Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Carol Dalon died in the care of Ocean Springs Health and Rehabilitation Center (OSHRC). As administrator of her estate, Carol’s son Emile Dalon, sued the center for wrongful death, alleging OSHRC and its employees negligently caused Carol’s death. The circuit court granted the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, and Emile appealed. The Mississippi Supreme Court found Emile presented no evidence he lacked the opportunity to study the arbitration agreement and to inquire about its terms. Emile did not argue he was time pressured when signing the agreement. Additionally, the arbitration agreement explained that Emile had the right to seek legal counsel concerning the arbitration agreement. If Emile had concerns or questions about the arbitration agreement, he could have asked the facility, researched the question on his own, or hired an attorney to assist him. Emile argues he was forced to sign the arbitration agreement in order to get his mother the care she needed. The Court found this claim meritless, concluding Emile entered into the arbitration agreement knowingly and voluntarily. Therefore, the trial court made no reversible error in granting a motion to compel arbitration. View "Dalon v. MS HUD Ocean Springs LLC" on Justia Law

In chancery court, Plaintiffs challenged the two sources of funding for charter schools provided for under the Mississippi Charter Schools Act of 2013. Plaintiffs contended the Act was unconstitutional under Article 8, Sections 206 and 208, of the Mississippi Constitution. Also, one of the charter-school intervenors maintained that Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the suit. The chancellor held that the Plaintiffs did have standing to sue and that they did not prove that either source of funding was unconstitutional. Before the Mississippi Supreme Court, Plaintiffs concentrated their argument under Article 8, Section 206, of the Mississippi Constitution, alleging that a charter school’s ad valorem funding was unconstitutional. They did not appeal the chancellor’s ruling concerning per-pupil funds. The Jackson Public School District (JPS) maintained that the chancellor erred in denying its motion to be dismissed from the suit. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court, agreeing Plaintiffs had standing to sue, and that they did not meet their burden to demonstrate that Section 37-28-55 was unconstitutional. The Court found JPS’s arguments concerning its motion to dismiss were waived on appeal for failure to raise the issue in a cross-appeal. View "Araujo v. Bryant" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Jikiel Jones of armed robbery, armed carjacking and kidnapping. On direct appeal to the Mississippi Supreme Court, Jones argued: (1) the trial court erred by excluding his alibi witness; (2) the trial court erred by granting a deficient accomplice jury instruction; and (3) the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence before trial. With respect to the first issue, the Supreme Court found the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the testimony of Jones’s alibi witness. "While a per se violation of Mississippi Rule of Criminal Procedure 17.4(a) did occur, this violation cannot be held against Jones in light of his original counsel’s conflict of interest. Further, there is no indication in the record that Jones’s failure to notice the prosecution of his alibi witness was willful or motivated by a desire to obtain a tactical advantage." With respect to Jones' second issue: the Court found the accomplice instruction was deficient. Jones waived his right to appeal the exculpatory evidence issue. The Court reversed Jones’s conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Jones v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

This appeal involved a business dispute between two physicians. William Yost, M.D., owned and operated a pain-management clinic, Doctors Medical Center, LLC (DMC-Slidell). Within six months of opening DMC-Sidell, the Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners (LSBME) began an investigation of Dr. Yost for illegally operating a pain-management clinic. Yost surrendered his Louisiana license, and closed DMC-Slidell. Yost then opened a new clinic, Doctors Medical Center of Picayune, LLC (DMC-Picayune), and began seeing patients, including his former patients from DMC-Slidell. The Mississippi State Board of Medical Licensure (MSBML) required that all pain-management clinics be registered and issued a certificate; Yost submitted an application for registration to the MSBML, but the certificate was not immediately issued. Mayor Okoloise, M.D. met with Yost to discuss affiliating. As a result of these discussions, Okoloise began practicing medicine with Yost at DMC-Picayune. They formalized their relationship and signed a “Personal Services Contract” in August 2012. At trial, Okoloise testified that, at the time he signed the agreement, he was unaware of the LSBME’s investigation of Yost,and he was unaware that Yost was not properly credentialed in Mississippi. The MSBML was not aware of the Louisiana investigation either and approved Yost’s application practice in pain management, issuing the required certificate. Dr. Okoloise resigned from DMC-Picayune; when he learned of the investigations, Okoloise testified the clinic was being operated illegally, and, thus he believed his contract to have been void at its inception. After Okoloise resigned, several other DMC-Picayune employees unexpectedly resigned. Testimony was presented that Okoloise made plans to open another clinic before he submitted his resignation, Hope Medical Services, LLC. Okoloise offered several members of the DMC-Picayune staff jobs at Hope Medical. The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) investigated Yost and DMC-Picayune, the result of which did not end in charges filed. But, on February 13, 2013, the DEA closed DMC-Picayune. That same day, Yost voluntarily surrendered his Mississippi medical license. Notwithstanding these investigations and the closure of his clinics, Yost sued Okoloise and Hope Medical and the DMC-Picayune employees that worked for Hope Medical. The chancellor determined there was sufficient evidence to sustain several claims against Okoloise and Hope Medical: trover/conversion, defamation, breach of contract, breach of duty of good faith, and misappropriation of trade secrets. The chancellor found “[Dr. Yost and DMC-Picayune] should be equitably compensated for the damages they incurred for these claims and losses.” He awarded a judgment against Okoloise and Hope Medical in the amount of $188,622. The Mississippi Supreme Court determined the chancellor’s findings were based on equitable measures, with no legal basis, and were therefore manifestly wrong. "The record evidence was insufficient to show losses attributable to Dr. Okoloise or Hope Medical. The judgment is manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, and not supported by credible evidence. We reverse and render." View "Okoloise v. Yost" on Justia Law

