Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Brent and Tracy Williams were granted an irreconcilable-differences divorce, and the chancellor resolved the issues upon which the parties could not agree. At issue in the direct appeal was: (1) whether the chancellor erred by not providing Tracy a set visitation schedule with their teenage son; (2) whether the chancellor erred in requiring Tracy to pay child support; (3) whether the chancellor erred in the valuation of the Williams’s business interests; and (4) whether the chancellor erred in finding an airplane and a boat to be marital property. On cross-appeal, the issue was whether the chancellor erred by not ordering Tracy to make monthly payments to Brent on his $1 million judgment award. Finding no merit to the assignments of error on appeal or cross-appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court. View "Williams v. Williams" on Justia Law

Mary Mac Atkinson alleged she was injured after slipping on a liquid substance at Clinton Healthcare. After the parties conducted significant amounts of discovery, Atkinson moved for a spoliation determination, requesting a spoliation jury instruction regarding a missing video, and moved for partial summary judgment as to liability. Clinton Healthcare moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion for spoliation, granted Atkinson’s motion for partial summary judgment, and denied Clinton Healthcare’s motion for summary judgment. The Mississippi Supreme Court determined genuine issues of material fact remained, and the trial court erred by granting Atkinson’s motion for partial summary judgment, but correctly denied Clinton Healthcare’s motion for summary judgment. Additionally, the Supreme Court found the trial court’s order regarding spoliation and the entitlement to a spoliation jury instruction was premature. Therefore, the trial court was affirmed in part, reversed in part, the spoliation order was vacated, and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Clinton Healthcare, LLC v. Atkinson" on Justia Law

In September 2013, the Gertys filed a joint complaint for an irreconcilable-differences divorce. The joint complaint sat with the Chancery Court for almost two years, during which the parties cooperated with each other and faithfully abided by the Property Settlement Agreement (“PSA”), which was filed contemporaneously with the joint complaint. The PSA provided that Michael would have physical custody of the couple’s minor child. Michael was required to move to the Great Lakes area to fulfill a three-year military commitment when Joesie agreed that their son would move with Michael. Joesie made the decision not to move to the Great Lakes area, instead, moving into her paramour's mother's house. For approximately two years, Michael and their son lived apart from Joesie. In January of 2015, Michael informed Joesie that reconciliation was impossible and that he wanted her to sign and finalize the divorce papers. Joesie, upon the advice of her attorney, surreptitiously told Michael that she also was ready to complete the irreconcilable-differences divorce. Based on the advice of her counsel, Joesie waited until her summer visitation had begun pursuant to the PSA and until her son was physically in Mississippi before withdrawing her consent to an irreconcilable-differences divorce. Joesie and Michael then filed separate complaints for divorce on the ground of adultery, inter alia, and alternatively sought an irreconcilable-differences divorce. The chancellor entered a final judgment and decreed that a divorce should be granted, but that neither party was entitled to a fault-based divorce. She found that Joesie had failed to establish adultery. She found that Michael had proved adultery because Joesie had admitted it, but that Michael had condoned Joesie’s adulterous conduct. Then the chancellor sua sponte declared the statutory scheme under Mississippi Code Section 93-5-2 (Rev. 2013) unconstitutional and granted an irreconcilable-differences divorce. Joesie was granted custody of their child. After final judgment was entered, Michael, Joesie and the State asked for reconsideration because no party had asked for, pleaded, argued, or offered proof on the unconstitutionality of the statute. The chancellor significantly amended her earlier final judgment, increasing Joesie’s award to include a percent of Michael’s military-retirement benefit and reducing the noncustodial parent’s summer visitation from three months, as provided in the PSA, to one month, contrary to the PSA and the chancellor’s original final judgment. The State appealed the chancellor's adjudication of 93-5-2 as unconstitutional. Michael appealed the trial court's adjudication of 93-5-2 as unconstitutional; (2) failing to award Michael a divorce on the ground of adultery; (3) reducing Michael’s summer visitation; (4) awarding Joesie a portion of Michael’s retirement benefits; and (5) awarding custody to Joesie. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor’s finding regarding custody and child support, but reversed the remaining judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Gerty v. Gerty" on Justia Law

