Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2005, Joey Chandler was convicted for the murder of his cousin Emmitt Chandler and sentenced to life in prison under Mississippi Code Section 97-3-21 (2005). His conviction and sentence was affirmed on appeal. In 2015, Chandler received a new sentencing hearing for his murder conviction in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). Following the hearing, the circuit court sentenced Chandler to life in prison. Chandler appealed, requesting that he be resentenced because the trial court failed to analyze all the factors identified in Miller and adopted in the Mississippi Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Parker v. Mississippi, 119 So. 3d 987 (Miss. 2013). The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed, finding the trial court did not automatically resentence Chandler to life in prison or perceive a legislative mandate that Chandler must be sentenced to life in prison without parole in violation of Miller. As required by Miller and the subsequent decision in Parker, the trial court held a hearing and, after considering all that was presented as well as the entire court file, sentenced Chandler to life in prison. The trial court took into account the characteristics and circumstances unique to juveniles. Although the trial court had the authority to sentence Chandler to life in prison with the possibility of parole, it chose to sentence Chandler to life in prison, which was also within its authority. Because the trial court satisfied its obligation under Miller and Parker, the Supreme Court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Chandler to life in prison. View "Chandler v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Craig Sallie was charged with one count of aggravated assault for shooting Gregory Johnson in the back and one count of possession of a weapon by a convicted felon. A jury found Sallie guilty of both counts, and the circuit court sentenced him to twenty years and ten years, respectively, with sentences to run concurrently in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC). The circuit court also sentenced Sallie to an additional ten years pursuant to the firearm-enhancement statute under Mississippi Code Section 97-37-37 (Rev. 2014), with that sentence to run consecutively to the other sentences, for a total sentence of thirty years in the MDOC. The Court of Appeals affirmed. On writ of certiorari, a majority of the Mississippi Supreme Court found “Sallie was not given adequate pretrial notice that an enhanced punishment would be sought until after his conviction,” which violated his right to due process. The majority affirmed Sallie’s convictions for aggravated assault and felon in possession of a firearm but vacated Sallie’s sentence and remanded the case to the circuit court for resentencing. On remand, the circuit court restructured Sallie’s remaining sentences to run consecutively instead of concurrently, resulting in a thirty-year sentence without the enhanced penalty portion prescribed by Section 97-37-37. Finding no error, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Sallie petitions the Mississippi Supreme Court again, for review of whether the trial court’s decision to change the sentences to run [consecutively] on Count I and Count II was error because the Court of Appeals affirmed those convictions and sentences and the Mississippi Supreme Court remanded only the sentence pursuant to [Section 97-37-37]. Following the Supreme Court’s order of remand for resentencing, the circuit judge stated for the record that when he imposed Sallie’s original sentence, he thought Sallie “was going to have another 10-year sentence that would [run] consecutively” to the two sentences running concurrently, effectively giving Sallie a thirty-year sentence in the custody of the MDOC. The circuit judge then restructured Sallie’s sentence to implement his original intention. As the Court of Appeals held, the circuit court had authority to do so, and therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Sallie v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

The central issue at issue in this case involved a dispute between a mother and son, Carolyn Ware (“Carolyn”) and Richard Ware (“Richard”), regarding the distribution of shares of stock of three closely held corporations. The shares were being held by the estate of the deceased husband/father, Frankie Don Ware (“Frankie”). Frankie’s will directed that the shares be distributed to a testamentary trust. The bylaws of the corporations (in which Frankie, Carolyn, and Richard were the sole shareholders) required any outstanding shares of stock be offered to the corporations prior to any transfer. Carolyn, the executrix, filed a petition to close Frankie’s estate and to distribute Frankie’s assets (including the shares) to the trust. Richard filed an objection to the closing of the estate, asserting the corporate bylaws of the three corporations. Carolyn responded, arguing that Richard lacked standing to object. The chancellor found for Richard and required Carolyn to offer the shares back to each corporation prior to transferring the shares to the trust. Carolyn subsequently appealed. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court found Richard lacked standing to object to the closing of Frankie’s estate because the injury for which he sought relief pertained to the corporations only. Therefore, the trial court's judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Matter of the Estate of Frankie Don Ware" on Justia Law