Gulfport OB-GYN was a professional association of physicians specializing in obstetrical and gynecological care. In 2008, it hired the law firm Dukes, Dukes, Keating & Faneca, P.A., to assist in negotiating the hiring of Dr. Donielle Daigle and to prepare an employment agreement for her. Five years later, Dr. Daigle and another physician left Gulfport OB-GYN to establish their own practice. They sued Gulfport OB-GYN for unpaid compensation and sought a declaratory judgment that the noncompetition covenant was unenforceable. The departing physicians ultimately prevailed, with the chancery court holding the noncompetition covenant not applicable to Dr. Daigle because she left voluntarily and was not “terminated by the Employer.” The chancery court decision was initially appealed, but the dispute was later settled through mediation when Gulfport OB-GYN agreed to pay Dr. Daigle $425,000. Gulfport OB-GYN then filed this legal-malpractice suit against the attorney who drafted the employment agreement and her firm. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the defendants after finding Gulfport OB-GYN had failed to produce sufficient evidence that it would have received a better deal but for the attorneys’ alleged negligence, i.e., Gulfport OB-GYN failed to prove that the alleged negligence caused it damages. The Mississippi Supreme Court agreed and affirmed. View "Gulfport OB-GYN, P.A. v. Dukes, Dukes, Keating & Faneca, P.A." on Justia Law

The Mississippi Supreme Court remanded this case for further proceedings to determine child custody. On remand, the chancery court awarded custody of the children to the father. Aggrieved, the mother appealed, arguing that the instructions given by the Mississippi Supreme Court were simply to review the determination of the mother's fitness without the hearsay evidence, not to conduct a new trial on custody. Finding that the chancellor was not manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous in granting custody of the three minor children to the father, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ballard v. Ballard" on Justia Law

Jeremy Fogelman was convicted by jury of felony failure to stop his motor vehicle for police. Because Fogleman fled at a high rate of speed, showing an indifference to the consequences and to causing injury, the trial judge designated Fogleman’s offense a crime of violence under Mississippi Code Section 97-3-2(2) (Rev. 2014). This finding resulted in Fogleman’s parole-ineligibility period increasing from one-fourth to one-half of his five-year sentence—a sentence allowed by statute and authorized by the jury’s verdict. The appellate court held that the resulting parole-ineligibility increase violated the Sixth Amendment because it was based on facts found by a judge, not a jury. The United States Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment required factual determinations that increase maximum or minimum sentences be submitted to a jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. The Mississippi Supreme Court found the judge’s crime-of-violence designation merely impacted the minimum time Fogleman had to serve before becoming parole eligible. It did nothing to affect Fogleman’s sentence. Thus, no Sixth Amendment violation occurred. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court's judgment. View "Fogleman v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Defendants in this case were, inter alia, former officers, directors, employees, and investors of KiOR Inc., a startup biofuels company. The State of Mississippi lent KiOR $75 million to construct its first commercial-scale production facility in Columbus, Mississippi. The facility was completed in 2012. Operations were suspended in early 2014, however, and KiOR filed for bankruptcy later that year. In January 2015, the State sued Defendants, alleging fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent and negligent omission, civil conspiracy, aiding and abetting, and respondeat superior. The case was assigned randomly to Judge Gowan. In late 2017, three weeks after briefing had ended on the last motion to dismiss, Judge Gowan sua sponte reassigned the case to Judge Green. In response to the order, Defendants petitioned the Mississippi Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus, which was treated as a petition for interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court granted review and a stay of the trial court proceedings and deconsolidated three cases, with a separate decision handed down for each. The “Cannon” defendants argued Judge Gowan did not have the authority to transfer or reassign Cannon to Judge Green. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the transfer from Judge Gowan to Judge Green. View "Khosla v. Mississippi ex rel. Hood" on Justia Law

Derrick Nelson was convicted by jury of murder. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred by refusing an imperfect self-defense jury instruction; it reversed Nelson’s conviction and remanded for a new trial. The State filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which the Mississippi Supreme Court granted. Because no evidentiary basis in the record supported the grant of an imperfect self-defense jury instruction, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. While the Court of Appeals did not reach Nelson’s argument that the State deprived him of a fair trial, the Supreme Court found no reversible error, thus affirming Nelson’s murder conviction and sentence of life imprisonment. View "Nelson v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

This case arose from Hurricane Katrina insurance litigation. After the hurricane had destroyed many homes, policyholders and insurance companies began litigating whether the hurricane losses were caused by flood damage or wind damage. The distinction determined whether the insurance companies would pay claims on those polices that did not cover flood damage. This case is before the Court on interlocutory appeal. Safeco Insurance Company (Safeco) and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company individually challenged the circuit court’s reassignment of their respective cases and the appointment of a special master. The Mississippi Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion in reassigning judges, but vacated the order appointing the special master, finding an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. “The order itself acknowledged a blind-billing provision was “unusual.” But the Supreme Court found it was more than that: requiring both parties, one of which is the State of Mississippi, to pay an attorney in Louisiana to act as a judge, allowing either side to meet with him ex parte, and not requiring this special master to mention these meetings or even justify or detail his bill far exceeded the discretionary authority to appoint special masters.” View "Safeco Insurance Company of America v. Mississippi, ex rel. Hood" on Justia Law