T. Mark Sledge left the law firm Grenfell Sledge and Stevens, PLLC. When he did, an issue arose regarding the fee distribution for several of the firm’s and Sledge’s cases, more specifically, the interpretation of the firm’s partnership agreements and related documents. Sledge filed suit against his former firm and its individual members. Following a hearing, the Chancery Court granted the motion for summary judgment filed by Grenfell Sledge and Stevens, PLLC, and its individual members and also a declaratory judgment in their favor. Sledge challenged the chancery court’s rulings; however, the Mississippi Supreme Court was unpersuaded by his arguments on appeal and affirmed. View "Sledge v. Grenfell Sledge And Stevens, PLLC d/b/a Grenfell & Stevens, PLLC" on Justia Law

In 2008, Officer Joe Edney was involved in the arrest of Carlos Williams. Williams alleged that Edney had attempted to stop a vehicle in which Williams had been a passenger. When the vehicle stopped, Williams ran until Edney demanded that he stop. Williams stated that after he surrendered, Edney began screaming at him obscenities, threats, and racial slurs. Williams alleged that Edney then sprayed Williams with mace and kicked and stomped Williams in the face, neck, and shoulder, causing him injuries. Williams sued; the return of service was made in March 2010; by July 2010, Williams applied for default, stating Edney failed to respond to the complaint. The circuit court entered default judgment in November 2010. The case remained stagnant for four and a half years after entry of default. In April 2015, the trial court found Williams failed to notify or name the City of Greenville as a party, and as such, the claims against Edney in his official capacity had to be dismissed. The trial court then awarded damages in favor of Williams against Edney individually. Thereafter, Endey moved for relief from the judgment, contending the final judgment awarding damages, fees and costs was the only notice he received that he had been sued. Further, Edney alleged that the summons and complaint was delivered to another Greenville Police Department employee, and that person's signature, who was not authorized to received service of process for him, appeared on the proof of service. Thus, the default judgment entered against him was void. The court found that Edney’s motion was well-taken and held that the court had not acquired jurisdiction over Edney because of improper service of process. The court ordered the entry of default, the default judgment, and the order of the court awarding damages to be set aside. Counsel for Williams immediately made an ore tenus motion for an additional 120 days within which to serve Edney with a copy of the summons and complaint. The trial court reserved ruling and ordered the parties to brief the issue of whether the dismissal should be with or without prejudice. At the end of the hearing, counsel for Williams handed a copy of the summons and complaint to Edney. Edney moved to dismiss, arguing the statute of limitations has expired. Williams contended that he should have been allowed to begin the lawsuit anew because he had demonstrated a good-faith effort to serve Edney. Edney appealed the trial court’s holding that Williams had established good cause for his failure to serve process within the statutory time period. The Mississippi Supreme Court found that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider in its analysis of good cause Williams’s four-and-a-half-year delay in pursuing this action. Therefore, it reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded this case to the trial court to include the length of delay in its analysis of good cause. View "Edney v. Williams" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court centered on release language in a settlement agreement. This case began as a legal malpractice action by Delie Shepard and Ashley Stowers (the Plaintiffs) against Robert Germany and his law firm, Pittman, Germany, Roberts & Welsh, LLP. Shepard and Stowers were represented by Michael Crowley and Edward Blackmon; Germany and his firm were represented by Fred Krutz and Daniel Mulholland. After several years of litigation and mediation, the parties reached a settlement. In the settlement, Shepard and Stowers agreed “to execute a Full and Complete Release.” The parties agreed to and memorialized the essential terms of their settlement in an email exchange. Although the essential terms were agreed upon, Crowley’s email to Krutz did not specify the precise language of the “Full and Complete Releases.” Believing that the parties had a meeting of the minds on the essential terms of the settlement in an email exchange, Germany moved to enforce the settlement agreement using the release language proposed by his attorneys. Shepard and Stowers later filed their own motion to enforce the settlement agreement using their proposed releases. Before Shepard and Stowers filed their motion, the circuit court held a hearing on Germany’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement. The circuit court entered an Order Enforcing Settlement Agreement and Judgment of Dismissal. Unsatisfied with the order enforcing the settlement agreement, which required their signature on the releases, Crowley and Blackmon filed an emergency petition for writ of prohibition with the Supreme Court, which was ordered to be treated as a Notice of Appeal. They later filed a notice of appeal in the underlying case on behalf of Shepard and Stowers. The appeal sought essentially the same relief as Crowley and Blackmon’s petition, so the Supreme Court consolidated the cases. The issue for the Supreme Court was whether the circuit court abused its discretion by enforcing a settlement agreement using specific release language that required the Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ signatures. Finding that the circuit court abused its discretion, the Supreme Court reversed the Order Enforcing Settlement Agreement and Judgment of Dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Crowley v. Germany" on Justia Law

