealed. The Mississippi Supreme Court found that the trial court erred by finding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the Defendants. View "Fitch v. Wine Express Inc." on Justia Law
Diamondhead Country Club and Property Owners Association, Inc. v. The Peoples Bank
The issue this case presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review centered on whether a purchaser of real property out of foreclosure was automatically assigned and thereby entitled to the developer’s exemption from assessments on the lots previously owned by the developer. Diamondhead Country Club and Property Owner’s Association (DPOA) contends that the foreclosing purchaser, Peoples Bank, is not automatically granted an assignment of the developer’s personal rights (i.e., the exemption from Property Owner Association (POA) Assessments) in addition to property rights and that the developing company did not expressly assign this exemption to the lender/foreclosing purchaser; therefore, the lender/foreclosing purchaser does not enjoy the exemption. The Supreme Court concluded the covenants provided that the developer’s exemption would be eliminated by conveyance of the property to a third party. Therefore, the exemption was a personal right requiring assignment to Peoples. A 2008 deed of trust conveyed both the real property rights and personal rights of the developer, but the 2012 deed of trust was void of any language granting the developer's right of exemption to Peoples. Therefore, the Court determined Peoples was entitled to the exemption from paying assessments in connection with the Glen Eagle lots, but it was liable for assessments levied on the Diamondhead lots. As to the Glen Eagle lots, the Supreme Court affirmed; the Court reversed and remanded as to the Diamondhead lots. View "Diamondhead Country Club and Property Owners Association, Inc. v. The Peoples Bank" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Real Estate & Property Law
Eubanks v. Mississippi
Ashley Brown and Jessica Baugh were roommates at the Bay Meadows Apartments in Ridgeland, Mississippi. They worked together at a local bar. One night after work, Brown and Baugh met up with friends, including Stephanie Mejia, another co-worker. Mejia arranged to spend the night at Brown’s and Baugh’s apartment. Because Mejia did not have a key to the apartment, Baugh told her that she would leave the door unlocked. Mejia then left Baugh to meet up with her friends. During the night, Jones woke up Baugh and advised that someone had come into the apartment. Baugh was not concerned because she assumed it was Mejia. Later that morning, Brown woke up Baugh and advised that her car was gone. Brown’s keys, along with her debit and credit cards, were also gone. Baugh began to look around the apartment and noticed that her iPad and Michael Kors bag were missing. The tips that Baugh had received from work were in the bag. Brown and Baugh called the police. The Ridgeland Police Department learned that Amonteel Pates had used Brown’s credit card to purchase a pair of shoes. Pates was later arrested. When questioned about the incident at Brown’s and Baugh’s apartment, Pates acknowledged his involvement and culpability and provided the names of the other suspects: Rahim Williams, Michael Tillman, Fabiyonne Peel, and defendant Jontavian Eubanks. According to Pates, Mejia instigated taking Baugh's tips; Pates was aware that Mejia had arranged to spend the night at Baugh’s and Brown’s apartment and that Baugh would leave the door unlocked. Eubanks, Pates, Peel, Williams, and Tillman were indicted on burglary of a dwelling, conspiracy to commit burglary of a dwelling, motor-vehicle theft, and conspiracy to commit motor-vehicle theft. Pates pleaded guilty and was sentenced to twenty-five years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC), with ten years to serve. As part of his plea agreement, Pates testified against Eubanks at trial. Eubanks was convicted of burglary of a dwelling, and conspiracy to commit burglary of a dwelling, and was sentenced to serve twenty-five years in the custody of the MDOC on Count I and five years on Count II, with the sentences to run concurrently to each other, but consecutively to any and all other sentences. He was further ordered to pay $698.50 in court costs, fees, and assessments. Eubanks appealed, arguing the trial court erred by: (1) denying his motion for funds to retain an expert for trial; (2) denying his motion for funds to retain an expert for a Daubert hearing; (3) overruling his Batson challenge; and (4) permitting hearsay testimony to establish essential elements of the charged offenses. Finding no reversible error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed Eubanks' conviction. View "Eubanks v. Mississippi" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Fowlkes Plumbing, L.L.C.