Casey Woods was indicted on one count of first degree murder, stemming from the shooting of his girlfriend’s estranged husband. Woods also was indicted on one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The counts were severed and the case proceeded to trial solely on the murder charge. A jury found Woods guilty of second degree murder, for which Woods was sentenced as a habitual offender under Mississippi Code Section 99-19-83 to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Woods’s trial counsel did not file any post-trial motions. Woods appealed, arguing: (1) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to overcome the presumption afforded by the Castle Doctrine that he acted reasonably when he killed Pierre Tenner; and (2) he received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. Woods waived his insufficient evidence argument; however, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to Woods’s trial counsel’s failure to file a post trial motion for a new trial challenging the weight of the evidence. View "Woods v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Ralph Smith sued the Attorney General of Mississippi, Jim Hood, raising various causes of action, each of which was premised on Smith’s purely legal argument that the Office of the Attorney General was in the judicial branch of the state government. The circuit court disagreed with Smith and found that, as a matter of law, the Office of Attorney General was in the executive branch, and so, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Hood. Smith appealed. The Mississippi Supreme Court found that the Office of Attorney General was a member of the executive branch of government, as delineated in the Mississippi Constitution, Article 6. View "Smith v. Hood" on Justia Law

Biel REO, LLC (“Biel REO”), filed a breach of contract and guaranty action. Note 1 was secured by property in Okaloosa County, Florida. While the Mississippi case remained pending, Biel REO foreclosed on the Florida collateral and obtained a deficiency judgment against Lee Freyer Kennedy Crestview, LLC (“LFK Crestview”). Biel REO appealed a circuit court finding that because Biel REO had obtained a judgment pursuant to Note 1 in Florida solely against LFK Crestview and because Biel REO’s pleadings requested relief based on Note 1 itself, Note 1 no longer existed. Thus, the Continuing Guaranty signed by Lee Freyer Kennedy (“Kennedy”) individually had nothing left to guarantee as to Note 1. Therefore, Kennedy was not personally liable on any obligations relating to Note 1. The Kennedy Defendants cross-appealed the circuit court finding that LFK Crestview was liable under Note 2 and that the Guaranty Agreement unambiguously encompassed Note 2. The Kennedy Defendants also appealed the trial court’s decision to award Biel REO attorneys’ fees and pre- and post-judgment interest in the amount of Note 2’s stated default rate of eighteen percent. With respect to Note 1, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that the Florida judgments were sufficient evidence of an obligation of LFK Crestview to Biel REO, and the trial court erred in its determination that Biel REO was required to amend its pleadings to include the Florida judgments. With respect to Note 2, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's finding that the Kennedy Defendants failed to submit sufficient evidence to prove the assignments were not effective. In addition, the Supreme Court held the trial court correctly found Kennedy to be personally liable for the indebtedness of LFK Crestview pursuant to Note 2. Lastly, the trial court’s award of pre- and post-judgment interest and its award of attorneys’ fees was affirmed. View "Biel Reo, LLC v. Lee Freyer Kennedy Crestview, LLC" on Justia Law

