Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries
Pace v. Mississippi
Damion Pace was indicted for one count of burglary, two counts of kidnapping, one count of forcible rape, and one count of extortion. The jury acquitted Pace of forcible rape, but convicted him of one count of extortion, two counts of kidnapping, and one count of robbery, a crime for which Pace had not been indicted. The Circuit Court sentenced him to twenty years for robbery, twenty years for each of the kidnappings, and ten years for extortion, with the sentences to run consecutively. Pace appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred by denying his motion for a directed verdict and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that, because Pace was not indicted for robbery and robbery was not a lesser-included offense of the indicted crime of burglary, the trial court’s entry of a judgment of conviction of robbery was a plain error that required vacation of the robbery conviction and sentence. Therefore, the Court vacated and remanded the robbery conviction and sentence. The Court found no merit to Pace’s other issues. View "Pace v. Mississippi" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
D. W. Caldwell, Inc. v. W.G. Yates & Sons Construction Company
Yates Construction, LLC, and D.W. Caldwell, Inc., entered into a construction subcontract for the roof installation on a residential dormitory at Auburn University in Auburn, Alabama. When Caldwell completed both the repairs and the roof installation, it had yet to receive total payment for the structural repairs. The companies disputed the scope and expense of these repairs and quickly negotiated to an impasse. Thereafter, Caldwell filed a claim against Yates for causing delay and increased costs by failing to pay for work performed, which was in breach of the agreements between the parties. The parties proceeded to arbitration. Although the arbitration record was neither recorded nor transcribed, the parties conceded that the arbitrator considered arguments, reviewed evidence, and heard witness testimony over the course of three days. He then reopened the proceedings for additional documentation, before issuing his thirteen-page award. Within two weeks of the arbitrator’s decision to deny Yates’s motion for reconsideration, Caldwell requested that the circuit court confirm the award under Mississippi Code Section 11-15-125. Yates moved the trial court to alter, amend, or vacate the award under Mississippi Code Section 11-15-25. With the understanding that Yates would provide oral argument on its motion at the award confirmation hearing, Caldwell filed a request to limit the presentation of proof before the circuit court. Ultimately, the trial court reviewed fourteen exhibits and the testimony of one witness in making its decision. Based on this evidence, the court issued its order modifying the arbitrator’s award. Finding that the arbitrator had duplicated the labor costs for shingle installation in its award–once under the original subcontract and once under the oral agreement to repair the structural damage (referred to as the Repair Agreement)–it amended the award, reducing the total by $104,507. After its review, the Mississippi Supreme Court determined: (1) the miscalculations alleged in this matter were not evident from the award itself, nor were they apparent from the agreed-upon record; and (2) the judge erred when he allowed the parties to present witness testimony regarding the extent of any alleged miscalculations, rather than relying on the award and the arbitration record as the relevant law suggested. Finding error, the Court therefore reversed the circuit court’s decision and remanded this case to the circuit court with directions to confirm the arbitration award. Furthermore, because the subcontract between the parties provided that each contractor would be responsible for his own fees and costs, the Court declined to assess costs to one party over the other, and instead, enforced their bargained-for agreement. View "D. W. Caldwell, Inc. v. W.G. Yates & Sons Construction Company" on Justia Law
Rankin County Board of Supervisors v. Lakeland Income Properties, LLC
The Board of Supervisors of Rankin County appealed a circuit court decision granting Lakeland Income Properties’ summary judgment motion and holding that Lakeland Income Properties was properly before the circuit court and was entitled to an ad valorem tax exemption under Mississippi Code Section 61-3-21 for land rented from the Jackson Municipal Airport Authority. The circuit court also granted a refund of the 2015 ad valorem taxes. Lakeland Income Properties filed a cross-appeal, arguing it was entitled to an ad valorem tax refund under Mississippi Code Section 27-73-7 for the 2015 ad valorem taxes and for the prior three years. Under a de novo standard of review, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in holding that the ad valorem tax exemption sought by Lakeland Income Properties was automatic and self-operating under Mississippi Code Section 61-3-21, and thereby, properly before the circuit court under Mississippi Code Section 11-51-77. Further, the Court affirmed the trial court’s holding that Lakeland Income Properties was entitled to a refund of the 2015 taxes. The Court reversed, however, the trial court’s holding that Lakeland Income Properties was not entitled to a refund for the 2012, 2013 and 2014 tax years, holding that Lakeland Income Properties was entitled to the refund under Mississippi Code Section 27-73-7. View "Rankin County Board of Supervisors v. Lakeland Income Properties, LLC" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Tax Law
Marquis v. Mississippi
Willard Marquis was convicted for the sexual battery of a female minor under the age of fourteen. In a pretrial competency hearing, J.D., who was seven at the time, was found to be competent to testify. And a day later, J.D. testified at trial through closed-circuit TV. During the trial, a recording of a forensic interview of J.D. was played before the jury. Also played before the jury was a recording from J.D.’s mother’s cell phone in which J.D. told her mother of the alleged sexual abuse. At the end of the trial, the jury found Marquis guilty. Marquis appealed, arguing: (1) that J.D. was not competent to testify; (2) that the State’s use of a recorded forensic interview of J.D. violated his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him; and (3) that the State’s use of the recorded conversation between J.D. and her mother, along with the recording of the forensic interview, was cumulative evidence which amounted to improper bolstering. Having reviewed the record, the Mississippi Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed Marquis’s conviction. View "Marquis v. Mississippi" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Sanford v. Mississippi
Walter Sanford was convicted for aggravated DUI causing death under Mississippi Code Section 63-11-30(5). Having found no appealable issues, Sanford’s counsel filed a “Lindsey” brief. Sanford argued, pro se, insufficiency of the evidence. Finding the conviction was supported by legally sufficient evidence, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. View "Sanford v. Mississippi" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Lofton v. Mississippi
Jerry Lofton was convicted by jury for murder. He was sentenced as a habitual offender to life without parole. Lofton appealed, claiming he was forced to proceed pro se without knowingly or voluntarily waiving his right to an attorney. The Mississippi Supreme Court found the record was clear Lofton was not left to his own defense as a pro se litigant. Instead, after being warned of the dangers of self-representation, he asked for and received a “hybrid defense.” Lofton made it clear he wished to take the “lead” role in a “co-counsel” arrangement with his court-appointed attorney. And the judge allowed him to proceed in that fashion. Because Lofton “received the best of both worlds—the assistance of counsel while conducting his own defense[,]” he could not now complain that he was wholly pro se or received inadequate warnings. View "Lofton v. Mississippi" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Thompson v. Baptist Memorial Hospital-DeSoto, Inc.