In May 2015, the Chickasaw County School District entered into a contract with Sullivan Enterprises, Inc., for window restoration work on the Houlka Attendance Center. In July 2015, during construction, a fire began that completely consumed the attendance center. Liberty Mutual, the school district’s insurer, paid the school district $4.3 million for the damage to the building. Liberty Mutual then filed a subrogation suit against Sullivan Enterprises, Fowlkes Plumbing, LLC, and Quality Heat & Air, Inc. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi found that the waiver of subrogation did not apply to damages to the “non-Work” property, thus Liberty Mutual could proceed in litigation as to “non-Work” property damages. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit allowed an interlocutory appeal and certified a question to the Mississippi Supreme Court regarding whether the subrogation waiver applied to “non-Work” property. The Supreme Court determined that based on the plain meaning of the contract language, the waiver of subrogation applied to both work and non-work property. View "Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Fowlkes Plumbing, L.L.C." on Justia Law
Anderson v. Wiggins
The Chancery Court granted summary judgment in favor of Darnice Wiggins in a conversion case she brought against Chastity Anderson, the fiancée of Wiggins’s deceased son Jhonte Sanders. Sanders and Anderson met each other while serving in the military in 2009. The two lost touch with one another. In 2011, Sanders was diagnosed with leukemia while living in Chicago, Illinois. In May 2013, Sanders reconnected with Anderson online. Sanders then moved to Rankin County, Mississippi and continued his chemotherapy treatment at University of Mississippi Medical Center (UMMC). In 2014, Sanders settled a personal-injury claim and received a monetary settlement in excess of $350,000. Sanders made multiple transfers of those settlement funds to Anderson. Sanders died soon after the transfer of his funds. Following Sanders’s death, the Chancery Court appointed Wiggins administratrix of his estate. Wiggins filed a “Complaint for Conversion” against Anderson, the crux of her complaint revolved around transfers Sanders made after his personal-injury settlement. In support of her conversion claim, Wiggins alleged that Anderson was aware of Sanders’s pending settlement, that Sanders qualified as a vulnerable adult, and that Anderson either unduly influenced him to transfer the funds or utilized her position of trust to take advantage of him while he was a vulnerable adult. During the summary judgment hearing, Wiggins offered multiple exhibits into evidence. Wiggins argued that the court should grant her motion because Anderson’s admissions, the established facts, and a doctor's affidavit proved that no genuine issue of material fact existed. The chancellor agreed and granted summary judgment, reasoning that the pleadings, answers to discovery and requests for admission, together with the affidavit of the doctor showed no genuine issue of material fact. De facto affirming the chancery courts decision by a 5-5 vote, the prevailing opinion wrote that Anderson’s failure to respond to the motion for summary judgment meant she rested upon her allegations, and those were insufficient to show there was a genuine dispute of material fact. The Mississippi Supreme Court determined the Chancery Court erred by granting the motion for summary judgment. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party left genuine issues of material fact unresolved. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Anderson v. Wiggins" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Personal Injury
Smith v. Mississippi
Carlos Smith appealed the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In his petition for post-conviction relief, Smith sought permission to proceed with an out-of-time appeal. The circuit court denied his motion, finding that it had no jurisdiction to allow the out-of-time appeal due to the 180-day time limit imposed by Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(h). The filing was well past the 180-day deadline under the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure; however, the petition was still within the three year time limit imposed for filing a petition for post-conviction relief under Mississippi Code Section section 99-39-5(2) (Rev. 2015). The Mississippi Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred by not considering Smith’s post-conviction motion for an out- of-time appeal under Section 99-39-5(2). Accordingly, it reversed and remanded. View "Smith v. Mississippi" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Mississippi Department of Public Safety v. Herrington
Justin Herrington, a law-enforcement officer with the Columbia Police Department, was convicted of violating Mississippi Code Section 97-3-104, which prohibited sexual activity between a law-enforcement employee and an offender on correctional supervision. The trial court ordered Herrington to register as a sex offender under Mississippi Code Sections 45-33-21 through 45-33-51. The trial court then amended its order and removed Herrington’s registration requirement. The Mississippi Department of Public Safety (MDPS) appealed and argued that the trial court erred by removing Herrington’s requirement to register as a sex offender. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court agreed and reversed the trial court’s order dispensing with Herrington’s registration requirement. View "Mississippi Department of Public Safety v. Herrington" on Justia Law
Holland v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc.
