Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A property owner defaulted on his obligations, and the construction lender foreclosed the property at issue in this appeal. The general contractor had a materialman’s lien on the property. At the foreclosure sale, the purchase price for the property was significantly lower than the total amounts owed. The sole issue before the chancery court was which lien had priority – that of the construction lender, or that of the contractor. The chancery court found that the contractor’s lien had priority. Because the chancery court did not abuse its discretion in arriving at that conclusion, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. View "Whitney Bank v. Triangle Construction Company, Inc." on Justia Law

An interlocutory appeal arose from a 2010 civil suit filed by Carol Clement against Russell Puckett. After Puckett’s death in 2014, Clement substituted the Estate of Russell Puckett (the “Estate”) as the defendant in the suit and served the Estate. The Estate moved to dismiss the suit due to failure to timely serve process under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h). The Estate argued that the statute of limitations had expired before Clement perfected service. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The Estate appealed, arguing the trial court erred in denying the motion to dismiss because: (1) Clement failed to show good cause for failing to serve Puckett within the statute of limitations; and (2) it did not waive its statute-of-limitations defense. Clement argued the trial court properly denied the motion to dismiss since she demonstrated good cause and the Estate waived its defense of the statute of limitations. Assuming all of Clement’s extensions of time were proper and tolled the statute of limitations, the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded she still failed to perfect service before the expiration of the statute of limitations, and her suit was thus barred. The statute of limitations began running in this case on September 11, 2009. On June 11, 2010, Clement filed the complaint and tolled the statutes with ninety-three days remaining. The statute began running again in the interim periods between the third and fourth extensions of time and the fourth and fifth extensions of time. After the fifth extension expired on February 28, 2012, the statute of limitations resumed running and expired on March 16, 2012. Clement did not serve process on Puckett or the Estate until August 25, 2014. Therefore, Clement’s suit was barred by the statute of limitations, and the trial court erred in denying the Estate’s motion to dismiss. View "Estate of Russell Puckett v. Clement" on Justia Law

In 2014, Douglas Michael Long Jr. filed suit against Pennsylvania resident David Vitkauskas for alienation of affections. Vitkauskas entered a special appearance and then filed a motion to dismiss for, inter alia, insufficient service of process under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 4(c)(5). The trial court granted Vitkauskas’s motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficient service of process, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed, finding the trial court and Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Long’s service of process on Vitkauskas was insufficient. Under Rule 4(c)(5), a rebuttable presumption arises that a signed return receipt is valid when delivery is restricted. The presumption can be rebutted, but only if the defendant objects thereto and submits an offer of proof to the contrary. Vitkauskas never argued that “Mary” (the name provided on the return receipt) was not his authorized agent, nor did he state that he failed to receive process. Additionally, the record contained no offer of proof by Vitkauskas to contest either point. Had he done so, the burden then would have shifted to Long to prove “Mary” was an authorized agent of Vitkauskas. However, without an appropriate objection and offer of proof, Vitkauskas’s “due-process argument [was] without substantive merit.” View "Long v. Vitkauskas" on Justia Law

Paula Hathorn appealed a circuit court judgment granting summary judgment in favor of the Louisville Utilities Commission (Commission). Hathorn sued the Commission along with the City of Louisville and the O’Reilly Auto Parts store for injuries she claimed resulted from a fall that occurred after she stepped into a sunken utility box set into a sidewalk in front of O’Reilly’s Auto Parts. Hathorn dismissed O’Reilly Auto Parts and the City from the suit after entering into a settlement agreement with each separately. The Commission thereafter moved for summary judgment, which was granted based on the court’s findings that: (1) the Commission was a subsidiary of the City, and according to the settlement agreement, Hathorn had released all claims against the City and its subsidiaries; (2) the Commission was immune from liability in this instance under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA) because it did not have a ministerial duty to maintain the water meter at a level even with the ground; and (3) Hathorn could not maintain a premises liability claim against the Commission because the City owned the Commission’s assets including its water meter boxes. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that Hathorn released her claim against the Commission when she entered into a settlement agreement with the City. Therefore, the Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Commission. This issue being dispositive, the Court limited its decision in this case to that assignment of error. View "Hathorn v. Louisville Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

The City of Meridian filed a petition for forfeiture against Maria Catalan after police found $104,690 in her truck during a traffic stop. Catalan filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, which the county court granted. The Circuit Court affirmed. The City appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. Having granted certiorari, the Mississippi Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals’ dissent that the City’s forfeiture petition satisfied the notice pleading requirements of Rule 8 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court also agreed with the Court of Appeals’ dissent that in deciding the Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the county court considered matters outside the City’s petition: the court also considered matters outside the pleadings for purposes of Rule 12(c), which allowed for a judgment on the pleadings. In doing so, the county court in effect converted the Rule 12(b)(6) and/or 12(c) motion into a motion for summary judgment, as provided in Rule 56 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 56(c) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure requires at least ten days’ notice to both parties that the court is converting the motion, which did not occur in this instance. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals as well as the county court’s order, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "City of Meridian v. $104,960.00 U.S. Currency et al." on Justia Law