In 1996, the City of Gulfport filed an eminent domain complaint against Dedeaux Utility Company. Gulfport did not take physical control of the utility until December 20, 2004, after a jury awarded Dedeaux $3,634,757. Dedeaux appealed that verdict and Gulfport cross-appealed. In the first in a series of cases between these parties, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, and the second jury awarded Dedeaux $5,131,676 for the taking. Dedeaux again appealed, and Gulfport again cross-appealed. The Supreme Court again reversed and remanded in “Dedeaux II,” and the case was tried a third time, resulting in a jury verdict in favor of Dedeaux totaling $8,063,981. The jury found that the fair market value of Dedeaux as of December 3, 1996, when the complaint was filed, was $7,082,778. It found that the fair market value of tangible assets added to Dedeaux from December 3, 1996, to December 20, 2004, when Gulfport took physical control, was $981,203. Based on payments already made by Gulfport to Dedeaux, the trial court found that Gulfport owed Dedeaux $1,951,102 plus interest on the amount of $7,082,778, and that it owed Dedeaux $728,117 plus interest on the amount of $981,203. Gulfport appealed, and the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court on all issues except interest: the trial court had determined that Mississippi Code Section 75-17-1 applied and mandated that it award eight-percent interest. The Supreme Court determined that Mississippi Code Section 75-17-7 applied, which charged the trial court to set an interest rate. The Court then remanded “for the limited purpose of determining a reasonable rate of interest and issuing an order for payment of that interest.” In the fourth appeal, the only issue was whether the interest rate on the judgment was appropriate. Because the trial court failed to follow the Mississippi Supreme Court’s mandate to set an interest rate, it reversed and remanded for entry of judgment consistent with the evidence presented. View "City of Gulfport v. Dedeaux Utility Company, Inc." on Justia Law

In August 2014, Dianne and Reggie Harkins alleged the direct and proximate negligence of multiple healthcare providers located in Leake County and Hinds County resulted in, among other problems, the amputation of Dianne Harkins’s hands and feet. In January 2015, Madden Medical Clinic, PLLC (Madden Medical) and David Moody, M.D. (Dr. Moody) filed a motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for severance and transfer of venue to the Circuit Court of Leake County. Shortly thereafter, Baptist Medical Center-Leake, Inc. (BMC-Leake) and Mississippi Baptist Health Systems, Inc. (Baptist Health) filed a motion also to dismiss or transfer venue to the Circuit Court of Leake County. On February 26, 2016, the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County entered an order denying the motions of Dr. Moody, Madden Medical, BMC-Leake, and Baptist Health to dismiss or, in the alternative, to transfer venue. The parties appealed, collectively filing two interlocutory appeals, and both appeals were granted and consolidated. The Mississippi Supreme Court held that under the plain language of Mississippi Code Section 11-11-3(3), venue was proper for the properly joined defendants in Hinds County or Leake County, and the judgment of the trial court was affirmed. View "Mississippi Baptist Health Systems, Inc. v. Harkins" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals issued an opinion affirming a circuit court’s denial of Illinois Central Railroad’s request for a setoff of a jury verdict awarded to Bennie Oakes through his representative Clara Hagan. As described by Illinois Central, who as appellant framed the issues for appeal, “This case is about whether, once those damages are assessed by a jury, a railroad company under the [Federal Employers’ Liability Act] is entitled to a credit or reduction of that verdict for sums that have already been paid by others to the Plaintiff for the same injuries and damages.” In Illinois Central’s answer, it raised an affirmative defense that it was entitled to apportionment or set off liability and/or damages for any negligence of or damages caused by third parties. However, Illinois Central later clarified its position that it was not attempting to have negligence apportioned, and the circuit court echoed the clarification by stating that Illinois Central had not “tried to use a third, an empty chair for any other defendants.” The Mississippi Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals misconstrued the primary case it relied upon and ignored other federal precedent; therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment and the circuit court’s denial of Illinois Central’s motion for a setoff. View "Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Oakes" on Justia Law

Patrick Ridgeway sought an irreconcilable differences divorce from Louise Ridgeway (now Hooker). The parties entered into a written agreement, which the Chancery Court approved and memorialized in its Final Judgment of Divorce – Irreconcilable Differences. But after Hooker had filed a Petition for Citation of Contempt against Ridgeway approximately two years later, Ridgeway filed a Motion for Relief from Final Judgment of Divorce pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4), arguing that the judgment was void because the Chancery Court had lacked subject-matter and personal jurisdiction. The court found that it had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties and denied Ridgeway’s Rule 60(b)(4) motion. Ridgeway appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ridgeway v. Ridgeway Hooker" on Justia Law