In 2016, Mario Holland parked his vehicle at Black’s Food Market and walked to West Lounge. Upon returning to his vehicle after patronizing West Lounge, Holland was shot and robbed in the Black’s Food parking lot. He alleged the assailant came from a vacant lot across the street from Black’s Food. Murphy Oil owned the vacant lot. Holland suffered serious injuries from the assault. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant Murphy Oil, finding that, as a landowner that owned land near the scene of an assault, it did not owe any legal duty to Holland. Holland appealed, arguing that the Mississippi Supreme Court should adopt Section 54 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, which provided for instances when landowners might owe a duty to persons or property located off the landowner’s property. The Supreme Court determined it did not need to address the Restatement because it did not apply to the facts of this case. Further, the Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment because the landowner did not owe any legal duty to Holland. View "Holland v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc." on Justia Law
In the Matter of the Estate of Julisa Matute
Sixteen-year old Julisa Matute, along with her sister and father, were involved in a motor-vehicle accident in Harrison County, Mississippi. Julisa was transported to Mobile, Alabama, and was admitted to University of South Alabama Medical Center, a hospital operated by University of South Alabama (USA). Julisa died there intestate. Julisa’s mother and sister executed an authorization for the donation of Julisa’s organs with the Alabama Organ Center (AOC). An estate was opened; Julisa’s mother was appointed administratrix of the Estate. Shortly thereafter notice was served to creditors, USA probated a claim against the Estate for medical expenses. The Estate filed a “complaint to contest illegal probated claim and compulsory counterclaim,” alleging that before Julisa’s death, USA representatives approached Julisa’s family and asked that they donate her organs and, in turn, Julisa’s hospital bill incurred at USA would be “totally wiped out and not be collected.” As a result of this alleged agreement, the Estate contested USA’s probated claim and asserted that the “probated claim [wa]s null and void and uncollectable.” In a counterclaim, the Estate alleged emotional distress, fraud, and punitive damages because, according to the Estate, “[t]he hospital told [Julisa’s family] that the bill would be wiped clean for allowing them to have [Julisa’s] organs . . . .” A wrongful-death lawsuit related to the motor-vehicle accident was filed then by the Estate. A settlement was reached among the parties in September 2018. Months later, a hearing was held on USA’s contested probated claim. The chancellor entered a judgment approving the Estate’s Petition to Receive First and Final Accounting, Discharge Administratrix and Close Estate. USA filed a motion to alter or amend the order granting the Estate’s Petition to Approve Settlement of Claims of Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Julisa, and asserted that the chancellor’s reference to a “hospital lien claim” was erroneous. The chancellor denied the motion. USA timely appealed. The Mississippi Supreme Court determined that while the chancellor properly denied USA's probated claim as uncollectable, the chancellor erred in finding the probated claim was invalid and erroneously ruled on USA's hospital-lien claim. As a result, the chancery court's judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Julisa Matute" on Justia Law
Central Mississippi Medical Center v. Mississippi Division of Medicaid
Central Mississippi Medical Center (CMMC) appealed a Chancery Court decision denying its appeal of a Division of Medicaid (DOM) hearing. The DOM had determined that CMMC owed it $1.226 million due to overpayment. The Mississippi Supreme Court recently decided a reimbursement dispute involving the DOM, Crossgates River Oaks Hosp. v. Miss. Div. of Medicaid, 240 So. 3d 385 (Miss. 2018). In Crossgates, the hospitals prevailed because the DOM had failed to adhere to the Medicare State Plan Agreement. Applying the same legal principles to this case, the Supreme Court ruled the DOM prevailed because the DOM adhered to the Plan. The chancellor found sufficient evidence to support the DOM’s decision, decreed that it was neither arbitrary nor capricious, and decreed that it did not exceed the DOM’s authority or violate any of CMMC’s statutory or constitutional rights. View "Central Mississippi Medical Center v. Mississippi Division of Medicaid" on Justia Law