After probation was revoked and he was sentenced to serve the full five years of his suspended sentence, Demario Walker filed a motion for post-conviction relief (PCR). The circuit court dismissed Walker’s petition, and Walker appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part the judgment of the circuit court. The Mississippi Supreme Court granted certiorari review and held that the Court of Appeals did not err in finding: (1) the circuit court had jurisdiction and authority to revoke Walker’s probation; (2) Walker was afforded due process at his revocation hearing; and (3) revocation of Walker’s probation was proper. However, the Court of Appeals did err in finding that the circuit court’s sentencing Walker to serve the full, five-year term of his suspended sentence was improper. Therefore, in affirming in part and reversing in part, the Supreme Court reinstated and affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. View "Walker v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Brandy Williams was convicted by jury of the capital murder of Sheriff Garry Welford. He was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. On appeal, Williams argued the trial court erred by not quashing her indictment, improperly instructing the jury and admitting evidence of her prior crimes. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. View "Williams v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Joseph Patrick Brown was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in 1994, and his conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Mississippi Supreme Court in 1996. Brown notified the Supreme Court of his intent to file a successive petition for post-conviction relief. Included in that notice was a motion requesting the Court to direct the Circuit Court of Adams County to assume jurisdiction over “discovery matters relevant to Mr. Brown’s successive post-conviction claims.” The Supreme Court unanimously denied that motion on December 17, 2015, finding that “there has been no minimal showing of any need for pre-petition discovery.” Brown’s Motion for Leave to Invoke Discovery and Seek Access Orders in the Circuit Court was thus denied. “The only thing differentiating this motion from the previous request is that Brown now presents [the Supreme] Court with several discovery ‘needs.’ Aside from references to a claim of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel, Brown’s motion does not identify with any particularity the issues that he plans to raise in his successive petition. Instead, he claims that so-called ‘pre-petition discovery’ is necessary for him to ‘file a meaningful and constitutionally adequate motion for leave to proceed in the trial court with a petition for post-conviction relief.’” View "Brown v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

A homeowner appealed an award of attorney fees associated with a complaint filed against him for injunctive relief to enforce a neighborhood’s restrictive covenants. The Deer Haven Owners Association filed a Complaint for Mandatory Injunction and Other Relief against Arlin George Hatfield III, claiming he had violated the subdivision’s restrictive covenants by erecting pens for various fowl without the covenants’ required prior approval, and that Hatfield’s fowl had violated the covenants’ prohibition against noxious or offensive activities by roaming around the subdivision and making loud noises. The Association sought an injunction ordering Hatfield to comply with the covenants and an award of attorney fees. According to the chancellor, the original complaint sought to have the fowl and pens removed for violations of the covenants, and the Association prevailed on that argument, therefore, fees were warranted for the Association. Hatfield appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hatfield v. Deer Haven Homeowners Association, Inc." on Justia Law

In an effort to increase chances of conception, Lacy Dodd underwent surgery to remove ovarian cysts and, potentially, one fallopian tube. During the surgery, Lacy’s physician, Dr. Randall Hines, discovered that both of Lacy’s ovaries appeared abnormal to the extent that they seemed cancerous. Dr. Hines consulted, intraoperatively, with his colleague, Dr. Paul Seago. Dr. Seago concluded that both ovaries lacked any appreciable amount of normal tissue and were highly suspicious for malignancy; he recommended that it was in Lacy’s best interest to remove both ovaries. Dr. Hines agreed and removed both ovaries. A biopsy later revealed that Lacy’s ovaries were not cancerous. Lacy and her husband, Charles Dodd, filed a pro se complaint against Dr. Hines, Dr. Seago, and Mississippi Reproductive Medicine, PLLC, claiming that her ovaries were removed without consent. Lacy also alleged defendants were negligent in failing to obtain informed consent from the patient and/or her family to proceed with the procedure, failing to test tissues and analyze the results; and misdiagnosing Lacy’s condition as malignant. The trial court found that Lacy had consented to the removal of her ovaries based on a consent form executed by Lacy prior to the surgery and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Despite the sole issue of consent before the trial court, it entered a final judgment with respect to all of Lacy’s claims alleged in her complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals determined that Lacy’s claim was “battery-based” and held that Lacy did not give express consent for the removal of her ovaries and the consent form did not summarily provide consent to remove her ovaries. The Mississippi Supreme Court agreed with the result reached by the Court of Appeals, holding that there is a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment as to whether Lacy consented to the removal of her ovaries in accordance with the Court’s decisions in Cole v. Wiggins, 487 So. 2d 203 (Miss. 1986), and Fox v. Smith, 594 So. 2d 596 (Miss. 1992). The trial court’s judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings for reasons different than those of the Court of Appeals. View "Dodd v. Hines" on Justia Law