Richard Gerald Jordan was sentenced to death following his conviction on charges of kidnapping and murdering Edwina Marter in 1976. In his Second Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Jordan challenged the Mississippi Department of Corrections’ (MDOC) using midazolam as the first drug in its three-drug lethal-injection protocol. According to Jordan, midazolam did not meet the requirements set forth in Mississippi Code Section 99-19-51(1) (Supp. 2018), which directed MDOC to use “an appropriate anesthetic or sedative” as the first drug. Because Jordan failed to provide sufficient support to warrant an evidentiary hearing, the Mississippi Supreme Court denied his petition. View "Jordan v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

In this, Thomas Edwin Loden Jr.’s fourth petition for post-conviction relief, he challenged the Mississippi Department of Corrections’ use of midazolam in its lethal-injection protocol. He claimed that midazolam was not an “appropriate anesthetic or sedative” that, “if properly administered in a sufficient quantity, is likely to render the condemned inmate unconscious, so that the execution process should not entail a substantial risk of severe pain” under Mississippi Code Section 99-19-51 (Supp. 2018). Loden requested the Mississippi Supreme Court to enter an order forbidding the State from using any drug, including midazolam, as the first drug in its lethal-injection series. The Court determined, from review of Loden's filings and affidavits on whether a 500-milligram dose of midazolam met Mississippi’s statutory definition of an “appropriate anesthetic or sedative,” Loden offered no more than the ipse dixit arguments of his expert, Craig W. Stevens, Ph.D. "Loden has failed to carry his burden of proof in presenting a substantial showing of the denial of a state or federal right as required by Mississippi Code Section 99-39-27 (Rev. 2015), for the portions of his affidavits related to the efficacy of a 500-milligram dose of midazolam are a 'sham' and are not supported by established medical literature." Moreover, the United States Supreme Court considered the same arguments presented in Loden's petition and rejected them. Accordingly, Loden's petition for PCT was denied. View "Loden v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

At issue before the Mississippi Supreme Court in this case was whether NRG Wholesale Generation’s proffered expert used an acceptable method to determine the “true value” of its power plant in computing ad valorem tax. The expert used a mixture of the sales-comparison approach, the income approach, and the cost approach to determine the true value of the facility. Lori Kerr, the tax assessor for Choctaw County, and Choctaw County, Mississippi (collectively, the “County”), contended that Mississippi law mandates a trended historical cost-less-depreciation approach to calculate the true value of industrial personal property. The circuit court found in favor of the County and excluded NRG’s proffered expert testimony. NRG argued the circuit court abused its discretion. In addition, NRG also argued the circuit court erred in denying its motion to change venue because because many of the jurors knew the county officials named as defendants in this case, a fair trial in Choctaw County was impossible. The Supreme Court held the Mississippi Department of Revenue (the “DOR”) regulation controlled and that NRG’s expert applied an unacceptable method to determine true value. Therefore, the circuit court did not err in excluding NRG’s proffered expert testimony. Additionally, because NRG was afforded a fair and impartial jury, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to change venue. View "NRG Wholesale Generation LP v. Kerr" on Justia Law

In a contract dispute between film producer Adam Rosenfelt and the Mississippi Development Authority ("MDA"), Rosenfelt claimed the MDA promised loan guarantees so he could make movies in Mississippi. He made one film, which was not financially successful, and the MDA refused to guarantee the loan for his next project. Rosenfelt claimed the MDA breached a contract with him, personally. The Mississippi Supreme Court concluded Rosenfelt lacked standing to file suit: the actual documents showed any agreement was between the MDA and one or more LLCs, not Rosenfelt personally. Furthermore, the Court determined no error has been shown as to the dismissal of one of those LLCs, Element Studios, LLC, for want of standing. View "Rosenfelt v. Mississippi Development Authority" on Justia Law