Doretha Thompson appealed a judgment entered in favor of defendants, Baptist Memorial Hospital DeSoto, Inc. (BMH-D), and James Fortune, M.D., in a medical malpractice case. A surgical sponge inadvertently was left inside Thompson’s abdomen during an operation performed by Dr. Fortune to remove Thompson’s gallbladder in 2004. The sponge was not discovered until 2011, when Thompson presented to the emergency room in complaining of stomach pains. Dr. Fortune admitted at trial that the sponge inadvertently had been left in Thompson’s abdomen during the 2004 operation. And he admitted the sponge was the cause of Thompson’s 2011 injury and complications. But Dr. Fortune claimed he did not deviate from the applicable standard of care, which he contended did not require him to count or keep track of the number of surgical sponges used in the operation, but which allowed him to rely on an accurate sponge count conducted by a nurse and scrub technician assisting in the 2004 procedure, both of whom were employed by BMH-D. All parties provided expert testimony in support of their respective cases. The only issue the Mississippi Supreme Court found having merit was Thompson’s claim the jury was not properly instructed on the law in this case. That instructional error constituted reversible error, and Thompson was entitled to a new trial against both defendants. View "Thompson v. Baptist Memorial Hospital-DeSoto, Inc." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Medical Malpractice
Thompson v. Baptist Memorial Hospital-DeSoto, Inc.
Doretha Thompson appealed a judgment entered in favor of defendants, Baptist Memorial Hospital DeSoto, Inc. (BMH-D), and James Fortune, M.D., in a medical malpractice case. A surgical sponge inadvertently was left inside Thompson’s abdomen during an operation performed by Dr. Fortune to remove Thompson’s gallbladder in 2004. The sponge was not discovered until 2011, when Thompson presented to the emergency room in complaining of stomach pains. Dr. Fortune admitted at trial that the sponge inadvertently had been left in Thompson’s abdomen during the 2004 operation. And he admitted the sponge was the cause of Thompson’s 2011 injury and complications. But Dr. Fortune claimed he did not deviate from the applicable standard of care, which he contended did not require him to count or keep track of the number of surgical sponges used in the operation, but which allowed him to rely on an accurate sponge count conducted by a nurse and scrub technician assisting in the 2004 procedure, both of whom were employed by BMH-D. All parties provided expert testimony in support of their respective cases. The only issue the Mississippi Supreme Court found having merit was Thompson’s claim the jury was not properly instructed on the law in this case. That instructional error constituted reversible error, and Thompson was entitled to a new trial against both defendants. View "Thompson v. Baptist Memorial Hospital-DeSoto, Inc." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Medical Malpractice
Beard v. City of Ridgeland
Shortly after the adoption of its comprehensive zoning ordinance and map in 2014, in June 2015, the City of Ridgeland (“the City”) adopted an amendment creating as a permitted use in general commercial (“C-2”) districts a Large Master Planned Commercial Development (“LMPCD”). The amendment allowed uses previously prohibited in C-2 districts and created an opportunity for the potential location of a Costco Wholesale (“Costco”). Appellants were residents of the City who lived in nearby neighborhoods; they appealed the City’s decision, arguing that the amendments constituted illegal rezoning and/or spot zoning. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that because the City amended its zoning ordinance shortly after adopting a new comprehensive zoning ordinance and map in order to accommodate Costco, substantially changing the uses previously allowed in a C-2 district without showing a substantial change in neighborhood character, the amendments constituted an illegal rezoning. In addition, because the amendments were entirely designed to suit Costco, the amendments constituted illegal spot-zoning as well. Accordingly, the circuit court erred in finding that the Costco amendments were not arbitrary and capricious. View "Beard v. City of Ridgeland" on Justia Law
Moore v. Mississippi
A jury convicted Everett Moore of second-degree murder for the 2015 shooting and killing Norris Smith. The Circuit Court sentenced Moore to thirty years’ imprisonment. A majority of the Mississippi Supreme Court determined the trial court erred by denying Moore the circumstantial evidence jury instruction to which he was entitled. Thus, it reversed his conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Moore v. Mississippi" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law