Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Roger Jackson appealed his convictions for aggravated assault and felon in possession of a firearm. The jury acquitted Jackson of deliberate-design murder, which was charged in the same indictment. Jackson claimed the trial court erred by: (1) limiting defense counsel’s cross- examination of State’s witnesses; and (2) limiting defense counsel’s closing argument about reasonable doubt. Finding no reversible error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed Jackson’s convictions. View "Jackson v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Mississippi Legislature amended Mississippi Code Section 97-37-7, granting enhanced concealed-carry licensees the privilege of carrying a concealed firearm in Mississippi courthouses, save for courtrooms, which the Legislature left within the province of judges. Litigants, witnesses, and family members who did not have enhanced concealed-carry licenses were subject to the general ban found in Mississippi Code Section 97-37-1 (Rev. 2014), which makes carrying a concealed weapon illegal for persons without enhanced concealed-carry licenses. Nonetheless, the three chancellors of the Fourteenth Chancery District, on their own motion, issued a court order prohibiting enhanced concealed-carry licensees from possessing a firearm in and around courthouse buildings of the Fourteenth District. Thereafter, Ricky Ward, an enhanced concealed-carry licensee, filed a petition to modify or dismiss the order. The chancellors issued another order denying Ward’s petition and reiterated that enhanced concealed-carry licensees would be prohibited from possessing a firearm in all Fourteenth District courthouses. Ward then filed an Extraordinary Writ of Prohibition to the Mississippi Supreme Court, seeking to have the orders vacated as unconstitutional and in direct conflict with state law. The Supreme Court ordered additional briefing, after which concluded the orders were facially unconstitutional. Furthermore, the orders "defy existing Mississippi statutory and caselaw. Accordingly, the orders are vacated. They are nullius juris." View "Ward v. Colom" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review was whether Robert Hammons Jr. properly named fictitious parties in his original complaint so his amended complaint related back to the filing of the original complaint to avoid the statute-of-limitations bar. The Circuit Court ruled that Hammons had failed to comply with the fictitious-party rules and granted summary judgment for the defendants. The Court of Appeals, in an evenly divided decision, affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. Hammons’s amended complaint, fifteen pages longer than his original complaint, added new parties and new claims against those parties. As the amendment was not a substitution under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 9(h), the Supreme Court determined it did not relate back to the time of filing of the original complaint under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(2). Further, the amended complaint was filed outside the statute of limitations, and Hammons’s claim was time-barred. Thus, the Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court and the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "Hammons v. Navarre" on Justia Law

In 2016, the Adjutant General of the Mississippi Military Department (Department) terminated Cindy King’s employment with the Department after conducting an investigation into some of King’s activities. King began working for the Department approximately twenty years ago, and her role was that of a supervisor in the Environmental Office at Camp Shelby. However, in late 2015, an officer was tasked with investigating whether King “utilized information garnered through her position as the Camp Shelby Environmental Officer to front run the Army Compatible Use Buffer Program for personal gain” by purchasing a specific piece of property located near Camp Shelby. King denied the claim against her, but after concluding the investigation, the Adjutant General terminated King’s employment with the Department. Aggrieved, King appealed her termination to the Mississippi Employee Appeals Board (Board); however, the Department challenged the Board’s jurisdiction to hear King’s appeal. The chief hearing officer assigned to King’s appeal agreed with the Department and dismissed King’s appeal. King then appealed for full Board review, and the Board affirmed the chief hearing officer’s determination. Next, King appealed to the Forrest County Circuit Court. The circuit court heard arguments and issued an opinion and judgment affirming the Board. Finally, King filed this appeal. The Mississippi Supreme Court held that, while King may be considered a state service employee as defined by the Legislature, the Adjutant General, by virtue of three statutory provisions, was not subject to review by the Board. View "King v. Mississippi Military Department" on Justia Law

The City of Horn Lake and DeSoto County appealed after the DeSoto County Chancery Court granted Sass Muni-V, LLC’s (Sass Muni’s) motion for summary judgment. The result of the chancery court’s decision voided a 2008 tax sale at which Sass Muni purchased some property in DeSoto County and also refunded Sass Muni the purchase price of $530,508. Due to the clear and unambiguous language of Mississippi Code Section 27-43-3, the chancery clerk’s failure to give proper notice of the tax sale rendered the sale void. Therefore, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. View "City of Horn Lake v. Sass Muni-V, LLC" on Justia Law

Prior to April 2016, a chancellor could, as part of a contested adoption, terminate the parents’ rights, even when the termination issue was pending in youth court as part of a child-abuse proceeding. In April 2016, the adoption and termination-of-parental-rights statutes changed. Now, a chancellor cannot grant an adoption contested by the parents unless the parents’ rights have been terminated under the Mississippi Termination of Parental Rights Law (MTPRL). Under the MTPRL, the Mississippi Legislature carved out an important exception to the chancery court’s jurisdiction over termination proceedings, giving “a county court, when sitting as a youth court with jurisdiction of a child in an abuse or neglect proceeding, original exclusive jurisdiction to hear a petition for termination of parental rights against a parent of that child.” In this contested adoption, the chancellor applied the MTPRL and recognized the youth court had exclusive jurisdiction over the request to terminate parental rights because the youth court already had jurisdiction over the child as part of an abuse proceeding. And unless and until the youth court terminated the parents’ rights, the chancery court could not grant the petition to adopt the child. For this reason, the chancellor dismissed the adoption so the termination could be pursued in youth court. The Mississippi Supreme Court found the chancellor correctly interpreted and applied the controlling law when he dismissed the adoption petition, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "M.A.S. v. Mississippi Department of Human Services" on Justia Law

In May 2017, Derrick Hall was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder. Due to his status as a habitual offender, Hall was sentenced to serve life in prison. Having his posttrial motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) denied by the circuit court, Hall petitioned the Mississippi Supreme Court for relief. Finding no reversible error, the Court affirmed Hall's conviction. View "Hall v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

In the first time this matter came before the Mississippi Supreme Court, the Court agreed with the chancellor that Tanya and Hobson Sanderson’s prenuptial agreement was procedurally conscionable. But the Court disagreed that potential substantive unconscionability was not a consideration. The Court reversed and remanded for the chancellor to weigh Tanya’s claim that the agreement was substantively unconscionable. Tanya had also claimed the chancellor erroneously classified as "Hob’s" separate property several assets that had been commingled with marital property. The Supreme Court agreed with Tanya regarding one asset: the couple’s joint bank account, and reversed the chancellor’s finding that the joint bank-account funds were not commingled. On remand, a different chancellor found the prenuptial agreement was substantively conscionable and thus enforceable. After a detailed "Ferguson" analysis, the chancellor then awarded Tanya $537.42 - the balance of the joint bank account at the time of Tanya and Hob’s final separation. Tanya appealed, arguing: (1) the chancellor failed to recognize the prenuptial agreement was unconscionable because the results of enforcement are unfair; or (2) alternatively, the chancellor erred by not expanding the scope of commingled marital assets to include Hob’s home and investment accounts. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error. View "Sanderson v. Sanderson" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Darius Haynes on two counts: possession of cocaine while in possession of a firearm and possession of a weapon by a felon. Because the evidence was legally sufficient to support the conviction of possession of cocaine, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed Haynes’ conviction for possession and the corresponding sentence. View "Haynes v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

April Horton, the estate administratrix for decedent Emmanuel Erves, appealed a circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of Vicksburg. She argued the court erred in finding that the City was entitled to immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA). Erves lived as a tenant in a ninety-eight-year-old historic home that was converted to a "rooming house" for multiple tenants. On February 24, 2014, Erves tumbled down the home’s exterior concrete stairs and died as a result of the injuries he sustained. Horton, as estate administratrix for Erves' estate, filed a complaint against the rooming house's owner, Malcom and Rose Carson (collectively, Carson) and MM&R Land Investments for their failure to provide a reasonably safe premises, failure to provide adequate security, and failure to warn of a dangerous condition. Horton claimed that the condition and configuration of the stairs where Erves fell, along with the absence of a mandatory handrail, violated the city’s housing code. She argued that, because of these violations, Erves was unable to regain his balance or break his fall, which ultimately resulted in fatal injuries. One year later, Horton amended her complaint to include the City of Vicksburg and City Code Inspector Benjie Thomas as defendants in the action. Claiming that Thomas and the City breached their duty to inspect the property adequately, and that the City individually failed to provide reasonable supervision of Thomas in his duties, Horton argued that both parties should have known that the home’s exterior steps were not up to code, posing an unreasonable risk of harm to the public. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court determined Horton's claims against the City of Vicksburg did not support a private cause of action, therefore it failed to reach the merits of Horton's MTCA-immunity arguments. Finding that Horton cannot establish that the City breached any discernible duty owed to the decedent, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s decision. View "Horton v. City of Vicksburg" on Justia Law